

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

## **THESIS**

EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF A MODEL OF TEAM COLLABORATION USING SELECTED TRANSCRIPTS FROM SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

by

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June 2009

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# EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF A MODEL OF TEAM COLLABORATION USING SELECTED TRANSCRIPTS FROM SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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#### **ABSTRACT**

The extraordinary events that occurred on the morning of September 11, 2001, left Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic controllers in New York, Boston, Washington, and Cleveland and their colleagues at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), without precedent as to how to respond to the hijacking of four American commercial airliners. Despite the chaos and confusion, the two agencies put forth a joint effort in order to decide when and how to scramble fighter aircraft to escort the airliners. The collaboration that occurred between the agencies was recorded in radio transcripts between NORAD and FAA air traffic controllers. The goal of this thesis is to utilize the September 11, 2001, NORAD/FAA channel three transcripts to offer a real-world example of how a team works together on a one-of-a-kind problem. Further, transcript of recorded audio were coded and analyzed in an effort to empirically validate the Office of Naval Research model of team collaboration. The model focuses on individual and team cognitive processes used during team or agency collaboration with the goal of understanding how individuals and teams work together in order to reach a decision.

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#### I. INTRODUCTION

#### A. **SEPTEMBER 11, 2001**

The following is a chronological list of events that occurred on Tuesday, September 11, 2001. It is merely a loose timeline, compiled from several sources, including the Cable News Network (CNN). It is neither official, nor all-inclusive. However, it illustrates the immediate impact of that day's tragic events and the complexity faced by the collaborating government and civilian organizations.

#### 1. Chronology of Events

- 0759 American Airlines flight 11 departs Boston, MA, for Los Angeles, CA.
- 0814 United Airlines flight 175 departs Boston, MA, for Los Angeles, CA.
- 0820 American Airlines flight 77 departs Washington Dulles International Airport for Los Angeles, CA.
- 0825 Boston Center is made aware of a hijacking.
- 0837 Boston Center notifies NEADS of a hijacked aircraft.
- 0842 United Airlines flight 93 departs Newark, NJ, for San Francisco, CA.
- NORAD orders a fighter aircraft launch to escort a hijacked aircraft in New York City (Bronner, 2006).
- 0845 A hijacked passenger jet, American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767, flying from Boston to Los Angeles, crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC), tearing a hole in the building and setting it on fire.
- 0903 A second hijacked airplane from Boston, United Airlines Flight 175, crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) and explodes. Now, both buildings are on fire.
- 0917 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shuts down all New York City airports.

- O921 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey closes all bridges and tunnels in the New York area.
- 0930 President Bush, speaking in Sarasota, Florida, declares the country has suffered an "apparent terrorist attack."
- 0940 The FAA halts all flight operations at all United States (U.S.) airports, for the first time in U.S. history.
- 0943 American Airlines Flight 77, a Boeing 757, flying from Washington's Dulles International Airport to Los Angeles, crashes into the Pentagon. Evacuation begins immediately.
- 0945 The White House is evacuated.
- 1005 The south tower of the WTC collapses.
- 1010 A portion of the Pentagon collapses. Additionally, United Airlines Flight 93, another hijacked airplane, crashes in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, southeast of Pittsburgh.
- 1013 The United Nations (UN) building evacuates.
- 1022 In Washington D.C., the State and Justice Departments are evacuated, as well as the World Bank.
- 1024 The FAA begins diverting all inbound transatlantic aircraft flying into the U.S. to Canada.
- 1028 The WTC's north tower collapses from the top down.
- 1045 All federal office buildings in Washington, D.C. are evacuated.
- 1053 New York's primary elections, scheduled for Tuesday, are postponed.
- 1057 New York Gov. George Pataki closes all state government offices.
- 1102 New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani urges all New Yorkers to stay at home and orders an evacuation of the area south of Canal Street.
- 1116 CNN reports that the Center for Disease Control and Prevention is preparing precautionary emergency-response teams.

- 1126 United Airlines confirms that United Flight 93, from Newark to San Francisco, has crashed in Pennsylvania. The airline also claims it is "deeply concerned" about Flight 175.
- 1159 United Airlines confirms that Flight 175, from Boston to Los Angeles, has crashed into the WTC's south tower.
- 1204 Los Angeles International Airport, the destination of three of the crashed airplanes, is evacuated.
- 1215 San Francisco International Airport, the destination of United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania, is evacuated.
- 1215 The Immigration and Naturalization Service says U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico are on the highest state of alert, but not closed.
- 1230 The FAA reports that 50 flights are in U.S. airspace, but none are reporting any problems.
- Bush, speaking from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, says that all appropriate security measures are being taken, including placing the U.S. military on high alert worldwide. He asks for prayers for those killed or wounded in the attacks and says, "Make no mistake, the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts."
- 1327 The city of Washington, D.C. declares a state of emergency.
- 1344 The Pentagon says five warships and two aircraft carriers will leave the U.S. Naval Station in Norfolk, Virginia, to protect the East Coast from further attacks, also reducing the number of military vessels in port. The two carriers, USS George Washington and USS John F. Kennedy, will head for the New York coast. The other ships that will head to sea are frigates and guided missile destroyers, capable of shooting down aircraft.
- 1400 Senior FBI officials tell CNN they assume that the four crashed airplanes were hijacked as part of a coordinated terrorist attack.
- 1430 The FAA announces there will be no U.S. commercial air traffic until 1200 EDT Wednesday.
- 1449 At a news conference, Mayor Giuliani announces the partial restoration of subway and bus services in New York City.

- 1555 A White House counselor says the President is at an undisclosed location, later revealed to be Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, and is conducting a National Security Council meeting by phone. Additionally, Mayor Giuliani now says the number of critically injured in New York City is up to 200 with 2,100 total injuries reported.
- 1600 CNN reports that U.S. officials say there are "good indications" that Saudi militant Osama bin Laden, suspected of coordinating the bombings of two U.S. embassies in 1998, is involved in the attacks.
- 1606 California Governor Gray Davis dispatches urban search-and-rescue teams to New York.
- 1610 Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex is reported on fire.
- 1625 The American Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) say they will remain closed Wednesday.
- 1715 CNN reports that fires are still burning in part of the Pentagon. No death figures have been released yet.
- 1720 The 47-story Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex, which was damaged and evacuated when the twin towers across the street collapsed earlier in the day, collapses. Other nearby buildings remain on fire.
- 1730 CNN reports that U.S. officials say the plane that crashed in Pennsylvania could have been headed for one of three possible targets: Camp David, the White House or the U.S. Capitol building.
- 1800 Explosions are heard in Kabul, Afghanistan, hours after terrorist attacks targeted financial and military centers in the United States. Afghanistan is believed to be where bin Laden, who U.S. officials say is possibly behind Tuesday's deadly attacks, is located. U.S. officials say later that the United States had no involvement in the incident whatsoever. The attack is credited to the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban group fighting in the country's ongoing civil war.
- 1840 U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, holds a news conference in the Pentagon, stating that the building is still operational.
- 1902 CNN reports the Marriott Hotel near the WTC is on the verge of collapse and says some New York bridges are now open to outbound traffic.

- 1945 The New York Police Department claims that at least 78 officers are missing, and that as many as half of the first 400 firefighters on the scene were killed.
- 2030 President Bush addresses the nation, saying "thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve." The President says the U.S. government will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed the acts and those who harbor them. He adds that government offices in Washington are reopening for essential personnel Tuesday night and for all workers Wednesday.
- 2122 CNN reports the fire at the Pentagon is still burning and is considered contained but not under control.
- 2157 Mayor Giuliani says New York City schools will be closed Wednesday and no more volunteers are needed for Tuesday evening's rescue efforts. He says there is hope that there are still people alive in rubble. He also says that power is out on the west side of Manhattan and that health department tests show there are no airborne chemical agents about which to worry.
- 2249 CNN reports that Attorney General Ashcroft told members of Congress that there were three to five hijackers on each plane armed only with knives.

#### 2. National Defense Response

On September 11, 2001, the defense of U.S. air space depended on close interaction between two federal agencies: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), the regional headquarters for the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD is a joint U.S. and Canadian organization that employs a network of space-based, aerial-and ground-based sensors, refueling capabilities and fighter aircraft to detect and deter any airborne threats to North America. NEADS is the regional headquarters for NORAD located at Griffiss Air Force Base in Rome, New York. It is responsible for protecting one of three NORAD regions, which covers half of a million square miles of North American airspace over the U.S. and Canada. NEADS was the key command and control (C2) center for the U.S. military response during the terrorist attacks.

Despite the fact that no specific protocols existed concerning suicide hijackers who used commercial planes as weapons of mass destruction, the civilian and military personnel at the FAA and NEADS attempted to rapidly improvise an effective home-land defense against an unprecedented attack. The conduct of NEADS personnel that day is commendable. Individual FAA controllers and command center managers proactively sought as much information and intelligence as they could process, and made seemingly sound decisions. The standard response to an aircraft hijacking is to launch fighter aircraft from the nearest military installation to follow the aircraft in order to observe and take the appropriate action when necessary (Bronner, 2006).

However, poor communication between more senior levels of the chain of command rendered this standard response, as well as the collective national response, ineffective (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Since the President, Secretary of Defense, and other senior military and FAA officials were not communicating effectively with each other, Air National Guard units with differing rules of engagement and standard operating procedures were launched without NORAD's consent or knowledge. Then, once airborne, they received conflicting instructions. Further illustrating this confusion is the fact that the order to shoot down the final hijacked airplane, United Flight 93, was not relayed to NEADS until almost thirty minutes after the plane crashed in Pennsylvania (Bronner, 2006).

Ultimately, the FAA realized it had lost situational awareness and control of U.S. air space, and ordered the grounding of all civilian aircraft. This decision unfortunately came after the hijackers intentionally crashed all four hijacked airplanes. It is NEADS standard procedure to record all internal and external radio communications on multichannel tape recorders. This thesis analyzes a transcript of one of those channels, focusing on the team collaboration and cognitive processes that occurred between the different government agencies that day.

#### 3. Emergency Response

The emergency response to the casualties suffered on September 11, 2001, not unlike the national defense response, had to be improvised. The Fire Department of New

York, the New York Police Department, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, as well as the employees and occupants of the affected buildings coordinated their efforts to the best of their ability. They were able to minimize the effects of surprising and destructive events, the brunt of which spanned a period of roughly 100 minutes (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).

Almost all personnel casualties occurred at or above the point where the hijacked airplanes impacted the buildings. Most immediate responders, who intentionally remained on scene in order to try to save as many lives as possible, were lost. Despite the lack of disaster preparation, absence of a unified incident command, and inadequate interagency communications, the responding agencies were able to save the lives of all but approximately one hundred of the thousands of civilians working below the impact zone (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). Additionally, the Pentagon handled their emergency response far more effectively than they handled the national defense response. The unaffected parts of the building were never shut down and continued to attempt to provide C2 to the larger response effort.

#### B. THESIS GOALS

The primary goal of this thesis is to empirically evaluate the model of team collaboration, developed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored Collaboration and Knowledge Integration (CKI) Program, using the September 11, 2001, NEADS/FAA channel 3 transcripts. A secondary goal is to apply the model to real-world team collaboration domains. The model of team collaboration focuses on how individuals use cognitive processes to develop information and knowledge to make an informed decision. For this research, we applied the macro-cognitive process definitions to the team communications in the transcripts, to determine whether these definitions accurately represent how teams collaborate to make real world decisions, or if the model is more suitable for analyzing controlled, laboratory situations. Additionally, this thesis provides suggestions for enhancements and additions to the existing list of definitions.

The audio from one of the primary communications channels used by the mission control commander (MCC), channel three MCC Operations (channel 3), was professionally transcribed. The resulting transcript provides a realistic example of an inter-agency collaborative team's response to a real-world emergency. Each speech turn in the transcript was coded, in whole or in part, by each coder using definitions included in the model of team collaboration. Several definitions were clearly designed for use in controlled, laboratory experimental environments, and were not applicable to this, or any, real-world scenario. However, this is not evidence that these definitions should be excluded from the model. Additional codes were included to represent additional team communications that occur in real-world task domains.

#### C. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Previous research was conducted with a similar goal of validating the initial structural model of team collaboration, including a thesis by Ensign Maura Garrity, 2007; a thesis by Lieutenant Luis Socias, 2008; a thesis by Lieutenant Commander Catherine Donaldson and Lieutenant David Johnson, 2008; and multiple studies by Hutchins and Kendall from a series of both field and laboratory experiments in which teams collaborated during air warfare and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) scenarios (Garrity, 2007), (Socias, 2008), (Donaldson and Johnson, 2008), (Hutchins and Kendall, 2008).

Garrity applied the definitions of the macrocognitive processes included in the initial version of the model of team collaboration to analyze the Fire Department of New York's (FDNY) response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, offering suggestions for improving both the performance of the FDNY and the model (Garrity, 2007). The Socias thesis focused on audio channel 4 from the NEADS response to the hijackings on September, 11 (Socias, 2008), while Donaldson and Johnson focused on audio channel 2. Their research was also aimed toward validating the structural model of team collaboration; however they used a second version of the model (Donaldson and Johnson, 2008). Their individual research efforts, like ours, are autonomous. However, pairing them with this thesis and potential future analysis of all the audio channels should create

a comprehensive account of the inter-agency team collaboration that occurred on September 11, 2001, between the military and civilian individuals and organizations.

MIOs are U.S. Navy-conducted operations that delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces or supplies en route to the battle area before they are in a position to harm friendly forces. During MIOs, suspicious vessels are often boarded by a trained military team to ensure compliance with embargos and other maritime laws. Hutchins and Kendall employed the structural model of team collaboration to analyze transcripts from a series of simulated MIOs and communications from air warfare teams on two U.S. warships, equipped with the Aegis fire control system, to observe how teams collaborated in unique, complex situations (Hutchins and Kendall, 2008), (Hutchins, Kendall, and Bordetsky, 2008).

#### II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND

#### A. THE FAA AND ITS COLLABORATION WITH NORAD

The airspace of the continental U.S. is monitored and protected by two main entities: the FAA, who is charged with navigating and controlling air traffic, and NORAD, who is charged with protecting the North American continent against air attack. In discharging its responsibilities, NORAD utilizes the airspace that is monitored by the FAA and must conduct their operations according to FAA regulations and with their active participation (Memorandum of understanding between FAA and NORAD, 1987). Thus, close coordination between the FAA and NORAD is required in order to maintain safety of the U.S. airspace. In order to interpret how the FAA and NORAD collaborated on the morning of September 11, 2001, this thesis will examine their missions and working relationships.

#### B. FAA MISSION AND STRUCTURE

As stated in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the FAA was granted authority to regulate and oversee all aspects of civil aviation in the U.S. Among its responsibilities the FAA is to regulate U.S. commercial air space by navigating and controlling air traffic (FAA, 2009). Twenty-two air route traffic control centers have been established to monitor the U.S. airspace. Controllers at these centers provide information to, and receive feedback from, the national Air Traffic Control System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia, which is tasked with overseeing daily traffic flow within the entire airspace system. However, ultimate responsibility for the National Airspace System lies with FAA headquarters located in Washington D.C. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). The operations center within the FAA headquarters will receive notifications of all major incidents, including hijackings and accidents.

The aircraft hijacked, on the morning of September 11, 2001, were monitored by the FAA control centers located in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and Indianapolis as depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1. FAA Air Traffic Control Centers (From The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004)

Although every center obtained some general knowledge of the happenings in the national airspace, each of the control centers involved received its information independently. Consequently, what was known to the controllers in the Boston command center was not necessarily known to those in New York, Cleveland, Indianapolis and vice versa.

#### C. NORAD MISSION AND STRUCTURE

NORAD was established in 1958 through a bi-national agreement between the U.S. and Canada. The primary goal of NORAD is to defend the North American airspace and protect the continent. Specifically, NORAD is charged with the missions of aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America (NORAD, 2009). Included

in the mission of aerospace warning is the monitoring of man-made objects in space, and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against the continent whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, through mutual support arrangements made between commands (NORAD, 2009). The job of aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of the airspace of Canada and the U.S. (NORAD, 2009). The NORAD mission does not make a distinction between national and international threats. However, since its establishment was a counter measure to protect U.S. airspace from a Soviet threat, it came to define its objective as defending against external attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

Since the end of the cold war brought about a decreased threat of a Soviet air strike, the number of NORAD alert sites was reduced from twenty-six to seven. The seven alert sites are called upon by one of NORAD's three sectors: the Canadian NORAD Region, the Alaskan NORAD Region, and the Continental United States Region (CONR). It is important to note that the CONR region is further divided into two sectors: the Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), and the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). NEADS, based out of Rome, NY, reports to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, who in turn reports to NORAD headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, as depicted in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Reporting Structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector (From The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004)

According to the 9/11 Commission Report: During the late 1990s, threats of terrorits using aircraft as weapons were recognized, but training to counter this threat was not based on actual intelligence. Further, the biggest threat NORAD perceived from these aircraft was their use in transporting weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, NORAD perceived the dominiant threat to be from cruise missiles.

Any order to shoot down a commercial airplane before the September 11, 2001, attacks would have to have come from the National Command Authority, a phrase used to describe the President and the Secretary of Defense (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Since officials had the impression that any threat or hijacked aricraft that would require intervention (in the form of shooting it down) would come from another country, they felt that sufficient time would be available to

identify the target and scramble interceptor aircraft. Further, the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the U.S.—and using them as guided missiles – was not recognized by NORAD before September 11, 2001 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

On the morning of September 11, 2001, all four of the hijacked aircraft were flying in the NEADS sector, in Rome, New York. NEADS is charged with safeguarding a half million square miles of North American airspace that stretches from the east coast to Tennessee through the Dakotas to the Canadian border, including Boston, New York, Washington D.C. and Chicago (Bronner, 2006). That morning, NEADS could call upon two alert sites: Otis Air National Guard Base, in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Both Otis and Langley had one pair of ready fighter planes on alert. Other facilities not on alert would be delayed in providing additional interceptor aircraft, as they would need time to arm fighters and organize crews (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Figure 3 illustrates NORAD's organizational structure during the attacks on September 11, 2001.




Figure 3. NORAD Organizational Structure

#### D. THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

### 1. FAA and the 9/11 Hijackings

Under FAA regulations, all aircraft flying above 10,000 feet are required to emit a unique signal in order to distinguish the aircraft's identity and determine its altitude. The hijackers were able to "hide" their aircraft by disabling the transponders on three of the four aricraft they commandeered. Without transponders, air traffic controllers can only track aircraft through their primary radar returns. However, this process is much more difficult and does not reveal the aircraft's identity and altitude. Consequently, air traffic controllers seem to be so dependent on transponder signals that they usually do not display primary radar returns on their radar scopes (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). However, after losing three of the four transponder signals, air traffic personnel changed the configuration settings on their radar scopes so that they could see the primary radar returns (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

Before 9/11, incidents of commerical aircraft deviating slightly off course, or occassions where an FAA controller lost radio contact with a pilot for a short period of time did occur. Although it happened much less frequently, a controller could also lose a commercial airliner's transponder signal. However, the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signals, which did happen during the hijackings, would be a rare and alarming occurance, and would normally indicate a catastrophic system failure or an airplane crash (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). According to procedure, the controller's job in this instance would be to reach out to the aircraft, the parent company of the aircraft, and other nearby planes in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircraft back on course. As these efforts could take five or more minutes, alarm bells would not start ringing until this protocol was attempted and failed (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Once air traffic personnel had attempted to implement this operational procedure and were still unable to contact the aircraft, they knew something was gravely wrong.

### 2. FAA, Department of Defense (DoD), and White House Teleconferences

After learning of the hijackings, personnel at FAA headquarters initiated teleconferences with various agencies at approximately 0920 Eastern Standard Time (EST). According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the National Military Chain of Command (NMCC) officer, who participated in the call between the FAA and the DoD, said "the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks" (National Commission of Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 36). The 9/11 Commission Report further indicates that the teleconference did not play a role in coordinating a response to the attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

At approximately 0930 EST, the FAA, DoD and the White House engaged in a teleconference. However, since the teleconferences that occurred before 1000 EST did not include the correct officials from the FAA or the DoD, they were not successful in producing a meaningful, coordinated response to the hijackings by the military and the FAA (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

Senior officials from FAA headquarters participated in the video teleconference that was conducted from the White House by Richard Clark, special assistant to the President. Although records indicate that this teleconference began at 0925 EST, the FAA did not join the discussion until 0940. The 9/11 Commission Report did not determine who from DoD participated in this conference, but it does indicate that, in the first hour, no personnel involved in crisis management were present. Also, the 9/11 Commission Report states that, throughout the first hour of this teleconference, no information was conveyed to the NMCC. A witness stated, "it was almost like there were parallel decision-making processes going on; one was a voice conference orchestrated by the NMCC and then there was the White House video teleconference. In my mind they were competing venues for command and control and decision making" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 36).

#### E. INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

On the morning of September 11, 2001, NORAD and the FAA had established protocols for dealing with the threat of a hijacked aircraft. The 9/11 Commission Report states, "on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and aproval at the highest level of government" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004, p. 17). Established procedures required the pilot of the hijacked aircraft to inform the air traffic controllers of the hijacking via radio or by squaking 7500, which is the universal code that represents a hijacked aircraft. Once controllers were notified they were to inform their supervisors, who would then relay the information up the chain of command to management at FAA headquarters. When determination of a hijacking was confirmed, the information would then be reported to the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security. Operating procedures then indicate that the Pentagon's NMCC is to be notified and a military escort aircraft is to be be requested. The military escort is to shadow the hijacked flight, to report anything unusual, and to aid in search and rescue in the event of an emergency. Only then would the NMCC seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for military assistance. Once approved, orders would then be transmitted through NORAD's chain of command (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

The NMCC updated the FAA hijack coordinator who also assisted FAA centers in their coordination with the military. FAA traffic control facilities, along with radars helped NORAD track the hijacked aircraft. These protocols, though, did not plan for the possibility of an intercept. The protocol assumed that figher escort would be discreet, vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft where it could monitor the aircraft's flight path (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). As outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report, the protocols established for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking assumed that: the hijacked aircraft would be easily identifiable and would not attempt to dissapear, there would be time to address the problem through appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command, and hijackings would take the traditional form, in that they would not be

suicide missions designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile. As concluded in the 9/11 commission report, these previously established protocols were unsuited for the events that occurred on the morning of September 11, 2001 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).

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### III. LITERATURE REVIEW

# A. COLLABORATION AND KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION (CKI) PROGRAM

In recent years, modern warfare trends have caused National Defense Policy to transition away from focusing on large-scale battles fought by independent platforms, to confronting unique scenarios requiring a rapid response by increasingly mobile, coalition forces. Associated challenges in team decision making have emerged along with this policy shift, including distributed, joint command level, crisis-driven decision making. Success in this environment requires a renewed focus on understanding the human ability to perform complex and collaborative analysis and decision making under severe time pressure (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). The mission of ONR is: "to foster, plan, facilitate and transition scientific research in recognition of its paramount importance to enable future naval power and the preservation of national security" (ONR, History & Mission of ONR). With the knowledge that accomplishing this mission means recognizing the evolving nature of modern warfare and policy, ONR organizes U.S. Navy and Marine Corps' science and technology programs, one of which is the CKI program.

The objective of the CKI program is to better understand cognitive processes employed by team members when responding to one-of-a-kind complex, information-rich problems, and improve the effectiveness of team decision making to solve unique, time-sensitive problems. ONR's interest in team collaboration research focuses on a cognitive perspective, aiming to develop cognitive science-based tools, models, and interfaces to provide common situational awareness to a diverse, distributed team collaborating to decide on a course of action (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Through the CKI program, ONR hopes to create new operator interfaces with supporting automated systems, allowing teams to analyze a large volume of uncertain data. The military can greatly increase its

warfighting effectiveness by refining its understanding of team knowledge sharing (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division).

#### B. COGNITION

In general terms, cognition refers to the way individual minds, groups, and organizations of varying size develop concepts (Cognition, Merriam-Webster). Cognition includes the mental processes that humans engage in to gain knowledge, remember concepts, judge situations, and attempt to solve problems. Higher level functions of the human brain fall under the concept of cognition. These functions include, but are not limited to, spoken language, imagination, perception, and planning (Cognition, Wikipedia). Perception, introspection, memory, imagination, conception, belief, emotions and reasoning are all examples of cognitive processes. There are several levels of cognition which attempt to explain all of the different things humans can do with their minds, including metacognition, microcognition and macrocognition (Donaldson and Johnson, 2008).

#### 1. Metacognition

Metacognition refers to the way humans think, process information and perform cognitive tasks. Researchers initially began to study metacognition in teams in the early 1990s. The September 11, 2001 attacks inspired real-world studies of metacognition within groups and teams, focusing on human reaction and performance under stress (Donaldson and Johnson, 2008). One important notion within metacognition is metamemory, the concept of how familiar humans are with what they remember. In group situations, accurate memory performance is essential to team success (Salas and Fiore, 2004). Two factors that contribute to group recognition and memory performance are consensus and correctness (Hinsz, 1990). The consensus factor demonstrates the willingness of the team to choose a similar or alternative outcome. The correctness factor demonstrates that collaborating groups are more likely to choose the correct alternative. Existing research on team problem solving is consistent with the idea of the correctness

factor, in that it shows that, when collaborating, groups are more likely to choose a correct response than they are to choose an incorrect response (Laughlin, 1980).

# 2. Macrocognition and Microcognition

Macrocognition refers to the way human cognition occurs in realistic decision-making situations, and is defined as the internalized and externalized high-level mental processes employed by teams to create new knowledge during complex, unique, collaborative problem solving situations. Simply stated, macrocognition decribes the way cognition emerges in natural environments (Letsky et al., 2007). Conceptually, macrocognition provides a framework for comprehending cognitive processes and their direct influence on task performance (Klein et al., 2000). Letsky et al., (2007) define the term "high-level" as "the process of combining, visualizing, and aggregating information to resolve ambiguity in support of the discovery of new knowledge and relationships."

Internal processes are defined as high-level mental processes, occurring at either the team or individual level, which cannot be expressed through external means (Letsky et al., 2007). These external means include: writing, speaking, and gestures. Internal processes can only be evaluated by qualitative metrics, such as cognitive mapping or think out loud protocols or by using alternate quantitative metrics, such as pupil size (Letsky et al., 2007). Externalized processes are defined as high-level mental processes, occurring at either the team or individual level, associated with actions that can be explicitly observed and measured in a consistent, reliable, repeatable manner (Letsky et al., 2007). Teams in complex environments, collaborating to solve unique problems, employ these processes (Fiore, 2007). Historically, cognitive psychologists have conducted contrived experiments, based on puzzle solving and controlled laboratory experiments. These functions are referred to as microcognition, since they investigate the processes that are believed to be invariant and serve as the foundation of human cognition.

#### 3. Relevant Terms

Throughout this document, terms will be used that hold specific meanings in the context of the study of cognition. Here, we provide definitions for a number of these

terms, as they relate to team collaboration. Consensus refers to an opinion or position reached by, and agreed upon by, the group as a whole (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Data refers to a raw fact or statement of event, independent of other entities (Bellinger, 2004). Data may be usable, yet still has no significance in and of itself (Ackoff, 1989). Decision refers to making a judgment on an issue that is being considered (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Decision Making is a form of problem solving in which an individual attempts to chose the best course of action from a given set of alternatives (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division).

Distributed cognition is the cognitive work that is done, not in isolation inside an individual's mind, but among teams, between individuals and artifacts, and over a period of time (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Information refers to data that are processed and deemed to be useful (Ackoff, 1989). The term information implies the understanding of some sort of relationship, potentially cause and effect (Bellinger, 2004). Knowledge refers to the deterministic application of data and information, such as memorization (Ackoff, 1989). Knowledge implies the recognition of a pattern that provides a high level of predictability about what will occur next (Bellinger, 2004). Knowledge Building is a process, through which individuals increase not only their own understanding, but also the team's collective understanding (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division). Knowledge Interoperability refers to the exchange of relevant, actionable knowledge between team members (Warner, Letsky, & Cowen, 2005).

Macrocognition in teams refers to the behavior that a team demonstrates when working together to solve a complex problem. It consists of both verbal (team discussions and negotiations) and non-verbal (hand gestures, bodily cues, visual aids and text messages) actions, and is comprised of several macrocognitive processes (Warner & Letsky, 2005). Process refers to a series of related actions, measured over time, engaged in by individuals or a team in order to create an outcome, result or product. Team

collaboration refers to individuals collaborating to solve a problem or complete an intellectual task (Merriam-Webster, 2002). Team problem solving refers to interactive decision-making between several team members with differing fields and levels of expertise, aimed at generating creative solutions to defined problems. The outcome of team problem solving is a solution that could not be reached independently by the individual team members (ONR, Science & Technology: Warfighter Department (Code 34), Human Performance Division).

Understanding refers to an analytical, cognitive process that synthesizes current knowledge with new knowledge, thus supporting the transition from data to information, and the transition of information to knowledge (Bellinger, 2004). Understanding implies an appreciation of the reasons leading up to a certain event (Ackoff, 1989). The difference between knowledge and understanding is that knowledge implies memorization, and understanding implies learning. Humans with understanding are able to execute useful actions by building upon currently held information, knowledge and understanding itself. Artificial intelligence (AI) systems possess understanding to the extent that a machine is programmed to be able to synthesize new knowledge from previously stored information and knowledge (Bellinger et al., 2004). Wisdom refers to evaluated understanding. It goes beyond understanding, itself, by giving humans an understanding about that which there has previously been no understanding. It is a predictive process, which calls on all previous levels of perception. Wisdom implies the ability to discern between right and wrong, good and bad, and is thus a uniquely human state, which cannot be achieved by a machine (Ackoff, 1989).

## 4. Using Macrocognition to Understand Complex Cognition

As previously noted, ONR perceives an increased need to understand how individuals and teams work together to plan, think, decide, solve problems, and take action as integrated units relying on interconnected and interdependent systems, as today's military teams typically do (Fiore et al., in press). ONR believes that cognition and collaboration in dynamic environments must be studied in great detail in order to be fully understood. These studies have led to the development of theoretical models

capable of capturing complex collaborative processes (Fiore et al., in press). The ultimate goal of these theoretical models is to exploit the understanding of human decision making in order to gain a military advantage over our adversaries.

Macrocognition, as opposed to microcognition, describes cognition at a more complex level as a means of distinguishing differing levels of cognitive processes. The concept of macrocognition was developed simultaneously in separate disciplines at the end of the 20th century. Macrocognition was described in the cognitive sciences as cognitive processes occurring at levels greater than a single processing unit, such as communication and reasoning (Fiore et al., in press). Cognitive engineers used the term to describe how cognition emerges when individuals and teams perform realistic tasks in natural environments, where complex cognitive processes are known to most often occur (Cacciabue & Hollnagel, 1995). Psychologists and behavioral scientists have found great value in studying macrocognition in the context of team collaboration. They have been and continue to be able to understand important aspects of human cognition and problem solving in collaborative settings (Warner et al., 2005).

# C. DATA, INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE TRANSFORMATION (DIK-T)

Simply stated, the DIK-T process is the combining of data and information to create actionable knowledge that did not explicitly exist before the collaboration, which can be considered synonymous with the term knowledge building (Sharma, 2008). This process involves more than just those three components, however. Ackoff, a systems theorist and professor of organizational change, classifies the content of the human mind into five categories: Data, Information, Knowledge, Understanding and Wisdom (Bellinger et al., 2004). He holds that the first four categories deal only with the past, with what is already known, and that wisdom is the only category that deals with the future. Wisdom is evaluated understanding, and incorporates vision and design (Sharma, 2008). Wisdom, however, is not easily reached. Humans must move their minds in order through the first four categories to be able to create the future, as opposed to merely grasping the events of the present (Ackoff, 1989).

#### 1. Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DIKW) Hierarchy

Ackoff was not the first, and not the last for that matter, to mention the DIKW hierarchy. The hierarchy is mentioned as early as 1982 in the information science domain, when Cleveland pointed to the origin of the hierarchy (Sharma, 2008). Surprisingly, the hierarchy's first mention is neither in the knowledge management nor information science field, but in early 20th century poetry (Cleveland, 1982). Cleveland names T.S. Eliot as the first to mention the hierarchy in his 1934 poem, "The Rock" (Eliot, 1934):

Where is the Life we have lost in living?

Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?

Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?

To this day, researchers struggle to answer those questions. With Eliot's hierarchy as a starting point, Ackoff's version points out that information ages most quickly, followed closely by knowledge and that understanding only appears to be permanent. Wisdom, however, is truly permanent (Ackoff, 1989), and is most quickly achieved in teams. Conceptions of data, information and knowledge have evolved since Eliot wrote his poem in 1934. However, he was able to point out some very real relationships that continue to influence the way researchers approach the study of cognition (Hey, 2004).

#### 2. Knowledge Transfer in Teams

Modern research on team collaboration aims to uncover truths about cognition by harnessing the power of collaboration in teams. A team is a group of several interdependent people who cooperate dynamically and flexibly to achieve a common goal (Salas et al., 1992). Teams can also be considered interdependent collections of individuals who share a common goal of achieving specific outcomes for themselves and their organization (Sundstrom et al., 1990). Military and government decision making teams are characterized by diverse knowledge, distinct roles, rotating members, and a hierarchical command structure (Letsky et al., 2007). They work in an environment distinguished by ambiguous situations with little margin for error (Letsky et al., 2007).

Further, military teams have short developmental stages and are comprised of heterogeneous team members. This combination serves to intensify the problems that arise during team collaboration (Letsky et al., 2007).

ONR's focus is to develop ways to expedite military teams' progression to the top of the DIK-T hierarchy. Military commands are geographically dispersed and support locations across the globe, causing most decision making teams to act as ad hoc virtual organizations (Socias, 2008). These hybrid organizations involve many team members at several locations with little time to collaborate to make an informed decision, such as the NORAD/FAA team analyzed in this thesis. During its progression through this hierarchy, a military decision making team will encounter many obstacles such as uncertain circumstances, rapidly unfolding events, and hostility (Elliot et al., 2001). Decision makers must be able to work through these obstacles. Problem solving must be geared toward identifying and disregarding inaccurate and unnecessary information in order to act on necessary information in a timely manner (Elliot et al., 2001). Executing a rehearsed strategy is challenging enough. Attempting to execute the plan as situations and mental models change, on the other hand, is even more difficult. It requires constant re-evaluation and adjustment of the plan in order for each team member to maintain an accurate awareness of the situation.

## D. DECISION-MAKING MODELS

Decision making in groups of several members or organizations presents the unique challenge of arriving at a decision based upon the input of multiple individuals (Lahti, 1996). There are various styles that describe the processes groups use to decide upon the best course of action. This section mentions several of these models, relevant to team collaboration. In order to compare and contrast each decision making model, we will refer to the notion of interests, which are formed by an individual's organizational task, career and personal life. In any group decision making situation, the different participating individuals, and organizations, often have differing interests which they wish to pursue (Morgan, 1996).

#### 1. The Rational Model

The rational model, also referred to as the classical model, focuses on the manner in which decisions ought to be made, and is the baseline against which other models are compared (Cheshire & Feroz, 1989). It focuses on objectives, alternatives, consequences and optimality. This model assumes that the decision maker, which can be an individual or team, is made aware of all of the available information required to make a decision. The decision maker then considers all possible alternatives with objectives in mind, and selects the best possible decision. The rational model presumes that the decision maker is completely rational and searches for a decision using a planned, orderly, and consistent process. This process must proceed, in order, through the following steps: problem identification, development of criteria against which all potential solutions can be evaluated, identification of alternative courses of action, evaluation of these alternatives, selection and implementation of the best alternative (Lahti, 1996).

#### 2. The Administrative Model

The administrative model, also referred to as the behavioral model, focuses on the manner in which decisions are actually made, in situations where the decision makers do not possess all of the information needed to make a decision. Similar to the rational model, the decision making proceeds sequentially and the alternatives are examined one at a time. However, in this model, the first satisfactory alternative that is found is chosen. Decision makers' individual experience, or lack thereof, and capabilities, along with limitations on information processing and resources, act as constraints to the decision making process (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008). Thus, the decision maker seeks to simplify the problem. Within the simplified model that the decision maker has created, this model assumes the decision maker identifies and examines a limited assortment of highly visible, previously tested, easily accessed alternatives. The decision maker then selects one of the alternatives which they deem satisfactory to the extent that it meets the minimum criteria for a desired solution (Lahti, 1996).

## 3. The Implicit Favorite Model

The implicit favorite model focuses on describing the manner in which decisions are actually made, as well. In this model, decision making is essentially a process of substantiating a choice or decision that the decision maker has already made in an intuitive and unscientific manner. In this model, the decision maker seeks to simplify the decision making process, a recurring theme among these models, by identifying an "implicit favorite". The decision maker does so before the alternatives are evaluated, often subconsciously, rendering themselves neither rational nor unbiased (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008). After choosing a favorite solution, the decision maker will attempt to appear rational and unbiased by developing decision criteria and by identifying and evaluating various alternatives in a subjective fashion, in order to ensure that the favorite solution emerges superior. Thus, it can justifiably be selected as the best solution (Lahti, 1996).

#### 4. The Political Model

The political model focuses on describing another manner through which decisions are actually made. The political model considers the preconceived notions that decision-makers bring to the table in the decision-making process, such as the interests that motivate them. Since the group members have different agendas, they need to negotiate with each other. As in the implicit favorite model, the decision maker is irrational and biased (Lahti, 1996). The process involves bargaining among the decision makers, through which each individual or entity attempts to influence the team, as a whole, to agree with their chosen solution (Cheshire & Feroz, 1989). Once the more powerful decision makers have been persuaded to support a particular alternative, the less powerful members of the decision making team typically consent. This model is based on personal influence and negotiation, and often involves withholding information in order to better relate a given perspective, but the associated bargaining and social pressures can produce negative effects. Decision-making criteria may be overshadowed

by personal agendas, which may prevent the selection of the best solution. Only by acknowledging the human propensity to push these personal agendas, can potential problems and conflicts be foreseen and minimized (Lahti, 1996).

## 5. The Emotional Model

The emotional model, suggests that human emotions are essential to rational decision making. Since emotions are generally regarded as irrational occurrences, and are thought to cloud judgment, this model has often been ignored by researchers. Recent research suggests that emotions act as indicators in our memory, which allow humans to associate them, positively or negatively, with a prospective decision (Thagard & Barnes, 1996). Unlike the rational and political models, the emotional model is most applicable when teams are faced with high technical uncertainty and forced to make decisions in rapidly changing environments. In this context of an assortment of possibly occurring outcomes, the value of rational analysis is reduced (Courtney, 2001). The benefit of this process is that it allows groups to draw upon their collective psychological assets to make decisions based on more than just the facts. However, the danger in this process is groupthink, which is characterized by team members making a decision together that they would not make individually, based purely on emotion (Thagard & Barnes, 1996). Interestingly enough, these dangers are best mitigated by exercising greater emotional aptitude (Goleman, 1995).

## 6. The Anarchy Model

The anarchy model, also referred to as the garbage can model, addresses the situation in which a group faces not only external uncertainty, but also internal conflict. Under these circumstances, the decision making process becomes anarchy, which does not follow a linear progression. This model describes the manner in which organizations are often combining "garbage cans" of randomly assorted problems and alternatives (Beach, 1997). These situations are rare and truly ambiguous (Courtney, 2001). This model does not adequately address the entire decision making process, but does illustrate that order can come out of chaos (Beach, 1997).

# 7. Reflection on Decision-Making Models

The study of group decision making is both a science and an art form. The rational and political models are easily applied to most planned decision-making situations. Conversely, the emotional and anarchy models are best suited to confronting unplanned decision-making situations. However, researchers have yet to reach a consensus on decision-making (Beach, 1997). Reflecting on currently used decision-making processes is a good start, but the understanding of team collaboration can only reach the next level by encouraging mutual trust, common vision and motivation (Courtney, 2001).

# E. THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH (ONR) MODEL OF TEAM COLLABORATION

Team collaboration is becoming increasingly dynamic, especially in a military context, allowing communication flow to follow virtually any path. Cognitive processes within each stage of collaboration are represented at two levels: metacognitive, guiding the overall problem solving process, and macrocognitive, supporting team member activities within the respective collaboration stage. Additionally, there are verbal and non-verbal communication mechanisms, used to develop the metacognitive and macrocognitive processes (Warner et al., 2005).

The ONR model of team collaboration focuses on macrocognitive processes. Microcognitive processes are not emphasized, since there are limited metrics for measuring microcognitive team processes, such as information and neural-cognitive processing. However, measuring verbal protocols and team communications allow for the empirical assessment of macrocognitive level activities, such as knowledge building, knowledge interoperability, shared team understanding, and team negotiation to reach team consensus (Warner et al., 2005).

Over the years, there have been several incarnations of the model. However, the model evaluated in this thesis consists of five phases: Individual Knowledge Building, Team Knowledge Building, Internalized Team Knowledge, Externalized Team Knowledge, and Team Problem Solving Outcomes; each with several associated

collaborative macrocognitive processes. The model focuses on the manner in which teams build new knowledge within a problem solving context, at the individual and team levels, as they move through these phases. New knowledge is viewed as the product of the team's collaboration, positioned within a particular problem solving situation. Process refers to a series of related actions, measured over time, engaged in by individuals or a team in order to create an outcome, result or product (SUMMIT, 2008). The processes begin with input, which is the initial information that a team receives, informing them of the task at hand and its desired outcome. Contributing factors include: time constraints, changing information, technology, team configurations and the tasks involved.

There is an additional sixth phase, or macrocognitive process category, which is essential for describing team collaboration during real-world events. This additional macrocognitive process emerged during previous research when other task domains were analyzed (Hutchins et al., 2008). These other problem-solving situations were MIO, air warfare and firefighting scenarios. This phase addresses team members' critical need to tell another team member to take a specific course of action (Hutchins et al., 2008). Decision to Take Action (DTA) is the additional macrocognitive process, which consists of a team member issuing an order for a Course of Action (COA) or making a Request to Take Action (RTA). Understanding the difference between the two requires an understanding of the severity of the action to be taken, as well as the relationship between the team member issuing the order and the team member receiving the order (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008). RTAs occur between two team members of similar rank or status, and the outcome of the action is typically not critical to the scenario outcome. The outcome of most COAs is, however, critical to the scenario outcome. Consequently, a COA order is typically given by a superior team member to a junior team member (Hutchins et al., 2008).

The six phases of the model seem chronological in nature, and in many cases they are. However, especially during an extended scenario, it is possible for a team or individual to move from an early phase to a later phase and vice versa. In these cases, it is also possible for teams to skip phases, entirely. Since team thought processes and

collaborative efforts are both parallel and continuous, the model and the cognitive processes will likely continue to evolve as researchers continue to study the cognitive processes involved in team collaboration (Letsky et al., 2007). Additionally, several of the macrocognitive processes used in this thesis were modified by: altering, excluding and adding several macrocognitive process definitions. Justification for these modifications can be found in the Chapter IV of this thesis. Explanations and examples of each macrocognitive process can be found, in their original verbiage, under the applicable cognitive phase below (SUMMIT, 2008).

## 1. Individual Knowledge Building Processes

The first phase of team collaboration involves Individual Knowledge Building Processes, which begin with an initial input of data or information and focuses on team members acting individually to use that input to build their own task knowledge. The metacognitive processes occurring during this phase are highlighted by each team member becoming aware that, in order to solve the collaborative problem, knowledge needs to be developed from data and information. Actions that team members engage in during this stage include, but are not limited to, reading, beginning to form mental models and accessing electronic displays (SUMMIT, 2008). All of the macrocognitive processes in the Individual Knowledge Building phase focus on supporting the development of individual and team knowledge, which will be put to use in future phases of team collaboration to develop solution alternatives (Bellinger, 2004). Below are the applicable macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

## a. Individual Information Gathering

Individual information gathering involves actions individuals engage in to add to their existing knowledge such as reading, asking questions, accessing displays, etc. Measurement methods include eye-tracking, communication audio, computer-generated messages and searches, asking behavior logged by experimenter on collaboration logger. Possible indices include the 'depth and breadth' of information seeking behaviors (e.g., searching for an appropriate vehicle for a given objective or searching for the location of

a needed personnel resource); dwell times in 'areas of interest'. For example, team member studies the personal as well as collaborative maps which display the waypoints where resources may be held.

## b. Individual Information Synthesis

Individual information synthesis involves comparing relationships among information, context, and artifacts to develop actionable knowledge. Measurement methods include information relationship density, nodal linkages, concept maps, similarity among knowledge objects; post-performance debrief/questionnaire, written or verbal probes during scenario. Possible indices include nature of connectedness between concepts, quantity of connections between concepts. For example, the Humanitarian Personnel Specialist synthesizes information about the different personnel he is in charge of and about the objective of the first operation into a set of criteria of what resources he should send to which grid.

### c. Knowledge Object Development

Knowledge object development involves creation of cognitive artifacts that represent actionable knowledge for the task. Measurement methods include analysis of created notes, diagrams, tables, sketches. Possible indices include quantity of diagrams/tables, structure of diagrams/tables, number of pushpins created, and relation between pushpins. For example, the Air Vehicle Specialist creates a table on a document outlining the three most appropriate means for moving parcels to zone 3A and provides it to the Humanitarian Personnel Specialist so that they may refer to it when planning how to get parcels to pickup zones.

## 2. Team Knowledge Building Processes

The majority of collaboration occurs during the next phase, Team Knowledge Building, where team members begin to collectively construct team knowledge (Bellinger, 2004). The Team Knowledge Building phase includes actions taken by teammates to communicate data, information and knowledge with the intent of transforming that information into actionable knowledge (SUMMIT, 2008). The

metacognitive processes occurring during this phase involve team members sharing and integrating knowledge, so that the team can come up with a common representation of the problem (Bellinger, 2004). Changes in the collective mental representation of the problem can begin to occur as the team gains more complete understanding of the problem's elements, goals and overlooked information (McComb, 2005). The macrocognitive processes in this phase focus on supporting the development of team situational awareness. Although the focus is different, many of the macrocognitive processes occurring in this stage are similar to those occurring in the Individual Knowledge Building phase. Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

## a. Team Information Exchange

Team information exchange involves passing relevant information to the appropriate teammates at the appropriate times. Possible indices include quality, amount, flow/sequencing, and timing of information exchanged; anticipation ratio (i.e., the ratio of passing to asking behavior) collected from the collaboration logger. For example, during the discussion of where to establish the land base, the Military Personnel Specialist points out that the land base location suggested by other team members is extremely far from any military personnel, which may be critical to completing mission.

#### b. Team Knowledge Sharing

Team knowledge sharing involves explanations and interpretations shared between team members or with the team as a whole. These explanations may be augmented by graphic visualizations on shared workspaces. Possible indices include quality, amount, flow/sequencing, and timing of knowledge exchanged, percentage of teammates sharing knowledge. For example, the Humanitarian Personnel Specialist posts pushpins (i.e., information memos) on the shared map that highlight for all team members where resources such as pallets and humanitarian workers are located.

#### c. Team Solution Option Generation

Team solution option generation describes offering potential solutions to a problem. Possible indices include the number of potential options offered, the percentage of teammates offering options, the timing of option generation, and solutions generated in proportion to total communications. For example, the team develops specific options regarding the transportation of supplies from the base to a grid where it is needed.

# d. Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives

Team evaluation and negotiation of alternatives describes clarifying and discussing the pros and cons of potential solution options. This could include clarifying pieces of information, verbally simulating the ripple effects of offered alternatives, or attempting to persuade other teammates regarding the relative efficacy of alternatives. Possible indices include the number of clarifications requested and provided, the number of supporting information points and/or conflicting information points offered per solution ultimately chosen; percentage of teammates who participated in the evaluation of alternatives; flow pattern of communication among members regarding evaluation of alternatives; and degree of following behavior within a team communication. For example, after the transportation specialist suggests that even though the helicopter at the base is more expensive to operate it can still deliver the supplies faster than the helicopter on the carrier, the team discusses the pros and cons of either option, such as what the impact of each option is on the refugees.

## e. Team Process and Plan Regulation

Team process and plan regulation involves discussing or critiquing the team's knowledge building process or plan following feedback on its effectiveness. Possible indices include the number of times a critique is offered, the percentage of teammates contributing to the critique or re-evaluation of the team's plan, and the timing of regulation or replanning efforts. For example, after completing one operation, the team receives feedback that one of their planes was lost due to bad weather. The air

vehicle specialist adamantly states that the cost of the airplane far exceeds what they would spend on higher reliability weather reports. Team members unanimously agree to purchase the highest reliability information possible in all subsequent planning.

## 3. Internalized Team Knowledge

The Internalized Team Knowledge phase deals with the collective knowledge held in the individual minds of team members (SUMMIT, 2008). The metacognitive process occurring during this stage is highlighted by the team's awareness of obvious knowledge overlap. The macrocognitive processes in this stage focus on supporting the team in fostering a common understanding and common goals (Bellinger, 2004). Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

## a. Team Knowledge Similarity

Team Knowledge Similarity can involve the degree to which differing roles understand one another (e.g., how well a land/sea vehicle specialist understands a humanitarian specialist), or how well the team members understand the critical goals and locations of important resources (shared situation awareness). Team Knowledge Similarity is indexed as an average distance score, a correlation, or percentage of agreement. Specific Forms include: (1) Task mental model similarity: The degree to which teammates' mental models of relatively stable task characteristics (e.g., equipment, procedures) converge (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993); (2) Team interaction knowledge similarity: The degree to which teammates' knowledge of their relatively stable positional roles, interdependencies and interaction patterns converge. This is referred to in the shared mental model literature as team interaction mental models (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993); (3) Teammate knowledge similarity: The degree to which teammates' mental models of one another's relatively stable levels of skill, knowledge, experience, dispositions and/or habits converge. This dimension is referred to in the shared mental model literature as shared mental models of teammates (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993) and in the transactive memory literature as teammate knowledge consensus (Austin, 2003); (4) Shared situation awareness: The degree to which teammates'

awareness and interpretation of moment-to-moment changes in their collective situation converge. This can also be evaluated by determining critical landmarks or by inserting perturbations and then observing team member interaction in response to this. This construct has been defined previously by Cooke et al. (2001), Endsley (1995), and Stout et al. (1994).

## b. Team Knowledge Resources

Team members' collective understanding of resources/responsibilities associated with the task. This could be examined through a performance assessment survey given to all members of the team at the end of each operation. Each individual team member would respond as to the relevant knowledge they have via paper and pencil method. Then, the whole team would be asked what relevant knowledge the team as a whole knew. This could also be examined through visual analysis of the eye tracking videos in conjunction with an assessment of the plan. If a team ember did not see a critical and relevant piece of information, then that could lead them to make a plan that was not optimal and would then lead the team to receive a lower score on their plan.

Team Knowledge Resources can be indexed as a sum or average of all team members' knowledge, or as a percentage of the relevant knowledge (defined a priori as the criterion space) that is held by at least one team member. Specific forms include: (1) Task knowledge stock: Accurate task-relevant knowledge held by team members. This would include knowledge about task strategy and equipment. This dimension is included within the components of transactive memory (Austin, 2003) and is referred to as task mental model accuracy within the shared mental model literature (Cooke et al., 2001; Rouse et al., 1992); (2) Interpositional knowledge: Accurate knowledge regarding position-specific roles, goals, responsibilities, access to information, constraints, and interdependencies with other team positions. This dimension is referred to as team interaction mental model accuracy within the mental model literature and as interpositional knowledge within the general team literature (Volpe et al., 1996); (3) Recognition of teammate expertise: Total amount of accurate knowledge regarding teammates' expertise and behavioral habits. This dimension is referred to in the literature

on transactive memory as teammate knowledge accuracy (Austin, 2003), in the literature on shared mental models as teammate mental model accuracy (Mathieu et al., 2005; Rouse et al., 1992), and in the schema literature as teammate schema accuracy (Rentsch, 1993); (4) Individual situation awareness: Accurate awareness of moment to moment changes in the team's environment. The construct has been defined previously by Endsley (1995).

## 4. Externalized Team Knowledge

During the Externalized Team Knowledge phase, all information has been analyzed, in some form or another, by team members, and they concentrate on refining the accuracy and completeness of their collective knowledge. During this phase, after all individual knowledge has been openly shared, the team's representation of the problem ceases to evolve. All components of the shared knowledge not agreed upon have been disregarded, leaving a more accurate and only relevant view of the problem at hand. It is interesting to note the degree to which a team's problem representation has matured through the problem solving process up to this point. The metacognitive process occurring during this phase is highlighted by the team's awareness that the final solution option must meet the problem solving goals. The macrocognitive processes in this phase focus on aiding the entire team in choosing the optimal solution option in the context of achieving the ultimate goal (Bellinger, 2004). Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

## a. Externalized Cue-strategy Associations

Externalized cue-strategy associations describe the team's collective agreement as to their task strategies and the situational cues that modify those strategies (and how). Possible indices include the percent or number of cues explicitly planned for and the quality of those cue-strategy associations. For example, linkages between weather data and resources appropriate for use in certain weather conditions.

## b. Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis

Pattern recognition and trend analysis is the accuracy of the patterns or trends explicitly noted by members of a team that is either agreed upon or unchallenged by other team members. Possible indices include the number or percent of trends and task related patterns collectively agreed upon that are correct or incorrect, or the amount of time needed to correctly agree upon those patterns or trends. For example, there is an optimal plan that can be determined based on cost and resources moved. If the air specialist creates a route for an aircraft to leave a carrier, go over to a site to pick up personnel, and then drop them off in another location, it could be considered a pattern, especially if it is not challenged by the other members of the team.

#### c. Uncertainty Resolution

Uncertainty resolution is the degree to which a team has collectively agreed upon the status of problem variables (e.g., hostile/friendly). Possible indices include the number or percentage of problem variables in which a team-level assessment has been agreed upon and that assessment is correct or incorrect, the amount of time needed to correctly agree upon those assessments; or the nature of "consensus" events logged by experimenter. For example, the resolution of the plan, and the individual components of the plan, would be an example of uncertainty resolution. Each team member is responsible for his or her resources, but also for communicating with teammates to move those resources to their respective locations. At first, there is a certain degree of uncertainty about the best method to move those resources, and it is the job of the team members to resolve that and come to a consensus with their plan they submit.

## 5. Team Problem Solving Outcomes

During the Team Problem Solving Outcomes phase, the team compares the solution option they selected with the problem solving goal. The team is then able to refine the chosen solution option to fully meet the goal (Bellinger, 2004). This phase serves to ensure that the team's solution effectively, expeditiously and efficiently meets the criteria for problem resolution. The final output simply marks the accomplishment of the assigned task. The model of team collaboration was designed to study how a team

functioned through all of the collaboration stages, not to appraise the output of the collaboration process in any way. The metacognitive process occurring during this stage is highlighted by the team's assessment of the quality of their solution or plan (SUMMIT, 2008). The macrocognitive processes in this phase focus on aiding the entire team in evaluating their chosen solution option in the context of achieving the ultimate goal (Bellinger, 2004). Below are the applicable collaborative macrocognitive processes, in their original verbiage (SUMMIT, 2008).

## a. Quality of Plan (Problem Solving Solution)

Quality of plan (problem solving solution) involves the degree to which the solution adopted by a problem solving team achieves a resolution to the problem (e.g., limit fatalities, limit destruction). Measurement methods include the output from function hooks in the program that shows number of objectives achieved (e.g., 67 refugees out of 100 rescued) at end of operation. Possible indices include the number of objectives completed, quality of the resolution to a problem. For example, each operation has an objective to complete, for example, rescuing a certain number of refugees from a particular zone. The percentage of refugees actually extracted from this zone would show the quality of a plan in regards to its problem solving solution. If one team rescues all 100 refugees and another only 80, then the first team has a higher quality plan in terms of solving the problem. However, efficiency remains a factor (see below).

## b. Efficiency of Planning Process

Efficiency of planning process describes the amount of time it takes a problem solving team to arrive at a successful resolution to a problem. Measurement methods include the operation time provided by the master control panel; anticipation ratios, number of interactions. Possible indices include the length of the problem solving process. For example, a team that requires 32 minutes for planning vs. a team that quickly plans and inputs in 17 minutes showcases a strong difference in planning efficiency, assuming their output remains high quality.

## c. Efficiency of Plan Execution

Efficiency of plan execution describes the quality of the plan (e.g., number of lives saved) divided by the amount of resources used to accomplish this and the amount of time the plan takes to unfold. Measurement methods include functions in the simulation that provide data on number of resources spent per planning phase and the impact on civilian population. Possible indices include all financial costs associated with the plan including labor (that is, time a plan becomes executed until the accomplishment of plan objectives multiplied by resources—man hours, gas, etc.). For example, the quality of a plan utilizing a high amount of unnecessary air travel to consolidate humanitarian aid parcels will likely be much lower than one that uses efficient ground travel to consolidate parcels to a single pick-up point for the expensive air vehicle. The end result of impact on civilians may be the same, but the influence of cost affects its quality.

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### IV. METHOD

#### A. CODING PROCESS

This thesis empirically evaluates the model of team collaboration developed by the ONR sponsored CKI Program, using the real-world team collaboration domain of the September 11, 2001, NEADS / FAA MCC Operations channel 3 transcript. For this research, we applied the macrocognitive process definitions to the team communications in the transcript, to determine whether these definitions accurately represent how teams collaborate to make real-world decisions, or if the model is more suitable for analyzing controlled, laboratory situations. Additionally, this chapter provides suggestions for enhancements and additions to the existing list of macrocognitive process definitions.

Using definitions included in the model of team collaboration, each coder independently coded 2,278 utterances from 1,710 speech turns, contained in the transcript. Once the individual coding was complete, the coders met in the presence of the thesis advisor to compare and discuss each other's classification of every speech turn. In cases where the coders agreed on an appropriate code to be applied to a speech turn, no discussion was necessary. When the coders disagreed, each coder would then supply the reason behind their coding decision. Then, the coders would either agree on a final code for that speech turn, marking that code in the "FINAL" category of the transcript table, located in Appendix A of this thesis. Codes that are bolded in any of the columns of the table indicate that one coder was persuaded by the other to change his assessment of a given speech turn.

## 1. Unnecessary Separation

During the coding process, the coders used two very different approaches to analyze each speech turn. Coder one was inclined to break down each speech turn into separate utterances, each having its own code. Coder two had a different approach, which was equally thorough. However, coder two often felt that that separating each speech turn into several utterances was unnecessary. In the example below, coder one separated the *Miscellaneous* (MISC) utterance and coded the subsequent utterance as

Team Information Exchange (TIE). Coder two felt that it was unnecessary to break out the MISC utterance, as it had no bearing on the overall intent of the speaker, and coded the entire speech turn as TIE. In each case, both coders categorized the intent of the speech turn with an identical code. In cases where one coder separated a speech turn into two utterances and the other coder did not, the code *Unnecessary Separation* (US) was placed in that coder's column in the table. For those utterances, the coder who had not assigned a code tended to agree with the coder who had. In every case, both coders eventually reached agreement on the final code for the speech turn, as a whole.

Table 1. Example of Unnecessary Separation Coding

			CODER	CODER	
LINE	SPEAKER	MESSAGE	1	2	FINAL
	Bob	Copy 4, Alpha, 10, Kilo Charlie, Echo,			
915	Davie:	Foxtrot. 9900, copy.	MISC	US	MISC
		One is going to Bangor - Correct. Gold 99.	TIE	TIE	TIE

#### B. MODIFYING COGNITIVE PROCESS CODES AND DEFINITIONS

#### 1. Additions to the Model

The model and its macrocognitive processes have been revised by the CKI program (Letsky et al., 2007). In view of that fact, several codes were added for this analysis. As mentioned in Chapter III, we have added the Decision to Take Action (DTA) macrocognitive process coding category, consisting of team members issuing an order for a Course of Action (COA) or making a Request to Take Action (RTA), based on research conducted by Hutchins & Kendall (2008, in press). Since we are analyzing communications from a military organization where issuing and implementing orders is a critical element of task completion, the addition of these codes is both appropriate and necessary (Hutchins et al., 2008).

#### 2. Modifications to the Model

Several of the codes used in this thesis were modified by altering their definitions. Several of the definitions did not indicate how or when the macrocognitive process should be used as a code to categorize speech turns. Instead, the majority of those definitions called for a calculation that would need to have been taken at prescribed intervals during the course of the recorded event. While these calculations are valuable to understanding team performance, they are not valuable as codes intended to categorize individual transactions.

Under the Team Knowledge Building phase of the model, we shortened the definition of *Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis* (PRTA) to read: "patterns communicated among team members," as opposed to reading: "number of patterns communicated among team members; the time to detect those patterns and accuracy of the patterns." The definition was shortened, because we used the code to identify single instances of pattern recognition or trend analysis. Identifying the number of patterns and the time taken to detect those patterns, as well as the accuracy of the patterns as a metric, adds value to cognitive research, but it must be done separately from the coding process.

#### 3. Omissions from the Model

Several definitions were clearly designed for use in controlled, laboratory experimental environments, and were not applicable to this, or any, real-world scenario. This is the case because during an actual event, it is impossible to administer a pre-and-post-event questionnaire. Some of the cognitive processes that appeared more relevant to laboratory settings, on the other hand, could be tailored to real-world scenarios. Principally, the definitions of those codes requiring a calculation were modified, and those that were completely dependent on calculations were eliminated. However, this is not evidence that these definitions should be excluded from the model, but simply that they were not applicable for the type of data produced by this real-world event.

Under the *Individual Knowledge Building Processes* phase, *Knowledge Object Development* was not applicable because we relied on the transcribed communications, alone, as our basis for analysis. We simply had no way of knowing if any team member created cognitive artifacts that represented actionable knowledge for the task (i.e. there was no indication of this process occurring in the transcript). Under the *Team Knowledge Building Processes* phase, *Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives* did not

apply, because no team member verbally simulated the ripple effects of offered alternatives. Our goal was to simply identify, not calculate, the number of clarifications requested and provided; number of supporting information points and/or conflicting information points offered per solution ultimately chosen; or the percentage of teammates who participated in the evaluation of alternatives. *Team Process and Plan Regulation* (TPPR), also under the *Team Knowledge Building Processes* phase, was not applicable to this scenario either. During the time period covered by the transcript, the NEADS / FAA team were not given any feedback on the effectiveness of any of their plans.

Under the *Internalized Team Knowledge* phase, *Team Knowledge Similarity* and its four subcomponents were excluded from our analysis, due to the fact that they all require a measure of degree to which differing roles understand one another, and that was not possible to asses from the transcript. Two subcomponents of *Team Knowledge Resources*, also under the *Internalized Team Knowledge* phase, were not applicable. The first, *Task Knowledge Stock* was excluded from our analysis, because we had no way of measuring transactive memory. The second, *Recognition of Teammate Expertise* was excluded, again because we were unable to measure the total amount of accurate knowledge regarding teammates' expertise and behavioral habits.

All three of the macrocognitive processes in the *Team Problem Solving Outcomes* phase were excluded, for a number of reasons. Primarily, the team did not reach that cognitive stage during the portion of the transcript that was analyzed. Had the team reached that stage, it is still beyond the purpose of this thesis to assess the degree to which the team's solution effectively met the criteria for problem resolution, the efficiency with which the plan did so, and the speed with which the team generated their plan. For many real-world tasks, such as NORAD collaborating with the FAA, performance assessment metrics are not available and their development is outside the scope of this research.

#### C. MEASURING INTER-RATER RELIABILITY

### 1. Inter-rater Reliability

Inter-rater reliability, the degree of agreement between raters, is used to refine tools given to human evaluators by determining if a particular system is appropriate for measuring a particular variable (Brennan, 1981). For instance, inter-rater reliability is used, in this case, to determine if the level of subjectivity occurring between raters is too high, indicating a change is needed. Changes could include refinement of the definitions or better training of coders. It provides a score of the degree of concurrence between the ratings given by raters, who in this thesis are referred to as Coder 1 and Coder 2. If raters have a high rate of disagreement, then either they require more training on the scale being used, or the scale is defective. Inter-rater reliability can be determined by a number of statistics, typically a version of measuring kappa. Kappa refers to a chance-adjusted measure of agreement (Brennan, 1981). It is considered a more robust measure than simply calculating inter-rater agreement percentage, because kappa accounts for the agreement occurring by chance.

# 2. Cohen's Kappa Coefficient

For this analysis, we elected to use Cohen's kappa coefficient, which is the appropriate method for measuring categorical inter-rater reliability between two raters (Cohen, 1960). Fleiss' kappa provides a similar measure of agreement, which would have been appropriate if more than two raters existed (Fleiss, 1981). Cohen's kappa coefficient accounts for the hypothetical probability of chance agreement, using the observed data to calculate the likelihood of each observer arbitrarily deciding on each available category. A potentially advantageous criticism of Cohen's kappa coefficient is that it has a tendency to take the frequencies of the observed categories for granted. Cohen's kappa coefficient is considered an overly conservative measure of agreement, because it often underestimates the inter-rater agreement over commonly used categories (Cohen, 1960). Additionally, the number of categories affects the magnitude of the value. For instance, the fewer the categories, the higher the Cohen's kappa coefficient will be (Cohen's Kappa Coefficient, Wikipdeia).

Cohen's kappa coefficient measures the agreement between two raters, each of whom classifies *N* items—in this case, speech turns from the 9/11 transcript—into *C* mutually exclusive categories—in this case, the macrocognitive process categories included in the model. If the two raters are in complete agreement, kappa is equal to 1. If the two raters are in complete disagreement, other than what would be anticipated by chance, then kappa is equal to 0 (Cohen's Kappa Coefficient, Wikipedia). Landis and Koch presented the following table for interpreting kappa values, supplying only their professional opinions as supporting evidence. Thus, this table is not universally accepted. However, it is a helpful guideline for interpreting the degree of inter-rater agreement indicated by a kappa value arrived at by two given evaluators (Landis & Koch, 1977).

Table 2. Cohen's Kappa Interpretation (From Landis & Koch, 1977)

Kappa	Interpretation
<0	No Agreement
0.0 - 0.20	Slight Agreement
0.21-0.40	Fair Agreement
0.41-0.60	Moderate Agreement
0.61-0.80	Substantial Agreement
0.81-1.00	Almost Perfect Agreement

### V. RESULTS

#### A. CODING RESULTS

Of the 1,710 speech turns, each of the 2,278 utterances warranted an individual code. Each individual utterance in a speech turn conveyed a specific message and was coded as such. Accordingly, part of a speech turn may have been a miscellaneous statement which was not a crucial component of the mission. However, another utterance in the speech turn conveyed a very important message. Thus, it was important to separate each utterance. In order to properly analyze the cognitive process used by the NEADS team members, each coder entered a code for each utterance into a spreadsheet. The coders were then able to compare the given code to each other, thereby determining the level of inter-rater reliability and the final code for each utterance for analytical purposes. The number of final codes use was 2,278 which included 707 *Miscellaneous* (MISC) and 73 utterances that were determined to be *Not Codeable* (NC). In the data analysis, the MISC and NC codes were used only to determine the frequency of each code used.

## 1. Percentage of Code Use

During analysis of the recorded transcript of channel three on September 11, 2001, it was discovered that 12 of the 22 (54.5%) macrocognitive process codes were used. Included in the codes used were: Course of Action (COA) and Request to Take Action (RTA) under the Decision to Take Action category, but not the MISC or NC codes. As previously stated there were 10 codes not utilized for the analysis of the transcript. However, this is not to say they are not valuable or useful codes, but that they simply did not apply to this specific real-world, unplanned event.

## 2. Coding Trends

Team Information Exchange (TIE) was the code most used as it was applied to 792 of 1498 utterances (52.87%). This figure is significant because it conveys how much information was being shared between team members, often without it being requested. While other times, team members needed to be asked for information as demonstrated

from the second most used code, Individual Information Gathering (IIG) with 463 out of the 1498 utterances (30.91%). These two codes will often relate to each other in the form of a question asked and then answered. The morning of September 11, 2001, was a very chaotic and confusing time. There were a lot of questions being asked by team members to enhance their mental model of the situation. However, the level of expertise of each team member assisted in their ability to disseminate pertinent information to other team members. In other words, their past experience helped them to understand and acknowledge which information being passed was crucial to the events that were occurring and, therefore, needed to be shared with all involved. Table 3 shows the macrocognitive process codes and their respective percentages, excluding the codes MISC, US, and NC.

Table 3. Frequency and Percentage of Macrocognitive Processes Used by NORAD and FAA<sup>1</sup>

Code	Cognitive Process	Number	Percentage
	Individual Knowledge Building Process		
IIG	Individual Information Gathering	463	30.91
IIS	Individual Information Synthesis	26	1.74
KOG	Knowledge Object Development	0	0
	Team Knowledge Building		
TIE	Team Information Exchange	792	52.87
TKS	Team Knowledge Sharing	56	3.74
TSOG	<b>Team Solution Option Generation</b>	46	3.07
ENA	Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives	0	0
PPR	Team Process and Plan Regulation	0	0
	Internalized Team Knowledge		
TKSim	Team Knowledge Similarity	0	0
TKR	Team Knowledge Resources	0	0
TkKS	Task Knowledge Stock	0	0
IPK	Interpositional Knowledge	3	0.2
RTE	Recognition of Teammate Expertise	0	0
ISA	Individual Situation Awareness	25	1.67
	<b>Externalized Team Knowledge</b>		
ECA	Externalized Cue-strategy Associations	1	0.07
PRTA	Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis	1	0.07
UR	Uncertainty Resolution	2	0.13
	<b>Problem Solving Outcomes</b>		
QoP	Quality of Plan	0	0
EPP	Efficiency of Planning Process	0	0
EPE	Efficiency of Planning Execution	0	0
	<b>Decision to Take Action</b>		
RTA	Request to Take Action	64	4.27
COA	Course of Action	19	1.27
TOTAL	Minute Manager Constitution   Nat Co.	1498	100.01

Excludes the Miscellaneous, Unnecessary Separation, and Not Codeable Codes

# **B. DEFINITION INTERPRETATIONS**

During the coding process, we often discussed the interpretation of definitions for several macrocognitive processes. The outcomes of these discussions helped determine situations where certain codes were appropriate. The nature of the problem was such that the team was flooded with continuous information. New information required the decision makers to ask multiple questions, in order to clarify new information and update their mental model of the situation. Under the Individual Knowledge Building phase, we used the code Individual Information Gathering (IIG) to classify speech turns in which a team member initially asks for or accesses information. When a team member asked for or provided clarification on previously collected information, we classified that speech turn as Individual Information Synthesis (IIS). IIS was also used to classify utterances where the speaker was making inferences about information. In both cases, the code used for the response to the question was not the same as the code used for the question. The response was typically coded Team Information Exchange (TIE) or Team Knowledge Sharing (TKS), since all team members monitoring channel 3 had access to the answer or explanation.

On a similar note, many definitions require "all team members" to discuss a piece of data, information or knowledge. Since all we had to rely on was an audio transcript, it was impossible to know if "all team members" were included in a particular discussion. We found that most of the macrocognitive process definitions were neither exclusive nor exhaustive. More specifically, a given utterance could potentially meet the requirements to be classified as more than one code. We determined that there was often a great deal of overlap between definitions. For instance, TIE can be used as a "catch-all" code, since generally every utterance contains relevant information being passed between team members

#### C. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

Two coders analyzed the transcript, in order to test the relative subjectivity of the coders' understanding and application of the macrocognitive process definitions included in the model. This inter-rater reliability test, measuring the degree of agreement between the two coders, can be used to refine the model's cognitive process definitions so that any coders, trained in applying the model, could reach an adequate level of agreement when evaluating a given transcript. A low score could indicate that the model definitions need

to be refined or that the coders need additional training in applying the model. The test further determines that the model is appropriate for evaluating a real-world team collaboration scenario, such as the one observed in this thesis.

Inter-rater reliability was determined by Cohen's Kappa Coefficient, which provided a score referring to the concurrence in the ratings given by the two coders. Analysis of the initial independent coding by each coder yielded a Cohen's Kappa Coefficient of 0.77. As previously mentioned, fewer categories imply a higher Cohen's Kappa Coefficient. In this case, excluding MISC, NC, US, DTA (COA) and DTA(RTA), we categorized the speech turns in the transcript into only 10 of the model's 22 macrocognitive process codes. Since less than 50 percent of the model's macrocognitive process codes were employed, we contend that our analysis consisted of a relatively low number of categories. This assertion contributes to our relatively high Cohen's Kappa Coefficient.

According to Landis and Koch (1977), the coefficient achieved by the two coders can be interpreted to mean that the two coder's agreement is substantial. Along with the high inter-rater reliability kappa score, this indicates that the macrocognitive process definitions used by the coders are both objective and applicable to real-world decision-making domains. However, those definitions that the coders agreed to disregard, because they did not apply when analyzing team communications from a real-world event, should potentially be clarified for future applications. Coder 1 and coder 2 engaged in numerous discussions in order to come to an agreement as to how the individual codes should be used. It was observed that as the coding process progressed, the coders became more familiar with each other's interpretation and application of the macrocognitive process definitions. Thus, the frequency of disagreements, which was initially higher, decreased as the coders continued to apply the model to the transcript. Ultimately, by either initial agreement or through the use of debate, coder 1 and coder 2 were in 100% agreement as to which final code was to be used for each speech turn.

During comparison discussions, it became apparent to each coder that he had occasionally made a mistake when assigning an incorrect macrocognitive process code to a certain speech turn. In these cases, the mistaken coder agreed with the other coder's

categorization of that speech turn and changed his code accordingly. Those 44 instances, which account for less than 2% of the analysis, are marked in bold in the appropriate Coder category on the transcript in Appendix A. Additionally, Table 4 below illustrates the total instances in which the two coders agreed on each macrocognitive process code.

Table 4. Coder Pivot Table

CODE TITLE	TIE	SII	MISC	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	NC	SIIG	TKS	TSOG	ISA	SN	JPK	UR	PRTA	ECA	Total Coder 2
TIE	685	0	6	0	0	1	3	5	7	2	61	0	0	0	0	770
IIS	12	13	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	31
MISC	27	0	582	0	0	1	4	0	1	0	97	0	0	0	0	712
DTA(RTA)	4	0	3	40	13	0	7	1	2	0	10	0	0	0	0	80
DTA(COA)	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	14
NC	2	0	1	0	0	67	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	74
IIG	1	0	12	0	0	1	413	1	2	0	33	0	0	0	0	463
TKS	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	38	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	61
TSOG	9	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	26	0	2	0	0	0	0	39
ISA	9	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	11	3	0	0	0	0	26
US	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
IPK	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
UR	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
PRTA	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
ECA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total Coder 1	773	13	604	41	24	70	429	50	39	13	221	1	0	0	0	2278

### D. INSIGHTS INTO THE COGNITIVE PROCESS

# 1. Dynamic Decision Making

On September 11, 2001, the FAA/ NEADS team responded to several instances of plane hijackings, occurring over a period of time. As a result, they were forced to make a series of dynamic decisions. The term dynamic decision making refers to a situation in which the decision maker cannot reach the goal by means of a single decision (Brehmer, 1992). In this form of problem solving, a team seeks a viable course of action (Hutchins

& Kendall, 2009). Because current decisions are constrained by earlier decisions, and eventually constrain later decisions, each decision is dependent on another. Additionally, the problem evolves, in real time, on its own and as a result of the decision-maker's actions (Brehmer, 1992). Table 5 displays an example of how information is shared in pieces, leading decision-makers to decide on a major course of action, without solving the overall problem. Specifically, *Team Information Exchange* leads to *Team Knowledge Sharing*, which leads to *Decision to Take Action (Course of Action)*, and then the problem continues.

Table 5. Example of Dynamic Decision-Making Process

	ı	T		ı	
			CODER		
LINE	SPEAKER	MESSAGE	1	CODER 2	FINAL
	Male				
702	Speaker:	Sergeant Demage?	MISC	US	MISC
		We are working a tanker.	TIE	TIE	TIE
	Sergeant				
703	McCain:	There is a bomb on board Boston -	TKS	TIE	TIE
	Male				
704	Speaker:	*Explative*	MISC	MISC	MISC
	Male				
705	Speaker:	On board what? Boston 93?	IIG	IIG	IIG
706	Huntress:	United.	TIE	TIE	TIE
	Male				
707	Speaker:	United?	IIG	IIG	IIG
	Canagant				
708	Sergeant McCain:	Bomb on board United 93.	TKS	TIE	TIE
708	mcCam.	Bonio on board Officed 93.	1172	HE	HE
		Intercept. Intercept. We want the aircraft	DTA	DTA	DTA
709	Huntress:	away from there.	(COA)	(COA)	(COA)

# 2. The Iterative Nature of Cognitive Processes

Although the model seems to imply that the cognitive phases occur sequentially, the transcript illustrates the iterative nature of the knowledge building between individuals and across teams (Fiore et al., 2008). In light of these observations, and by analyzing the transcript, we infer that the decision-making process is cyclical, involving constant reassessment of facts and judgments. While it is necessary for the team to consider how the current decision will solve the immediate problem, it is even more

important to consider how it will impact future decisions and accomplish the overall task (Brehmer, 1992). Stress is inherent in dynamic decision making, as is also apparent in the FAA/NEADS transcripts, because the decision maker cannot control when critical decisions have to be made (Hutchins & Kendall, 2009; Hutchins & Kendall, in press).

Deciding on a course of action affects the problem as well as the cognitive process involved in making that decision. By implementing a decided course of action, and observing its results, the decision maker actually changes the problem, itself (Hutchins & Kendall, 2009). For example, any action taken against a hijacked aircraft to determine the hijackers' intent will cause a response. That response, or lack thereof, will alter the team's mental model of that task (Hutchins & Kendall, 2009). Individuals initially react to injected data or information by making minor decisions. The outcomes of these decisions change the nature of the problem, for better or for worse. Execution of these minor courses of action leads to the creation of new information and knowledge, which forces the team to decide on more important courses of action, and this process repeats.

## 3. Uncertainty Reduction and Intuition

Throughout the team communications, we notice a continual growth in team understanding of the problem, as well as a continually increasing level of interpretation. A team finds the majority of its strength in its ability to coordinate, to maintain team situational awareness, to reduce uncertainty and to resolve ambiguity. Teams resolve ambiguity in data by restructuring it into more meaningful information. Restructuring serves to establish easily recognizable patterns, since detection of the abnormal requires recognition of the normal. Thus, when an anomaly occurs it is recognized as such (Fiore et al., in development). By combining, sorting and filtering information, a mental model is created (Warner et al., 2005). A mental model is a psychological representation of

real, hypothetical, or imaginary situations (Johnson-Laird, 1999), from which a person assumes they can explain and even predict a particular state of the world (Fiore et al., 2008).

From a person's mental model stems intuition, which serves to expedite the individual decision-making process. Little effort is used to reach intuitive decisions, which are typically made subconsciously (Hogarth, 2001). In situations involving significant uncertainty, such as the situation faced by the FAA/NEADS team, previous experience plays a large role. In this case, a solid mental model allowed the team to efficiently reach a much-needed consensus in a short amount of time (Damasio, 1996).

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### VI. CONCLUSION

#### A. VALIDITY OF THE MODEL

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the team at NEADS was faced with a one-of-a-kind catastrophe of amazing proportions, and was forced to collaborate under extremely difficult circumstances. Their mental ability was pushed to the limit, as they were required to adapt and update their preexisting mental models, which were geared toward less intense hijacking situations. The communications between NEADS and the FAA during the crisis provided an excellent example of team collaboration, against which to apply and assess the model of team collaboration. Despite the fact that several macrocognitive process codes were not applicable to this analysis, that does not indicate however that those codes are irrelevant to the model. It was simply impossible to determine, by analyzing the transcript alone, if the cognitive processes defined by those codes were actually occurring.

Based on our research, we can say with certainty that the model is applicable to the NEADS and FAA communications transcript. The results confirm that the team moved between the various cognitive phases outlined by the model, as the tragedy developed. Even though the model does not state that a team will progress sequentially from the beginning macrocognitive phases to the later macrocognitive phases, our research indicates that the NEADS team did, in fact, make such a progression during the observed time period. The results of the Cohen's Kappa Coefficient analysis demonstrate that two individuals can use the model to evaluate the same data and reach a substantial rate of agreement. This attests to the fact that the model is undistorted by emotion or personal bias. It is an objective tool that is able to be interpreted and applied by researchers of differing backgrounds.

#### B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Including the Donaldson & Johnson thesis (2008) and Socias thesis (2008), three of the four audio channels have been transcribed and coded with definitions from the model (Donaldson & Johnson, 2008; Socias, 2008). Since each channel represents a

portion of the entire NEADS/FAA team effort, it would be useful to transcribe and code the remaining channel. Then, further analysis could be conducted to mathematically determine the length of time it took the team to progress through the stages of the model, reach a shared mental understanding of the problem and ultimately agree on a solution. The efficiency and accuracy of shared information could also be evaluated. The author of a future thesis could also incorporate calculations called for by several of the codes.

Definitions of laboratory cognitive processes, requiring calculations or surveys, such as Knowledge Object Development, Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives, Team Process and Plan Negotiations, Team Knowledge Similarity, Task Knowledge Stock, Recognition of Team Expertise, Quality of Plan, Efficiency of Planning Process, and Efficiency of Plan Execution could be revised to make them more applicable to real-world scenarios. Limiting these cognitive processes to definitions intended for laboratory settings impairs the ability to accurately utilize them in the evaluation of team communications from real-world scenarios. Future researchers may also wish to assess actual outcomes of the team collaborative process. The quality of the team's final plan could be evaluated, along with the amount of available resources. Decisions made during the Outcome Appraisal stage of the model could be evaluated to see if they actually resolve the problem the team faced.

# APPENDIX A. NORTHEAST AIR DEFENSE SECTOR AND FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION CHANNEL 3 TRANSCRIPTS FROM SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, 1231 THROUGH 1556 (GMT)

1	TIME	SPEAKER	MESSAGE	CODER 1	CODER 2	FINAL
			Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 25 seconds.			
			Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 30 seconds.			
			Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 35 seconds.			
			Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 40 seconds.			
			Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 45 seconds.			
			Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 50 seconds.			
			Twelve hours, 30 minutes, 55 seconds.			
			Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 0 seconds.			
			Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 5 seconds.			
2	100.001	Commutan Vaisas	Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 15 seconds.	MICC	MICC	MICC
	[00:00]	Computer Voice:	Twelve hours, 31 minutes, 20 seconds.	MISC	MISC	MISC
3		Sergeant Rayorta:	Yes, ma'am. This is Sergeant Rayorta.	MISC	MISC	MISC
4		Huntress:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I'm just letting you know for information,			
			we're having an exercise - SF exercise -			
5		Sergeant Rayorta:	We're having a come out.	MISC	MISC	MISC
6		Huntress:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
7		Sergeant Rayorta:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
8		Huntress:	Copy, thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
9		Sergeant Rayorta:	All right. Thank you. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC

10	MCC:	This is your MCC.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		All flight personnel report to Op's, all flight personnel report to Op's.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
11	Male Speaker:	- Didn't come up in primary radar.	TIE	TIE	TIE
12	Female Speaker:	Okay. So you have a general location as to where he is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
13	Male Speaker:	We're still tracking him right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
14	Female Speaker:	You're tracking him?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Can you - Can you give lat and long where you think he is just for our SA?	IIG	IIG	IIG
15	Male Speaker:	Yeah, hold on a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
16	Female Speaker:	And where are they going now, do you know?	IIG	IIG	IIG
17	Male Speaker:	No idea. He's heading towards Kennedy -	TIE	TIE	TIE
18	Female Speaker:	Hey,?	NC	NC	NC
		We're looking for assets.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		give me a lat and long because primary only.	IIG	IIG	IIG
		FAA is tracking it. They because they're the only ones seeing it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
19	Female Speaker:	And is there any military assistance requested?	IIG	IIG	IIG
20	Male Speaker:	Yes,	TIE	TIE	TIE

21	Female Speaker:	Yes, that's correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
22	Male Speaker:	F-16s	TIE	TIE	TIE
23	Female Speaker:	Yes, you do want F-16's out?	IIG	IIG	IIG
24	Male Speaker:	Yes, F16's out of Otis.	TIE	TIE	TIE
25	Female Speaker:	But you don't have - You don't have any modes or codes on him?	IIG	IIG	IIG
26	Male Speaker:	Not right now. Right now it's just -	TIE	TIE	TIE
27	Female Speaker:	Is he inbound to JFK?	IIG	IIG	IIG
28	Male Speaker:	We have 41,15 north -	TIE	TIE	TIE
29	Female Speaker:	You don't know where he is at all?	IIG	IIG	IIG
30	Female Speaker:	41,15 north -	TIE	TIE	TIE
31	Male Speaker:	07,346 west -	TIE	TIE	TIE
32	Female Speaker:	07,346 west -	TIE	TIE	TIE
33	Male Speaker:	- and the approximate heading is 190 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
34	Female Speaker:	190 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
35	Male Speaker:	-3879	TIE	TIE	TIE
36	Female Speaker:	-3879	TIE	TIE	TIE
37	Male Speaker:	Last known altitude is flight level is 290 but we -	TIE	TIE	TIE
38	Female Speaker:	Please give me a call and let us know -	IIG	IIG	IIG
39	Female Speaker:	Can you give me any other information on it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
40	Male Speaker:	You want the type and stuff?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		What do you need? What do you want?	IIG	IIG	IIG

41	Female Speaker:	Yeah, like passengers on board, where it came from -	IIG	IIG	IIG
41	гетане зреакет:		IIG	IIG	IIG
42	Male Speaker:	We'll call you right back as soon we know more info.	MISC	MISC	MISC
43	Female Speaker:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
44	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
45	Male Speaker:	767, No idea how many people on board right now. They came from Boston. They're supposed to be going to L.A. and they're headed south. They're going the wrong way, obviously. It's just -	TKS	TKS	TKS
46	Female Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
47	Male Speaker:	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
48	Female Speaker:	All right. Thank you very much.	MISC	MISC	MISC
49	Male Speaker:	And so where are they - who are you gonna send? Do you know anything?	IIG	IIG	IIG
50	Female Speaker:	That determination hasn't been made yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Let me - if you could hold on just a moment, I'm gonna get - We have some coordination going on right now.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I think that they said they're gonna put Otis on battle stations. That's who I would anticipate the aircraft to be based on them going to JFK. That would be our closest backup.	IIS	TIE	IIS
		Okay. Let me give you my commercial			
51	Male Speaker:	number in case we get disconnected here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
52	Female Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

53	Male Speaker:	603 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
54	Female Speaker:	603 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
55	Male Speaker:	879 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
56	Female Speaker:	879 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
57	Male Speaker:	6666	TIE	TIE	TIE
58	Female Speaker:	666 - Oh, That's a scary number. 6666.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		And your number again, Sir? Joe?	IIG	IIG	IIG
59	Male Speaker:	Joe Cooper. You can talk to anyone here. Everybody knows what's going on.	TKS	TKS	TKS
60	Female Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
61	Male Speaker:	All right. So yeah. So I'll stay - I'll stay on hold and you can give me call so we can get this going.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
62	Female Speaker:	Okay. Stand-by.	MISC	MISC	MISC
63	Female Speaker:	Okay. Can you please call - I got miss assigned data up here. Write it all down. I got to get off the -	MISC	MISC	MISC
64	Male Speaker:	Boston Center?	MISC	MISC	MISC
65	Huntress:	Huntress calling you back real quick.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Did you guys have a Mode 2 at all on American 11?	IIG	IIG	IIG
66	Male Speaker:	Last altitude we saw it was descending290.	TIE	TIE	TIE
67	Huntress:	I'm sorry. Prior Mode 2 for American 11?	IIG	IIG	IIG
68	Female Speaker:	- Mode 3 -	IIG	IIG	IIG
69	Huntress:	Did you file anything - any information for Mode 3	IIG	IIG	IIG

			because we can locate them on the scope			
			if so?	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
70		Male Speaker:	Well -	MISC	MISC	MISC
71		Female Speaker:	Boston to Los Angeles. That was -	TIE	TIE	TIE
72		Male Speaker:	Last known altitude for Flight 11 was 290. Before that, he was requesting - Hold on. Looks like he was requesting flight level 350.	TKS	TKS	TKS
73	[00:05]	Huntress:	Okay. All we're asking is your Mode 3.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Your Mode 3? Did you assign any Mode 3 to that aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG
74		Male Speaker:	The reason - The reason was -	MISC	MISC	MISC
75		Male Speaker:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
76		Female Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
77		Male Speaker:	MCC -	MISC	MISC	MISC
78		Male Speaker:	Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
79		Male Speaker:	I just called it totally, utterly impossible to recall 53.	TIE	TIE	TIE
80		Male Speaker:	3064	TIE	TIE	TIE
81		Female Speaker:	We still should be able to get it without 53.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
82		Male Speaker:	52 is working.	TIE	TIE	TIE
83		Male Speaker:	We don't have any Mode 3s. No.	TIE	TIE	TIE
84		Huntress:	Nothing you guys -	TIE	TIE	TIE
85		Male Speaker:	Primary target only. I don't even know what it - I can try and find his original mode 3.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
86		Huntress:	Yeah, that's all we need.	TIE	TIE	TIE
87		Male Speaker:	Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC

88	Male Speaker:	What does 56 look like?	IIG	IIG	IIG
89	Huntress:	We don't know yet. They don't have a mode 3.	TKS	TKS	TKS
90	Male Speaker:	- mashed in so much real world stuff happened during an exercise.	MISC	MISC	MISC
91	Female Speaker:	American 11.	NC	NC	NC
92	Male Speaker:	Okay. Did you get the battle stations,	IIG	IIG	IIG
93	Female Speaker: Male Speaker:	Yeah, he's having a tough time talking because they are making threats and they have to -  Otis 1241 - Real world -	TKS TIE	TKS TIE	TKS TIE
95	Male Speaker:	For what?? You're gonna call them?	IIG	US	IIG
		They're not gonna help you out.	TIE	TIE	TIE
96	Male Speaker:	You want to read that out?	IIG	IIG	IIG
97	Female Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
98	Male Speaker:	It's a - It's a commercial number. 508 - 508-487-4069 or 4616.	TIE	TIE	TIE
99	Female Speaker:	Anybody 290	NC	NC	NC
100	Male Speaker:	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
101	Huntress:	Yes, go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
102	Male Speaker:	The original code was 1443.	TIE	TIE	TIE
103	Huntress:	1443. Copy that. Thank you, Sir. And one more question.	MISC	MISC	MISC
104	Male Speaker:	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
105	Huntress:	Any aircraft close by him that - a mode 3?	IIG	IIG	IIG
106		About the time that -	NC	NC	NC
107		Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC

108	Male Speaker:	I think we're working on that.	ISA	US	ISA
		I don't have anybody next to him right			
		now but - His speed is slowing down now.			
		He's turning southwest bound.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		So we don't have anybody close to him.	ISA	ISA	ISA
109	Huntress:	Okay. Thank you, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
110	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
111	Huntress:	We will eventually find -	NC	NC	NC
112	Male Speaker:	1443	TIE	TIE	TIE
113	Male Speaker:	Well - Well, we'll look and sit down - I'll sit one of these guys down and we'll - have to go on a little bit of hold here, that's all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I mean, we don't have a crew in yet. I mean -	ISA	US	ISA
114	Huntress:	Yeah. He said nobody in that - nobody in that -	NC	NC	NC
115	Male Speaker:	Z point.	TIE	TIE	TIE
116	Huntress:	SDMC, scramble - Is the data - is that -	NC	NC	NC
117	Male Speaker:	Copy. Same mission.	MISC	TIE	TIE
118	Male Speaker:	Who's talking in New York giving them a heads up? Anybody called New York?	IIG	IIG	IIG
119	Male Speaker:	The FCC. I don't know what on of these guys, too.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I need a direction, destination -	IIG	IIG	IIG
120	Female Speaker:	Is there a reference point?	IIG	IIG	IIG
121	Male Speaker:	It's around there, Steve.	TIE	TIE	TIE
122	Male Speaker:	Can we give you the Z point?	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
123	Female Speaker:	is Huntress ID.	TIE	TIE	TIE
124	Male Speaker:	It's north of New York City.	TIE	TIE	TIE

125	Huntress:	I got this lat, long 41, 15 coming 436.	TIE	TIE	TIE
126	Male Speaker:	Yes, Ma'am. Are you aware of the possible hijacking of American 11?	IIG	IIG	IIG
127	Male Speaker:	That's gonna be 346?	TIE	TIE	TIE
128	Huntress:	Destination as a real world hijack American 11. He is headed 40 miles north of JFK headed towards JFK.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We're trying to find out any information that we possibly can.	ISA	TIE	ISA
		Apparently, the pilot was having a rough time because there have been threats in the cockpit. It started out of Boston for Los Angeles, now heading -	TKS	TKS	TKS
		I wanted to give you a heads up to let you know that American 11. We're trying to locate any information as far as the			
		location.	ISA	ISA	ISA
		He is currently a Mode 3.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Do you have any information whatsoever?	IIG	IIG	IIG
129	Male Speaker:	I do not.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Hold on one second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
130	Huntress:	It's KKKK -	TIE	TIE	TIE
131	Female Speaker:	I can't locate that Mode 3.	TIE	IIG	IIG
132	Male Speaker:	MCC - Have you guys gotten any information on this yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
133	Female Speaker:	Is that KKKK, is that his position?	IIG	IIG	IIG
134	Male Speaker:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
135	Male Speaker:	Okay. We're working on a 25 mile box around that and getting everything up.	ISA	ISA	ISA

		HRD Foster Conar. How are you doing			
136	Huntress:	this morning?	MISC	MISC	MISC
137	Male Speaker:	Fine.	MISC	MISC	MISC
138	Male Speaker:	Hey, any word on - we got word that there was a real world hijack going on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
139	Sergeant McCain:	That's right.	TIE	TIE	TIE
140	Male Speaker:	Anything on that at all?	IIG	IIG	IIG
141	Sergeant McCain:	We're getting fighters airborne now. They're going to be under FAA control and we have not found the aircraft	TIE	TIE	TIE
		He's not squawking.	TIE	TIE	TIE
142	Male Speaker:	Oh, he's not squawking?	IIG	IIG	IIG
143	Sergeant McCain:	through the FAA.	NC	NC	NC
144	Male Speaker:	Are the fighters airborne already?	IIG	IIG	IIG
145	Sergeant McCain:	Not yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
146	Male Speaker:	Not yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
147	Sergeant McCain:	I'll let you know when they get airborne.	TIE	TIE	TIE
148	Male Speaker:	Okay. Thanks	MISC	MISC	MISC
149	Sergeant McCain:	Yep. Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain, can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
150	Male Speaker:	Yes, Collin Scoggins, Boston Center. How are you doing?.	MISC	MISC	MISC
151	Sergeant McCain:	Yes, Sir, just fine.	MISC	MISC	MISC

152		Collin Scoggins:	Are you all working on trying to get someone up to -	IIG	IIG	IIG
132		Court Beoggins.	someone up to -	по	110	по
153		Sergeant McCain:	Yes. Yes, we are.	TIE	TIE	TIE
154		Collin Scoggins:	Can you, by any chance, can you give me an altitude on him? Do you have an altitude -	IIG	IIG	IIG
155		Sergeant McCain:	Last one was 29,000.	TIE	TIE	TIE
156		Collin Scoggins:	Okay. I didn't know if your radar could actually pick up a correct altitude just so we can kind of nail it down maybe.	IIS	IIG	IIS
157		Sergeant McCain:	We haven't even found the track yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
158		Collin Scoggins:	You haven't found the track yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
159		Sergeant McCain:	Can you tell us where he's at? He-	IIG	IIG	IIG
160		Collin Scoggins:	Hold on one second. Did you arrange off from the nearest navi?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			It's primary only but I'll get you a track and you'll be able to find them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
161		Sergeant McCain:	Is there anyway that you can -	NC	NC	NC
162		Collin Scoggins:	15 miles east of Kennedy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
163	[00:10]	Sergeant McCain:	15 miles east of Kennedy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
164		Collin Scoggins:	East of JFK traveling southwest bound.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			It's only going about 300 knots.	TIE	TIE	TIE

165	Sergeant McCain:	15 miles east of Kennedy doing 300 knots.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Is there anyway - are we in contact with pilot? Are you guys in contact with the pilot?	IIG	IIG	IIG
166	Collin Scoggins:	No contact with the pilot whatsoever.	TIE	TIE	TIE
167	Sergeant McCain:	No chance in maybe getting some?	IIG	IIG	IIG
168	Collin Scoggins:	We can't, nope.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		The only thing that I understand that we got here was that someone heard in the background someone entering the cockpit. That's it.	IIS	IIS	IIS
		We have not had any contact with the pilot at all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
169	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
170	Collin Scoggins:	Do you have visual on him yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
171	Sergeant McCain:	We're picking up a search track roughly -	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Let me give you a better range here. I got it 8 miles east northeast of Kennedy on search only.	TIE	TIE	TIE
172	Collin Scoggins:	8 miles east northeast of Kennedy? 8 miles northeast east we have a visual, is that about right?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		That's about right.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Do you have an altitude on that?	IIG	IIG	IIG

173	Sergeant McCain:	No, I don't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
174	Collin Scoggins:	You don't? When you get an altitude, can you call us here at the center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
175	Sergeant McCain:	I will do my best.	TIE	TIE	TIE
176	Collin Scoggins:	And we can pass that on to New York.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Our DSN here is 881-1635.	TIE	TIE	TIE
177	Sergeant McCain:	We're losing - We're losing primary on them now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
178	Collin Scoggins:	You're losing primary on them now? Do you have another sight or -	IIG	IIG	IIG
179	Sergeant McCain:	No. HR2 was the only site. We're got satellite right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Give me your phone number?	IIG	IIG	IIG
180	Collin Scoggins:	Okay. 881-	TIE	TIE	TIE
181	Sergeant McCain:	- 881 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
182	Collin Scoggins:	1635	TIE	TIE	TIE
183	Sergeant McCain:	1635	TIE	TIE	TIE
		And your name again?	IIG	IIG	IIG
184	Collin Scoggins:	My name is Collin -	TIE	TIE	TIE
185	Sergeant McCain:	Collin.	TIE	TIE	TIE
186	Collin Scoggins:	Scoggins. S-C-O-G-G-I-N-S.	TIE	TIE	TIE
187	Sergeant McCain:	Scoggins. Okay. That's all we're seeing right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
188	Colin Scoggins:	Okay. No altitude pick up?	IIG	IIG	IIG

189	Sergeant McCain:	No.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Okay. Let me know if there's			
		New York and they have no clue what to			
190	Collin Scoggins:	move around them. So -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
191	Sergeant McCain:	I roger that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Yep. Thank you very much.			
192	Callin Sagaring	let us know	NC	NC	NC
192	Collin Scoggins:	!	NC	NC	INC
193	Sergeant McCain:	Sure will.	MISC	MISC	MISC
194	Collin Scoggins:	Thank you. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant			
195	Sergeant McCain:	McCain. May I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Yes, southeast -First Air Force Public			
196	Collin Scoggins:	Affairs, Sergeant Timmons.	TIE	TIE	TIE
197	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I was just talking with ID and we had a			
		phone call that came down to us saying			
	Sergeant	that they had a possible hijack out of			
198	Timmons:	Boston.	TIE	TIE	TIE
199	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		And I just flipped around and we were just			
		- we always watch the news and a 737 hit			
		the World Trade Center and I was just			
	Sergeant	curious at the same time if that was the			
200	Timmons:	aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG

		Last I knew they had a primary on him and the track was not squawking 7500 but	77.0		
		it was -	IIS	TIE	TIE
201	Sergeant McCain:	Send them to New York City.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
		Still continue go. Okay. Okay.	MISC	US	MISC
		Who's plugged in up there?	IIG	US	IIG
		Plug in.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
		I'm gonna have to have you hold.	TIE	US	TIE
		This is what I've got so far.	TIE	TIE	TIE
202	Sergeant Timmons:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
203	Sergeant McCain:	We're working to confirm that.	TIE	TIE	TIE
204	Sergeant Timmons:	Okay. That's fine. I understand you guys are pretty busy -	MISC	MISC	MISC
205	Sergeant McCain:	We're jumping through hoops right now.	MISC	MISC	MISC
206	Sergeant Timmons:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
207	Sergeant McCain:	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
208	Sergeant Timmons:	All right, I tell you what. I'll give you guys a call back. I know you're pretty busy up there.	MISC	MISC	MISC
209	Sergeant McCain:	Yep. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
210	Sergeant Timmons:	All right. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
211	Sergeant McCain:	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain. May I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
212	Sergeant Timmons:	Sergeant Kelly from Otis. Flew panthers off at 1252 Zulu.	TIE	TIE	TIE

213	Sergeant McCain:	Roger that, thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
214	Sergeant Kelly:	- peculiar -	NC	NC	NC
215	Sergeant McCain:	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain. Can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
216	Sergeant Kelly:	Yeah, how are you doing? Lieuenant Tracy at Otis. How's it going?	MISC	MISC	MISC
217	Sergeant McCain:	We're kind of busy. How you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
218	Lieuenant Tracy:	I know. I'm busy here, too.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		We've got the I just want to let you know that there's a Maine 85 in the airspace -	TIE	TIE	TIE
219	Sergeant McCain:	What airspace?	IIG	IIG	IIG
220	Lieutenant Tracy:	Pardon?	MISC	MISC	MISC
221	Sergeant McCain:	What airspace?	IIG	IIG	IIG
222	Lieutenant Tracy:	In Whisky 105.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		It may be useable for the missions that our panthers just took off on.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
223	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Stand by. Let me run this up the channel.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		We're gonna pass that up and if we need them then we'll get back to you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		How's that?	IIG	US	IIG
224	Lieutenant Tracy:	That's great.	TIE	TIE	TIE
225	Sergeant McCain:	That's the best we can do right now.	ISA	TIE	ISA
226	Lieutenant Tracy:	Yeah, you can - you can probably get them through Giant Killer if they're in the area.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
		They're out of Bangor and confirm that the location was 40, 40 north, west 74	IIG	IIG	IIG

			please?			
227		Sergeant McCain:	I'm sorry? Say that again.	MISC	MISC	MISC
228		Lieutenant Tracy:	40, 40 north, west 74.	TIE	TIE	TIE
229		Sergeant McCain:	74 west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		-	And that is the location of the Maine 85?	IIG	IIG	IIG
230		Lieutenant Tracy:	No, that was the location that you guys gave me of the - of the 767.	TIE	TIE	TIE
231		Sergeant McCain:	Okay. I -	NC	NC	NC
232		Lieutenant Tracy:	I wanted to double check the 74 west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
233		Sergeant McCain:	We're hearing - we're hearing reports right now that the civilian aircraft crashed in to the World Trade Center. Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
234	[00:15]	Lieutenant Tracy:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
235		Sergeant McCain:	It's not confirmed at this point. We're trying to confirm that. It's all over the news and the whole nine yards	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Just confirmed it? Boston Center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
236		Lieutenant Tracy:	Holy shit.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			There it is.	TIE	TIE	TIE
237		Sergeant McCain:	All right? So we don't know what's going on.	ISA	TIE	ISA
238		Lieutenant Tracy:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
239		Sergeant McCain:	All right?	MISC	MISC	MISC
240		Lieutenant Tracy:	Well, I'll get off the phone.	MISC	MISC	MISC
241		Sergeant McCain:	I'll try to keep you informed.	MISC	MISC	MISC
242		Lieutenant Tracy:	Okay, thanks. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
243		Sergeant McCain:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC

		This is Sergeant Akin calling from			
		International Guard Operation Center at			
244	Lieutenant Tracy:	Andrews.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I can probably pretty much assume that			
		ya'll are being a little bit busy up there now.	IIS	US	IIS
245	G P I				
245	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		But I have a question. Can you confirm if Otis was scrambled on to those aircraft			
246	Sergeant Akin:	that are out there toward -	IIG	IIG	IIG
247	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
248	Sergeant Akin:	That was agreed?	IIG	IIG	IIG
249	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yes, definitely.	TIE	TIE	TIE
250	Sergeant Akin:	Thank you very much.	MISC	MISC	MISC
251	Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
252	Sergeant Akin:	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
253	Sergeant Bianchi:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
254	Sergeant Akin:	Yes, this is Sergeant Akin calling again.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I just need to get your name and I spoke with you earlier about the 102nd			
		scramble.	IIG	IIG	IIG
255	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
256	Sergeant Akin:	Can I get your name again?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Sergeant Bianchi. Bravo, India, November - Alpha, November, Charlie,			
257	Sergeant Bianchi:	Hotel, India.	TIE	TIE	TIE
258	Sergeant Akin:	Okay. Your rank again?	IIG	IIG	IIG
259	Sergeant Bianchi:	Senior Analyst.	TIE	TIE	TIE
260	Sergeant Akin:	Senior Analyst? Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC

261	Sergeant Bianchi:	Second aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG
262	Sergeant Akin:	Yeah, yeah.	NC	NC	NC
263	Huntress:	That one looks like it's -	NC	NC	NC
264	Male Speaker:	United?	IIG	IIG	IIG
265	Huntress:	We're calling it a jet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
266	Male Speaker:	The first one -	NC	NC	NC
267	Huntress:	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain. May I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
268	Female Speaker:	Hey, it's Ken Borchen down at Langley.	TIE	TIE	TIE
269	Sergeant McCain:	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
270	Ken Borchen:	Do you guys have a few available to let us know what's going on right now?	IIG	IIG	IIG
271	Sergeant McCain:	I'm sorry?	MISC	MISC	MISC
272	Ken Borchen:	Do you guys have a few available or -	IIG	IIG	IIG
273	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah, hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
274	Ken Borchen:	Any word on what's going on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
275	Sergeant McCain:	None of this is really classified that we know of. It's all over the news if you've seen the news.	TKS	TKS	TKS
276	Ken Borchen:	Yeah. Is that why we're getting the battle stations?	IIG	IIG	IIG
277	Sergeant McCain:	Yes, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
278	Ken Borchen:	Okay. I'll call you back then.	MISC	MISC	MISC
279	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
280	Ken Borchen:	Giant Killer call.	NC	NC	NC
281	Sergeant McCain:	We're actually -	NC	NC	NC
282	Huntress:	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
283	Male Speaker:	Yes, this is Kelly from Langley.	MISC	MISC	MISC

284	Sergeant McCain	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
285	Lt. Kelly:	Hold for MCC Major Evans.	MISC	MISC	MISC
286	Sergeant McCain:	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
287	Lt. Kelly:	Go ahead. Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
288	Male Speaker:	We are looking for words on - for the battle stations.	IIG	IIG	IIG
289	Sergeant McCain:	It's Langley Command Post. They want words on why they're on battle stations.	TKS	TKS	TKS
	Major Evans:	We're looking for words.	TIE	TIE	TIE
291	Sergeant McCain:	Have you been watching the news?	IIG	IIG	IIG
292	Major Evans:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
293	Sergeant McCain:	That's why.	TIE	TIE	TIE
294	Major Evans:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
295	Sergeant McCain:	- Langley Command Post.	TIE	TIE	TIE
296	Major Evans:	Okay. That's the reason -	TIE	TIE	TIE
297	Sergeant McCain:	You can pass it to the as well.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
298	Major Evans:	We were looking for the words because we understand we need to get words.	IIG	IIG	IIG
299	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Air sovereignty national -	TIE	TIE	TIE
300	Major Evans:	Go.	MISC	MISC	MISC
301	Sergeant McCain:	Hey, this is Major McCarthy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Who am I speaking to?	IIG	IIG	IIG
302	Major Nasypany:	This is Major Nasypany.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
303	Major McCarthy:	Hey, Nasypany. Are you guys watching CNN?	IIG	IIG	IIG

		Yep. We are in a situation right now. I'm			
304	Major Nasypany:	kind of busy so -	MISC	MISC	MISC
305	Major McCarthy:	Okay. I just wanted to -	NC	NC	NC
306	Major Nasypany:	Yeah. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
307	Major McCarthy:	Attention in the Ops room. All personnel who are not actively involved right now, would they please leave the Ops room? I'll say again: All personnel that are not actively involved please leave the Ops room.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
308	Major Nasypany:	Yes, I do.	NC	NC	NC
	тајот назурану.	Do you have contact with that aircraft	NC	NC	NC
309	Male Speaker:	airborne?	IIG	IIG	IIG
310	Male Speaker:	No. United 175 is the second aircraft that crashed in to the Trade Center.	TIE	TIE	TIE
311	Huntress:	Okay. That's what I needed, Sir, is confirmation.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Only one other question: The on board were either ?	NC	NC	NC
312	Male Speaker:	You'd have to get Boston Center on that.	TSOG	US	TSOG
		They were both out of Boston going to Los Angeles.	TIE	TIE	TIE
313	Huntress:	·	NC	NC	NC
314	Male Speaker:	Boston Center would have that information.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We don't have that information yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
315	Huntress:	Thank you, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
316	Male Speaker:	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
317	Huntress:	Sorry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
318	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

319		Huntress:	Yes. No, we're here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
320		Male Speaker:	November, 612, Uniform, Alpha.	TIE	TIE	TIE
321		Huntress:	November, 612, Uniform, Alpha.	TIE	TIE	TIE
322		Male Speaker:	Yeah, we shut all the traffic off at Boston Center.  Nobody is departing.	TIE TIE	TIE TIE	TIE TIE
			We're routing all incoming arrivals New York Metro Airport.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I have a question for you in case we have any more aircraft that start deviating. We need to -	NC	NC	NC
323		Huntress:	I don't even have one.	TIE	TIE	TIE
324		Male Speaker:	I'm not gonna send that because I don't know what the hell to put on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
325		Male Speaker:	American Airlines is still airborne, still hijacked.	TIE	TIE	TIE
326		Male Speaker:	Oh, God. They better call the President.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
327		Female Speaker:	Believe me, we know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
328	[00:20]	Female Speaker:	American 11.	TIE	TIE	TIE
329		Male Speaker:	New York, Huntress ID reference American Airlines 11.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I'm calling American right now - New York.	TIE	TIE	TIE
330		Male Speaker:	This is New York. Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
331		Huntress:	Yes, Sir. We just had information that American Airlines 11 is still airborne heading towards Washington.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Did you get that information?	IIG	IIG	IIG
332		Male Speaker:	Stand by.	MISC	MISC	MISC

		Sir, I'm on with New York. I'm on with			
333	Huntress:	New York, hold on.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Tail number is right here. November,			
		334, Alpha, Alpha.	TIE	TIE	TIE
334	Male Speaker:	- Alpha, Alpha - American -	NC	NC	NC
335	Huntress:	Air Defense?	MISC	MISC	MISC
336	Female Speaker:	Yes, go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
337	Male Speaker:	What beacon code are you looking at?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Sir, we don't have a beacon code. We			
338	Huntress:	only have a tail number.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Last known beacon code was 1443 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I'm gonna give you a phone number and			
339	Male Speaker:	you need to call them because -	DTA(RTA)	TIE	DTA(RTA)
340	Huntress:	Is it 631-468-,	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Sir, 5959?	IIG	IIG	IIG
341	Male Speaker:	It's 631-468-5959.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		That's the Watts desk and they'll have any information you may need on this flight.	TSOG	US	TSOG
342	Huntress:	Okay. If you can do me a favor and have them call us.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
		We cannot call out for some reason.	TIE	TIE	TIE
343	Male Speaker:	All right. Let me have your number.	IIG	IIG	IIG
344	Huntress:	It's - Do you have DSN or no?	IIG	IIG	IIG
345	Male Speaker:	I'm sorry?	MISC	MISC	MISC
346	Huntress:	315 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
347	Male Speaker:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
348	Huntress:	- 334 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
349	Male Speaker:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
350	Huntress:	-6344	TIE	TIE	TIE

351	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
352	Huntress:	Thank you, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
353	Male Speaker:	All right. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
354	Huntress:	Oh, shoot. 6348, 6344.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Who needs what? Major Anderson? Major Anderson, what did you need? American Airlines 11?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		New York is gonna call me back right now with the information that they have.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I'm just waiting.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		That's the first one we had that we thought went into the World Trade Center. 767 type aircraft. We got his tail number and everything.	TKS	US	TKS
355	Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
356	Huntress:	How you doing? This is Kelly. Can I post?	IIG	IIG	IIG
357	Sergeant Perry:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
358	Lt. Kelly:	Langley.	NC	NC	NC
359	Sergeant Perry:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
360	Lt. Kelly:	We need the heading again. The altitude -	IIG	IIG	IIG
361	Sergeant Perry:	The altitude? Stand by. Langley needs an altitude.	IIG	IIG	IIG
362	Lt. Kelly:	Okay. 010299. Let me give you another heading. We don't have a -	TIE	TIE	TIE
363	Sergeant Perry:	We have tankers - We have additional tankers on the wire.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Call sign? I'm not sure on the numbers.	TIE	TIE	TIE
364	Male Speaker:	I'm aware of it, yes. Thank you, Sir.	US	TIE	TIE

			We got the tail number, November, 334,			
365		Male Speaker:	Alpha, Alpha.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			when they hit still airborne, still hijacked.	TIE	TIE	TIE
366		Mala Cara alam	Ť	MISC	MISC	MISC
300		Male Speaker:	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
367		Female Speaker:	Okay. This is Langley again. What's the primary? Is it 234?	IIG	IIG	IIG
368		Sergeant Perry:	Standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC
369		Male Speaker:	Copy.	MISC	MISC	MISC
370		Sergeant Perry:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
371		Male Speaker:	I need a -	NC	NC	NC
372		Sergeant Perry:	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
373		Male Speaker:	I don't know exactly where -	TIE	TIE	TIE
374		Sergeant Perry:	All right. Nothing heard.	TIE	TIE	TIE
375		Male Speaker:	Ten miles.	TIE	TIE	TIE
376		Sergeant Perry:	Oh, yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
377		Male Speaker:	Hello? What? I just got here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
378	[00:25]	Male Speaker:	- World Trade Center. That's the second aircraft that hit.	TKS	TKS	TKS
379		Mala Casakan	Northeast, Sergeant Perry. Nothing heard. We're trying to get a hold of them. We're	TIE	TIE	TIE
380		Male Speaker:	trying to make sure -	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.			
381		Sergeant Perry:	from CONAR.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Hey, real quick can you guys throw in the chat with squawks for the Otis birds, please?	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
382		Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay. We'll send it on to the chat.	TIE	TIE	TIE
383		Male Speaker:	Thank you. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC

384	Sergeant Bianchi:	You're welcome. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
385	Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
386	Sergeant Bianchi:	Hi, Sergeant Lucas calling from Lotus.	MISC	MISC	MISC
387	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
388	Sergeant Lucas:	We're in the CONAR chat here and see I that CONAR - the region commander has directed all sectors -  Are we increasing THREATCOM?	TIE IIG	TIE IIG	TIE IIG
			по	110	no
389	Sergeant Bianchi:	I know we are for New York. That's all I know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
390	Sergeant Lucas:	Okay. So we are not at this time?	IIG	IIG	IIG
391	Sergeant Bianchi:	I don't believe you are. I haven't read the chat. I haven't got the chat in front of me so I couldn't tell you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
392	Sergeant Lucas:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
393	Sergeant Bianchi:	All right?	MISC	MISC	MISC
394	Sergeant Lucas:	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
395	Sergeant Bianchi:	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
396	Sergeant Lucas:	This is Air Force, Sergeant Michael speaking.	MISC	MISC	MISC
397	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yeah, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		The force protection plan and the force protection mission Bravo, was that just for NEADS or us or -	IIG	IIG	IIG
398	Sergeant Michael:	It's everybody in New York State.	TIE	TIE	TIE
399	Sergeant McCain:	That's all of New York?	IIG	IIG	IIG
400	Sergeant Michael:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE

401		What about for CONAR? Have you heard	W.C.	WG	W.G
401	Sergeant McCain:	anything?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		No, I haven't heard anything about that.			
	C	All I heard about was all national guard			
402	Sergeant Michael:	units inside of New York State - General Barbarren put them in to Bravo.	TKS	TIE	TKS
402	Michael.	Okay. In New York. All right. Thank	110	TIL	TKS
403	Sergeant McCain:	vou.	MISC	MISC	MISC
	Sergeant				
404	Michael:	All right?	MISC	MISC	MISC
405	Sergeant McCain:	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
	Sergeant	Indianapolis was the last one to work with			
406	Michael:	it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
407	Sergeant McCain:	- earlier from Boston?	IIG	IIG	IIG
408	Male Speaker:	Yeah, Boston to L.A.	TIE	TIE	TIE
409	Male Speaker:	Boston to L.A.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We don't know what the hell it's for. All			
410	Male Speaker:	we can do is say we - I don't know -	TIE	TIE	TIE
411	Huntress:	Go ahead. Hold on -	MISC	MISC	MISC
		It's over Long Island over			
412	Male Speaker:	Long Island and	TIE	TIE	TIE
413	Sergeant McCain:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		It's here from CONAR. We			
414	Male Speaker:	need a phone number for the air team.	IIG	IIG	IIG
415	Sergeant Bianchi:	Air team?	IIG	IIG	IIG
416	Male Speaker:	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
417	Sergeant Bianchi:	Hold on a second. Oh, hold on a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
418	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
419	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yep. Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC

120			- 010 - Did you catch that in - 6 miles east			
420		Male Speaker:	of the White House.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			304 extension will get you right to a			
421		Sergeant Bianchi:	commander.	TIE	TIE	TIE
422		Male Speaker:	Say again now? I couldn't hear that.	IIG	IIG	IIG
423		Sergeant Bianchi:	587-6304.	TIE	TIE	TIE
424		Male Speaker:	6304. Thanks very much.	TIE	TIE	TIE
425		Sergeant Bianchi:	Right here, Sir. Here's your target. Bravo 032.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
426		Male Speaker:	Hey, it's Sergeant Benowski at the post at Langley.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Did you do a for our guys?	IIG	IIG	IIG
427	[00:30]	Sergeant Bianchi:	I'm sorry, ma'am. 1335?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Sergeant				
428		Benowski:	Yes, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
429		Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay. That's what I need.	TIE	TIE	TIE
430		Sergeant Benowski:	Okay. Thanks. Bye-bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
431		Sergeant Bianchi:	Steve, prosecute Bravo 032.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
432		Sergeant Benowski:	Radar only. Bravo 326?	IIG	IIG	IIG
433		Male Speaker:	32	TIE	TIE	TIE
434		Male Speaker:	Bravo 032.	TIE	TIE	TIE
435		Sergeant Bianchi:	Don't have an altitude?	IIG	IIG	IIG
436		Male Speaker:	Don't have an altitude. 290 knots.	TIE	TIE	TIE
437		Male Speaker:	<u>?</u>	NC	NC	NC
438		Sergeant Bianchi:	We don't have an altitude.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		is at 80 now. Bravo 032, that's			
439	Male Speaker:	the aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Get his Z point. Thank you.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
440	Sergeant Bianchi:	Where are the fighters?	IIG	IIG	IIG
441	Male Speaker:	2T25. Quit 25 right down thereon bad data now. Zero velocity. 032 back on the Z point.	TIE	TIE	TIE
442	Male Speaker:	I got it.	MISC	MISC	MISC
443	Male Speaker:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
444	Male Speaker:	Okay. From York, he was 080 to 01 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
445	Male Speaker:	Where is York?	IIG	IIG	IIG
446	Huntress:	Indianapolis.	TIE	TIE	TIE
447	Sergeant McCain:	Oh, okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
448	Huntress:	80,010	TIE	TIE	TIE
449	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. So 841 -	NC	NC	NC
450	Huntress:	38, 41 north. 082, 52 west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
451	Male Speaker:	How long ago?	IIG	IIG	IIG
452	Huntress:	When was that last, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
453	Sergeant McCain:	Right before we saw him -	TIE	TIE	TIE
454	Huntress:	That was his last -	TIE	TIE	TIE
455	Male Speaker:	They're doing that now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
456	Huntress:	Heading westbound 270.	TIE	TIE	TIE
457	Male Speaker:	Heading west 270.	TIE	TIE	TIE
458	Male Speaker:	I don't know his speed at this point. WE got that information off of the	TIE	TIE	TIE
459	Huntress:	Bravo 112. That point you gave me, Mo.	TIE	TIE	TIE
460	Male Speaker:	Lat and long - 270.	TIE	TIE	TIE
461	Sergeant McCain:	The point out is Bravo 112.	TIE	TIE	TIE
462	Huntress:	Bravo 112, Bravo 112.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		Bravo - American 77 last known position			
463	Sergeant McCain:	is Bravo 112. That hit point right there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
464	Huntress:	Right here?	IIG	IIG	IIG
465	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
466	Male Speaker:	Oh, my God.	MISC	MISC	MISC
467	Sergeant McCain:	What is it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
468	Female Speaker:	Delta what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
469	Male Speaker:	89	TIE	TIE	TIE
470	Male Speaker:	89. Boeing 757.	TIE	TIE	TIE
471	Male Speaker:	Las Vegas?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		I don't even know how the - I need a code.	IIG	IIG	IIG
472	Female Speaker:	089 is the Delta 89.	TIE	TIE	TIE
473	Sergeant McCain:	Bravo 089? Bravo 089. Area 1.	TIE	TIE	TIE
474	Female Speaker:	Yeah, that's another hijack. Delta is Bravo 089 has been trapped.	TKS	TIE	TKS
475	Sergeant McCain:	Do me a favor? Make sure that gets a special 15 just for everybody's information.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
476	Female Speaker:	Okay. I'm not sure where all the tankers are right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I got another hijack. Another hijack. It's a Delta - Delta 89.	TIE	TIE	TIE
477	Sergeant McCain:	It's right there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
478	Male Speaker:	Boston to Vegas. I know it's	TIE	TIE	TIE
479	Sergeant McCain:	It's right there. Approximately 75 miles.	TIE	TIE	TIE
480	Male Speaker:	Bravo 089.	TIE	TIE	TIE
481	Male Speaker:	Delta 89.	TIE	TIE	TIE
482	Sergeant McCain:	Take a deep breath.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			Oh, yeah. They've been airborne for quite			
483	[00:35]	Male Speaker:	a while. Sorry.	TIE	TIE	TIE
484		Male Speaker:	Come here.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
485		Sergeant McCain:	Go to be.	NC	NC	NC
486		Huntress:	Delta 89. Out of Boston heading to1304.	TIE	TIE	TIE
487		Male Speaker:	I got additional fighters coming out of - Got more aircraft coming out from Langley. First Fighter Wing.	TIE	TIE	TIE
488		Huntress:	south of Cleveland.	TIE	TIE	TIE
489		Male Speaker:	ALS, right?	IIG	IIG	IIG
490		Male Speaker:	Aircraft, right near the Okay. Steve, you've got an aircraft spotted right near the Pentagon.	TIE	TIE	TIE
491		Male Speaker:	Mode 3 -	IIG	IIG	IIG
492		Sergeant McCain:	1304	TIE	TIE	TIE
493		Huntress:	Okay, guys. Another aircraft spotted near the Pentagon.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Also, did you get the word that Delta 89 south of Toledo - Yeah, the track is Bravo 089.	IIG	IIG	IIG
494		Male Speaker:	Reclassified as specials, Laia. Somebody made a It's going back to special. I'm gonna forward tell it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			If CONAR calls, its -	NC	NC	NC
495		Male Speaker:	Bravo 089?	IIG	IIG	IIG
496		Sergeant McCain:	Bravo 089. That's the special. That's the Delta 89, 767, originally Boston to Las Vegas from what I understand.	TKS	TIE	TKS

		And I'm trying to contact			
497	Male Speaker:	for another possible hijack.	TIE	TIE	TIE
498	Sergeant McCain:	You might want to - you might want to talk to Duluth, too.	TSOG	DTA(RTA)	TSOG
		That's the keyboard. We've been so busy.	MISC	US	MISC
499	Male Speaker:	Talking about -	NC	NC	NC
500	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah, they've got guards posted all over - They ought to have some freaking Just grass, Mo.	TIE	TIE	TIE
501	Male Speaker:	Yeah, sky actually.	NC	NC	NC
502	Sergeant McCain:	No.	MISC	MISC	MISC
503	Male Speaker:	It just shows that the - I don't know.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		They ain't gonna do much at the White House.	TIE	TIE	TIE
504	Sergeant McCain:	We're talking to -	NC	NC	NC
505	Male Speaker:	Sergeant Perry?	IIG	US	IIG
		Is this his wife?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		We're really busy. Okay? Like -	MISC	MISC	MISC
506	Male Speaker:	Right there.	TIE	US	TIE
		Both of them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
507	Sergeant McCain:	What about Duluth?	IIG	US	IIG
		Did you think about them?	IIG	US	IIG
		What about Duluth? Did you -	IIG	IIG	IIG
508	Male Speaker:	- Fighters.	TIE	TIE	TIE

509	Sergeant McCain:	All right. Just throwing out possibilities.	MISC	MISC	MISC
	, ,	Force protection condition?	IIG	US	IIG
		We're at Bravo. Real world.	TIE	TIE	TIE
510	Male Speaker:	Real world?	IIG	IIG	IIG
E11	S. M.C.:	Call and a first and a second a standard	MICC	MICC	MICC
511	Sergeant McCain:	Call your wife when you get a chance.	MISC	MISC	MISC
510	14.1.6.1	Who's this?	MISC	MISC	MISC
512	Male Speaker:	near Lake Eerie.	TIE	TIE	TIE
513	Sergeant McCain:	This is Sergeant McCain.	MISC	US	MISC
		That is a Delta flight, 89.	TIE	TIE	TIE
514	Male Speaker:	They say it possibly may not be a hijack.	TIE	US	TIE
		He - They did get in touch with him.	TIE	US	TIE
		They confirmed that they are	TIE	TIE	TIE
515	Sergeant McCain:	So it's just a possible - Right now it's just a possible hijack, okay?	TIE	US	TIE
		They've started to learn towards it's not Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
		They are in contact with the FAA. They are in contact with that aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		It's a Delta 89 757	TIE	TIE	TIE
516	Huntress:	Keep them at high priority though, because they're not sure about that.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
517	Sergeant McCain:	Hey, How are you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
518	Huntress:	Not well.	MISC	MISC	MISC
519	Male Speaker:	Do you need help on anything?	IIG	IIG	IIG

			Nope. We got things as well handled as			
520		Male Speaker:	we can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
521		Male Speaker:	Okay. I'm in Rome,	TIE	US	TIE
			so if you need anything I can come right			
			in.	TIE	TIE	TIE
522		Male Speaker:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
523		Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
524		Male Speaker:	Okay. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
525		Male Speaker:	- Possible.	NC	NC	NC
526		Male Speaker:	High priority -	NC	NC	NC
527		Male Speaker:	Who was that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
528		Female Speaker:	One of the guys in wanting to know if we needed any help.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		•				
529		Sergeant McCain:	If anything, we need more trackers.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
530		Male Speaker:	Yep.	TIE	TIE	TIE
531	[00:40]	Sergeant McCain:	Say that again, please.	MISC	MISC	MISC
532		Male Speaker:	Who's that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
533		Male Speaker:	The search track is heading toward New York. That's all I know.	TIE	US	TIE
			He's got a tracker sitting here doing just New York and he's telling us the tracks. That's all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
534		Male Speaker:	Sergeant McCain.	TIE	TIE	TIE
535		Sergeant McCain:	Yes, this is	NC	NC	NC
536		Sergeant McCain:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC

537	Male Speaker:	DMNA just called.	TIE	TIE	TIE
538	Sergeant McCain:	Who?	IIG	IIG	IIG
539	Male Speaker:	DMNA.	TIE	TIE	TIE
5.40		NI d o	пс	W.C.	W.C.
540	Sergeant McCain:	Who are they?	IIG	IIG	IIG
541	Male Speaker:	Division Military and Naval Affairs.	TIE	TIE	TIE
542	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
543	Male Speaker:	We've been directed to force protection condition Charlie.	TIE	TIE	TIE
544	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. That's real world?	IIG	IIG	IIG
545	Male Speaker:	Yep. I'm here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
546	Sergeant McCain:	Hello? Can you hear me?	MISC	MISC	MISC
547	Male Speaker:	Yeah, I can now.	MISC	US	MISC
		Did you hear me?	MISC	MISC	MISC
548	Sergeant McCain:	Yes, I heard you.	TIE	US	TIE
		Force conduct - Force condition Charlie for New York State; is that correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
549	Male Speaker:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
550	Sergeant McCain:	Just New York State?	IIG	IIG	IIG
551	Male Speaker:	Yep.	TIE	TIE	TIE
552	Sergeant McCain:	Roger that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
553	Male Speaker:	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC

554	Sergeant McCain:	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
555	Male Speaker:	MCC - MCC -	MISC	MISC	MISC
556	Sergeant McCain:	Go ahead. Did you get word that the Pentagon has now been hit?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		We're at condition Charlie.	TIE	TIE	TIE
557	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
558	Sergeant McCain:	Charlie. Yep. We're at Charlie. No. Okay.	TIE	TIE	TIE
559	Male Speaker:	Okay. We need to be more selective on what we drop.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
		We have Boston - No, we have New York City and Washington back here.	TIE	US	TIE
		We're watching New York and Washington.	TIE	US	TIE
		Up there, they have Boston - the hijack headed west and the	TIE	TIE	TIE
560	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. There's one hijacker now?	IIG	IIG	IIG
561	Male Speaker:	Right now they -	NC	NC	NC
562	Sergeant McCain:	- Shelly, those are out of Langley. Shelly, those are the Langley -	TIE	TIE	TIE
563	Male Speaker:	Show that one Z point you just put in.	DTA(COA)	US	DTA(COA)
		Go.	DTA(COA)	US	DTA(COA)
		I see that guy going north.	IIS	US	IIS
		Let him run north.	DTA(COA)	US	DTA(COA)
		I don't want anything headed east.	DTA(COA)	US	DTA(COA)
		You tell me if you see anything heading towards New York City, okay?	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)

564	Male Speaker:		NC	NC	NC
565	Sergeant McCain:	Huh?	MISC	US	MISC
		That's not him. That's your search target right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We have fighters on cap over New York City. We have fighters right now headed for Washington to go on cap to be in position.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		They're trying to find someone to get on our western guy. They're having problems -	TIE	TIE	TIE
566	Male Speaker:	<u> </u>	NC	NC	NC
567	Male Speaker:	Yeah, they're having a problem. That might be. He might be headed towards the Sears Tower. I don't know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		They are trying to get on that guy someone - west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We don't know if they're trying to get someone from Selfridge has no aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
568	Male Speaker:	Steve, Steve. They're trying to get Toledo airborne.	TIE	TIE	TIE
569	Male Speaker:	Toledo?	IIG	IIG	IIG
570	Male Speaker:	They're trying to get Toledo up. We are trying to get a hold of Toledo.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Trying to get them airborne to get that other guy.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
571	Sergeant McCain:	There's four now reported.	TIE	US	TIE

		They're not where they're supposed to be.	TIE	TIE	TIE
572	Male Speaker:	Steve, do you have enough trackers?	IIG	IIG	IIG
573	Sergeant McCain:	Do we need anybody -	IIG	IIG	IIG
574	Male Speaker:	Do we need to recall anybody for tracking?	IIG	IIG	IIG
575	Sergeant McCain:	We have everybody in.	TIE	US	TIE
		I can get another crew in here pretty damn quick.	TSOG	TIE	TIE
576	Male Speaker:	No, we're okay right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
577	Sergeant McCain:	If I have to I'll call every son of a bitch I can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
578	Male Speaker:	We're okay right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
579	Male Speaker:	All right.	MISC	US	MISC
		Let me know.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
580	Male Speaker:	Hello?	MISC	US	MISC
		Did you catch that?	IIG	US	IIG
		089, hard right-hand turn at level 27,000.	TIE	TIE	TIE
581	Male Speaker:	They got a computer -	NC	NC	NC
582	Male Speaker:	What do you need utility for, Sir?	IIG	US	IIG
		You need TT?	IIG	US	IIG
		Okay. Long arm is down?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		I need TT out here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
583	Sergeant McCain:	Nobody at Duluth. They don't have any aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Try to get Toledo up.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
584	Male Speaker:	I need GTE out here immediately.	TIE	TIE	TIE
585	Male Speaker:	Jeff, long arm radios are down.	TIE	TIE	TIE

586		Sergeant McCain:	I got four so far.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			They reported American Airlines 11, American Airlines -	TIE	TIE	TIE
587	[00:45]	Male Speaker:	They're still airborne?	IIG	IIG	IIG
588		Male Speaker:	No. This is from the beginning of this whole shebang.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Keep an eye on it.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			Where's he at?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Weapons has the listings in their checklist. In the checklist they have a whole ITA listing. I don't know what they're - Boston and New York.	TIE	TIE	TIE
589		Sergeant McCain:	Surveillance, Sergeant Richmond. Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
590		Male Speaker:	Hello, this is Sergeant Barns at the 103 <sup>rd.</sup>	MISC	MISC	MISC
591		Sergeant McCain:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
592		Sergeant Richmond:	I got a call earlier saying you guys might need a?	TIE	TIE	TIE
593		Sergeant Barns:	Let me - Let me give you to my MCC -	MISC	MISC	MISC
594		Sergeant Richmond:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
595		Sergeant Barns:	Who is this? The 103 <sup>rd</sup> ?	IIG	IIG	IIG
596		Sergeant Richmond:	103 <sup>rd</sup> .	TIE	TIE	TIE
597		Sergeant Barns:	I'm sending you to 6311.	TIE	TIE	TIE
598		Sergeant Richmond:	Yeah, I did.	NC	NC	NC

		Northeast?	NC	NC	NC
599	Sergeant Barns:	Hello, sir. This is Sergeant Demage at the 103 <sup>rd</sup> ACS.	MISC	TIE	TIE
		I got a call from you guys earlier saying you might need a sub. Do you need us?	IIG	IIG	IIG
600	Sergeant Richmond:	Let me find out for you. Hold on.	TIE	TIE	TIE
601	Sergeant McCain:	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
602	Sergeant Demage:	Do you need the 103 <sup>rd</sup> out of Connecticut?	IIG	IIG	IIG
603	Sergeant McCain:	Not yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
604	Sergeant Demage:	Not yet, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
605	Sergeant McCain:	Do you want us to - to get our radar up or -	IIG	IIG	IIG
606	Male Speaker:	Stand by and crank it a turn, he says.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
607	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. We have people in route to turn it on right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
608	Sergeant Demage:	Okay. We'll be ready.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Thanks. Gotcha.	MISC	US	MISC
609	Sergeant McCain:	MCC?	MISC	MISC	MISC
610	Sergeant Demage:	What?	MISC	MISC	MISC
611	Sergeant McCain:	Charlie crew swing surveillance?	IIG	IIG	IIG

612	Male Speaker:	You need them?	IIG	IIG	IIG
613	Sergeant McCain:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
614	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
615	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Long arm radios, computer up front is locked up.	TIE	TIE	TIE
616	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
617	Sergeant McCain:	Looks like the Pentagon got hit.	TIE	TIE	TIE
618	Male Speaker:	Pentagon did get hit.	TKS	TIE	TIE
		We need to make a command decision.  saying he needs some more surveillance people.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We're recommending Charlie crew swing to come in here.	TIE	TIE	TSOG
619	Sergeant McCain:	He needed and it wasn't working.	TIE	TIE	TIE
620	Male Speaker:	Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
		We're all here. Northeast.	TIE	TIE	TIE
621	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah, I'm looking for a Major Deskins.	TIE	US	TIE
		This is Major Mormon from Springfield National Guard Base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
622	Huntress:	Stand by. Stand by. I'll get you Major Deskins -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
623	Sergeant McCain:	Who am I talking to right now? What office?	IIG	IIG	IIG
624	Major Mormon:	This is the Ops floor, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE

625	Sergeant McCain:	Of where?	IIG	IIG	IIG
626	Major Mormon:	Of Northeast Air Defense Sector.	TIE	TIE	TIE
627	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
628	Major Mormon:	Huntress. I just motioned. She's up and behind some glass here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
629	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. I don't need to talk to her.	TIE	US	TIE
		What we're trying to do is she just called here and said we need airplanes in the air.	TIE	US	TIE
		I don't know why she called Springfield National Guard Base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
630	Major Mormon:	We've got a problem out there. That's why she called.	TIE	TIE	TIE
631	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. You know where our airplanes are, correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
632	Major Mormon:	Sir, I really - I haven't been working that part of our -	TIE	TIE	TIE
633	Sergeant McCain:	I understand. I -	MISC	MISC	MISC
634	Major Mormon:	I'm not familiar -	NC	NC	NC
635	Sergeant McCain:	I understand. All I'm doing is following up on a phone call and make sure it wasn't somebody -	TIE	TIE	TIE
636	Major Mormon:	I've got her coming down here right now and she'll be here in just a minute.	TIE	TIE	TIE
637	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

620		6311. The Ohio National Guard. You	TOTAL	TEVE:	TELE
638	Major Mormon:	called them. You called them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
639	Sergeant McCain:	Major Deskins.	MISC	MISC	MISC
640	Major Mormon:	Major Deskins? This is Major Tom Mormon from -	TIE	TIE	TIE
641	Sergeant McCain:	Oh, by the way. 68 IC 3, 68 IC 3, be advised we are at 4 <sup>th</sup> option Bravo. Force protection Bravo. Real world.	TIE	TIE	TIE
642	Major Deskins:	Copy.	MISC	MISC	MISC
643	Major Mormon:	Copy.	MISC	MISC	MISC
644	Male Speaker:	I hate to bother you with this, okay, but Steve says he needs more people. I suggest we call -	TIE	TIE	TIE
645	Male Speaker:	Force protection -	TIE	TIE	TIE
646	Male Speaker:	We call Charlie Crew Swings.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I want all the surveillance people in here pronto.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
647	Sergeant McCain:	- the other one now.	NC	NC	NC
648	Male Speaker:	No problem.	MISC	US	MISC
		Kevin? Make sure that this is a no bullshit recall. I want them in here as fast as possible.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
		Quit 301. Try it.	NC	NC	NC
649	Sergeant McCain:	I don't know. Do you need more people?	IIG	IIG	IIG
650	Huntress:	- for 89?	IIG	IIG	IIG

651		Sergeant McCain:	- I don't know who they're -	NC	NC	NC
652		Sergeant McCain:	Stand by. I may need you as a runner.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
		8	Do you need more people?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I'm gonna get you two.	TIE	US	TIE
			Go find Kevin Foster and tell him I need two ID techs from Charlie ASAP.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
653		Huntress:	From what I understand, this guy out west is orbiting?	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Is that what I heard?	IIG	IIG	IIG
654		Male Speaker:	I got a recall Charlie flight surveillance, and I recalled two ID techs over here so that these guys can get a break.	TIE	US	TIE
			These guys have been sitting here and messing with this stuff.	TIE	US	TIE
			You need some kind of food.	TIE	MISC	MISC
			Sir, I recalled all of Charlie Crew surveillance and two ID techs.	TIE	US	TIE
			We recalled Charlie crew surveillance from swing and two ID techs from Charlie flight.	TIE	TIE	TIE
655	[00:50]	Sergeant McCain:	We called Charlie crew surveillance. We already did it. We already did. It's already been done. They've been recalled.	TIE	TIE	TIE
656	[00.00]	Male Speaker:	MCC, 257 has gone to 1,200 target -	TIE	TIE	TIE

657	Sergeant McCain:	Hey, Steve. How you doing?	MISC	US	MISC
		Hey, we're not doing so good right now.	MISC	US	MISC
		I need you guys to make sure that -	MISC	MISC	MISC
658	Male Speaker:	Attention in the area, attention in the area. Check noise level in the Ops room, please.	MISC	MISC	IIG
		Noise level in the Ops room. Did anyone hear it?	IIG	US	IIG
		Can you please - Chuck, Bravo 089. That's the track number. Okay.	TIE	US	TIE
		Tell them we're still gonna keep it at 15 until we confirm that he's on the ground. All right?	DTA(RTA)	TIE	TIE
		Northeast, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	US	MISC
659	Male Speaker:	Yeah, this is Sergeant Centra- at Southeast.	MISC	US	MISC
		Could you confirm that B089 is where it's supposed to be?	IIG	IIG	IIG
660	Male Speaker:	Can I confirm what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
661	Sergeant McCain:	That the track of special in your area -	IIG	IIG	IIG
662	Sergeant Centra	Bravo 089?	IIG	US	IIG
		Okay. Last - These are the last words, okay?	TIE	US	TIE
		They got in touch with the pilot. He is evidently not declaring a hijack and is landing at Cleveland for precautionary measures only. But -	TIE	TIE	TIE

663	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		- But we are going to keep him a special 15 until we confirm him down on the			
664	Sergeant Centra:	ground and safe.	TIE	TIE	TIE
665	Sergeant McCain:	I understand.	MISC	MISC	MISC
666	Sergeant Centra:	Understand? Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
667	Sergeant McCain:	You to 6854.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
668	Sergeant Centra:	At this point, I ain't doing shit. I'm just passing on information.	MISC	MISC	MISC
669	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
670	Male Speaker:	6854, I got the 103 <sup>rd</sup> coming to you - I'm talking to my operator.	TIE	US	TIE
		I got the 103rd coming your way. I'm sending you to 6854.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		MCC? The 103rd working a link.	TIE	TIE	TIE
671	Sergeant McCain:	You the man.	MISC	MISC	MISC
672	Male Speaker:	Connecticut I want to say or Rhode Island. Connecticut.	TIE	TIE	TIE
673	Male Speaker:	Connecticut. It's Connecticut. The 103 <sup>rd</sup> is up in birds	TIE	TIE	TIE
674	Sergeant McCain:	I don't know. I know they were looking for number. I don't know what's going on with that.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			MCC,?	NC	NC	NC
675		Male Speaker:	I don't know. Let me check.	MISC	MISC	MISC
676		Sergeant McCain:	I need to know. All the targets -	IIG	IIG	IIG
677		Male Speaker:	Do we have any available?	IIG	IIG	IIG
678		Sergeant McCain:	That's what I'm asking.	TIE	TIE	TIE
679		Male Speaker:	Okay. That's what you're asking?	IIG	IIG	IIG
600			V	Mag	NACC	NACC
680		Sergeant McCain:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
681		Male Speaker:	Steve? Steve?	MISC	MISC	MISC
682		Sergeant McCain:	Yes?	MISC	MISC	MISC
683		Male Speaker:	A request just went in for an E3 over Chicago.	TIE	TIE	TIE
684	[00:55]	Sergeant McCain:	Got it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
685		Male Speaker:	Yeah, he was making a turn down -	TIE	TIE	TIE
686		Sergeant McCain:	I got the recall in.	TIE	TIE	TIE
687		Male Speaker:	calling from	MISC	US	MISC
007		тие эреакет.	I'd like to do 3 or 4 line checks.	TIE	TIE	TIE
688		Female Speaker:	Not a good time. Not a good time at all.	TIE	US	TIE
000		I churc speuter.	We've got all kinds of shit hitting the fan down here. Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
689		Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Forget it.	MISC	MISC	MISC
690		Male Speaker:	Yeah, do it later.	MISC	MISC	MISC

691	Sergeant Bianchi:	Washington -	NC	NC	NC
692	Male Speaker:	How long?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		We have to get a hold of Booster. Major			
		Booster.	TIE	US	TIE
		Can we call him? Did you try to call him?	IIG	US	IIG
		Try Major Booster and try Captain Ruby.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
		Where's the recall book? The recall roster?	IIG	US	IIG
		Get a hold of Booster.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
		If you can't get a hold of him then get a hold of Humberg. Humberg's at home			
		asleep.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
		It's all there. All your recall officers are there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Northeast? Okay. Major Cheney, how are you doing? Are you having any problems out there?	MISC	IIG	IIG
		Okay. You got two going up to Fargo -	TIE	US	TIE
		This is Sergeant McCain. How are you doing, Major Cheney? We're kind of busy here.	MISC	US	MISC
		Two at Fargo and two city. I'll pass that on.	TIE	US	TIE
		Under FAA control right now?	IIG	IIG	IIG
693	Sergeant Bianchi:	airline.	NC	NC	NC
694	Male Speaker:	Right. Got it. That's fine.	MISC	US	MISC
		I'll let them know.	MISC	US	MISC

		You bet. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
695	Sergeant McCain:	No, we don't know where he is.	TIE	TIE	TIE
696	Huntress:	just called.	TIE	US	TIE
		You got two coming up on status with Fargo and two more in two cities.	TIE	TIE	TIE
697	Sergeant McCain:	Why aren't we calling the other crew?	IIG	IIG	IIG
698	Huntress:	That's from the lodge. That came from the lodge.	TIE	US	TIE
		They're bringing them on status.	TIE	US	TIE
		Yes, it will be about half an hour before they get there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Sergeant McCain. Sergeant McCain, Northeast	MISC	US	MISC
699	Sergeant McCain:	Yes, this is	MISC	US	MISC
		Is the exercise knocked off?	IIG	IIG	IIG
700	Male Speaker:	The exercise was cancelled.	TIE	US	TIE
		We're all out of parts here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
701	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. I'll call the battle gap cab. Thanks.	TIE	TIE	TIE
702	Male Speaker:	Sergeant Demage?	MISC	US	MISC
		We are working a tanker.	TIE	TIE	TIE
703	Sergeant McCain:	There is a bomb on board Boston -	TKS	TIE	TIE
704	Male Speaker:	Fuck.	MISC	MISC	MISC
705	Male Speaker:	On board what? Boston 93?	IIG	IIG	IIG
706	Huntress:	United.	TIE	TIE	TIE

707		Male Speaker:	United?	IIG	IIG	IIG
708		Sergeant McCain:	Bomb on board United 93.	TKS	TIE	TIE
709		Huntress:	Intercept. Intercept. We want the aircraft away from there.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
710		Sergeant McCain:	United 93, bomb on board. They are recently over Pittsburg.	TKS	TIE	TIE
711	[01:00]	Huntress:	You have a mode 3 code?	IIG	IIG	IIG
712		Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
713		Huntress:	Yeah, Lieutenant calling from down Southeast.	MISC	MISC	MISC
714		Sergeant McCain:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
715		Sergeant Perry:	Hey, just wanted to confirm that that guy that you're telling us, Bravo 089 is Delta 89?	IIG	IIG	IIG
716		Male Speaker:	That's correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
717		Sergeant Perry:	Oh, okay. I'm seeing the stuff in the chat here, too.	IIG	US	IIG
			Can you lat tel that to us?	IIG	IIG	IIG
718		Male Speaker:	Can we lat tel what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
719		Sergeant Perry:	I got another thing here from 14:07 from NEADS MCC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
720		Male Speaker:	What do you need?	IIG	IIG	IIG
721		Sergeant Perry:	About the aircraft from Canada? We'd like to get a position on that.	IIG	IIG	IIG
722		Male Speaker:	We don't have a position on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
723		Sergeant Perry:	Okay. Good deal. Hey, what's going on with Delta 89? Is he landing or -	IIG	IIG	IIG

704	M 1 G 1	He's landing - Last we heard he's	TIVO	TELE	THE
724	Male Speaker:	supposed to be landing at Cleveland.	TKS	TIE	TIE
725	Sergeant Perry:	Okay. Good deal.	MISC	MISC	MISC
726	Male Speaker:	Got to go.	MISC	MISC	MISC
727	Sergeant Perry:	Wait -	MISC	MISC	MISC
728	Male Speaker:	Any squawks?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		If this is the next guy's input then this is a good one.	NC	NC	NC
729	Sergeant Perry:	You couldn't orchestrate this kind of bullshit.	MISC	MISC	MISC
730	Female Speaker:	Into Cleveland. Okay.	TIE	TIE	TIE
731	Sergeant McCain:	1527 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
732	Male Speaker:	1527? Can we locate that, please?	IIG	US	IIG
		1527, right?	IIG	IIG	IIG
733	Sergeant McCain:	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
734	Female Speaker:	1527, mode 3, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
735	Sergeant McCain:	35911. 35911. 078, 46 west.	TIE	TIE	TIE
736	Male Speaker:	7846. Going in for a Z point.	TIE	TIE	TIE
737	Male Speaker:	Thank you, Sir. This is the plane with the bomb on board.	TKS	TIE	TIE
738	Female Speaker:	351 north 078, 46.	TIE	TIE	TIE
739	Sergeant McCain:	Airborne in 20 minutes.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		All I got is a Z point - I got a Z point but to tell you the truth, I don't know what the			
		track number is. I can't find it but it's in			
740	Female Speaker:	there.	TIE	US	TIE
		If you look right on that you			
		gave me. 3978 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
7.41		G : 2200	TO TO	TO TO	
741	Sergeant McCain:	Coming up on 3280 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
742	Male Speaker:	Bravo 424, what's the Z point on that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
743	Sergeant McCain:	Why are they calling Charlie Crew in?	IIG	IIG	IIG
744	Male Speaker:	Huh?	IIG	IIG	IIG
745	Sergeant McCain:	Why are they calling Charlie Crew in?	IIG	IIG	IIG
746	Male Speaker:	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Colonel Lott from the 174 <sup>th</sup> is the SD			
747	Male Speaker:	available?	MISC	MISC	MISC
748	Male Speaker:	Yes, Sir. Stand by.	MISC	US	MISC
		Colonel Lott from 174th wants to talk to			
		you, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
749	Sergeant Perry:	·	NC	NC	NC
		I'm doing, well, as good as can be			
750	Colonel Lott:	expected.	TIE	US	TIE
		I got guys that will be launching in about 15 minutes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
751	Sergeant Perry:	I appreciate it.	MISC	US	MISC
731	Sergeum Lerry.	Are they loaded?	IIG	IIG	IIG
752	Male Speaker:	We've got hot guns. That's all I -	TIE	TIE	TIE
753	Colonel Lott:	Hot guns?	IIG	US	IIG

			Well, that's good enough for me for the time being. Only words I got are - I got another possible aircraft with a bomb on board. It's in Pennsylvania, York, approximate area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
754		Male Speaker:	Yeah, that's south.	TIE	TIE	TIE
755		Colonel Lott:	Yeah, south of us. There's also the possibility of - Where is that guy? Where's the other guy? The special? He turned back over the lake?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			No, the other lake. Lake Eerie. Right there.	TIE	US	TIE
			Okay, another one that's possibly at Cleveland area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
756	[01:05]	Male Speaker:	Okay. Do you want sectors on those?	IIG	IIG	IIG
757		Colonel Lott:	Not yet. It looks like one, the one over Cleveland, turned around.	IIS	US	IIS
			It looks like he's heading back to the east. The guy down at York, Pennsylvania -	IIS	TIE	TIE
758		Male Speaker:	I'm gonna try to voice that hard copy at CONAR -	TIE	TIE	TIE
759		Colonel Lott:	Can I have a phone number for you? 6850?	IIG	US	IIG
			What's your name again? What's your name again? Thank you.	IIG	IIG	IIG
760		Male Speaker:	410 -	MISC	TIE	TIE
761		Colonel Lott:	1527 on the mode 3?	IIG	IIG	IIG
762		Male Speaker:	Yeah, we're not finding them. Open line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
763		Female Speaker:	This is Sergeant Richmond.	MISC	MISC	MISC
764		Male Speaker:	What happened?	IIG	IIG	IIG

765	Male Speaker:	We're finding out. We're finding out.	TIE	TIE	TIE
	Sergeant				
766	Richmond:	- Northeast of Camp David.	TIE	TIE	TIE
767	Male Speaker:	No, I don't.	TIE	US	TIE
		Can you get a Z point for me?	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
		Give me the lat and long. Open line.	DTA(RTA)	IIG	IIG
768	Male Speaker:	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
769	Female Speaker:	from CONAR.	MISC	US	MISC
		We understand a plane coming out of Canada - We need clarification on if that plane is going to DC or state - Washington			
		State.	IIG	IIG	IIG
770	Male Speaker:	DC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
771	Sergeant Perry:	It's going towards DC?	IIG	IIG	IIG
772	Male Speaker:	We believe so.	TIE	TIE	TIE
773	Sergeant Perry:	:	NC	NC	NC
774	Male Speaker:	Stand by. All right. Hold on.	DTA(RTA)	MISC	MISC
775	Sergeant Perry:	Major Nasypany on line. Go.	MISC	MISC	MISC
776	Male Speaker	from CONAR, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
		I just - I had a request to find out if we have any fighters near the aircraft going towards DC that's coming out of Canada?	IIG	IIG	IIG
777	Sergeant Perry:	Yeah.	MISC	TIE	TIE
778	Major Nasypany:	We do? What do we have out there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
779	Male Speaker:	Wait a minute.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
		Are you requesting that we have Quit 25, 26 in the MCA area? Quebec, India, Uniform, Tango?	IIG	IIG	IIG
780	Major Nasypany:	25 and 26? Where are they out of?	IIG	IIG	IIG

			A 1. A 1. 25 126 W. 1 6 W.			
781		Male Speaker:	4 quit, 4 quit, 25 and 26. We're falling behind in the stuff.	TIE	TIE	TIE
782		Major Nasypany:	Ouit?	IIG	IIG	IIG
783		Male Speaker:	Quit.	TIE	US	TIE
			It's over the NCA area.	TIE	US	TIE
			Quit 25, 26.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			QT?	IIG	IIG	IIG
784		Major Nasypany:	QT, yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
785		Male Speaker:	What base are the fighters out of?	IIG	IIG	IIG
786		Major Nasypany:	They're over Cleveland.	TIE	US	TIE
			I've got 3 over there. I got 25, 26 and 27. I got 3 birds there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
787		Male Speaker:	Okay. I'm trying to see if that's the same - airline right now?	IIG	TIE	IIG
788		Male Speaker:	No, they're with the NCA. I got them flying over the NCA. They're doing the best they can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
789	[01:10]	Major Nasypany:	4342. They want somebody to handle them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			What aircraft is this?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			It keeps saying unknown, unidentified. Okay.	IIG	IIG	IIG
790		Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
791		Major Nasypany:	Hi, this is Mr. Arnold at Niagara Falls.	MISC	US	MISC
			How are you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
792		Female Speaker:	Good.	MISC	MISC	MISC
793		Sergeant Perry:	Hey, I need to talk to somebody -	IIG	IIG	IIG
			They called about our availability.	TIE	US	TIE
			They said to ask for the MCC.	TIE	TIE	TIE

794	Mr. Arnold:	Yes, Sir. Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
		I got MCC from Niagara Falls on the line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
795	Sergeant Perry:	Yes, hi. Who is this?	IIG	US	IIG
		This is the MCC.	TIE	US	TIE
		Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
796	Mr. Arnold:	Hi, it's Mr. Arnold from Niagara Falls.	MISC	MISC	MISC
797	Sergeant Perry:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
798	Male Speaker:	We can have one chopper ready - We can have it airborne in 2 hours pumped up with some extra offload capability and we're in the process of pumping another two up right now after that.	TKS	TIE	TKS
799	Mr. Arnold:	Okay. One and two hours?	IIG	US	IIG
		How long for the second two?	IIG	IIG	IIG
800	Male Speaker:	I would give it about an hour and a half to two hours for the other two. I -	TIE	TIE	TIE
801	Mr. Arnold:	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
802	Male Speaker:	North of Camp David.	TIE	TIE	TIE
803	Mr. Arnold:	Hello? Who's this?	MISC	MISC	MISC
804	Male Speaker:	It's Niagara Falls calling to see if you need Cleveland right behind us.	TIE	TIE	TIE
805	Male Speaker:	Okay. Was he on hold?	IIG	MISC	IIG
806	Male Speaker:	No, no.	TIE	TIE	TIE
807	Male Speaker:	Have we called the Southeast and see if they have any fighters out of Charleston?	IIG	IIG	IIG
808	Sergeant McCain:	No, not yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
809	Male Speaker:	You got an idea?	IIG	IIG	IIG

810	Sergeant McCain:	That one is from New York.	TIE	TIE	TIE
811	Male Speaker:	Northeast.	MISC	MISC	MISC
812	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah, this is	MISC	NC	NC
		Is there any?	IIG	NC	NC
813	Female Speaker:	Hold on a minute, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
814	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
815	Male Speaker:	Do you know who it is?	IIG	MISC	MISC
816	Sergeant McCain:	I have no idea who -	NC	MISC	MISC
		Is there any way we can noise			
817	Male Speaker:	level?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		I'm sorry, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
818	Sergeant McCain:	Stand by. Stand by.	MISC	US	MISC
		We're real busy here.	TIE	MISC	MISC
819	Female Speaker:	I understand, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Get a hold of turn around and			
820	Male Speaker:	go	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
		Not you but that was an idea.	TIE	US	TIE
		Sir, are you there?	IIG	US	IIG
		Call back.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
		I think line 2 is clear.	TIE	US	TIE
821	Sergeant McCain:	Line two? Anybody on line two?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Okay. Yes, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
822	Male Speaker:	That is a coast guard.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			Turn him around and have him go look. Northeast is -	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
			1101411445015	2 111(0 011)	2 111(0 011)	2111(0011)
823		Sergeant McCain:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
824		Male Speaker:	Hey, Mike. This is Sergeant Tillhouse.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		•				
825		Sergeant McCain:	Yeah, hi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
826		Sergeant Perry:	Hey, just to let you know I'm on the freeway heading home. I'm in Syracuse. If they're doing any recall people I'm on my way home.	TIE	TIE	TIE
820		,	my way nome.	1112	TIL	TIL
827		Sergeant Tillhouse:	Miles, Miles. Standby. Miles?	MISC	MISC	MISC
828		Sergeant Perry:	Yes?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Sergeant				
829		Tillhouse:	This is Sergeant McCain.	MISC	US	MISC
			We could use you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
830	[01:15]	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
831		Sergeant Tillhouse:	We could use you bad.	ISA	TIE	ISA
832		Sergeant McCain:	Okay. I'll try and get in there as soon as I can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Sergeant				
833		Tillhouse:	Thanks, bud.	MISC	US	MISC
			What's that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
834		Sergeant McCain:	The President is airborne.	TIE	TIE	TIE

	Sergeant				
835	Tillhouse:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
836	Sergeant McCain:	Got it.	MISC	MISC	MISC
837	Male Speaker:	Can you help some of these people at tracking this bird?	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
838	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. We're recalling a bunch of people.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Hey, this is Sergeant McCain, Northeast.	MISC	US	MISC
		Can you get Air Force One airborne and get a good position on them and a good check on them?	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
		Can you make sure you call us as soon as possible -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
839	Male Speaker:	Okay. We're doing it now because he's on his way.	TIE	TIE	TIE
840	Male Speaker:	I don't care how far south he is we just want to know where he's at.	TIE	TIE	TIE
841	Sergeant McCain:	We're doing it now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
842	Male Speaker:	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
843	Sergeant McCain:	We got 475. We got the particulars, yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
844	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
845	Sergeant McCain:	He needs to anchor in the next three hours.	TIE	TIE	TIE
846	Male Speaker:	Well, where's he going? Where's he heading?	IIG	IIG	IIG

847		Sergeant McCain:	Oh, God. Okay for ID.	NC	NC	NC
848		Male Speaker:	No, it's leaving Florida.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		-				
849		Sergeant McCain:	Leaving Florida?	IIG	IIG	IIG
850		Male Speaker:	Yeah. More fighters are going out. Guns are on them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Two of them when they get there are going to - Washington DC - All right?	TKS	TIE	TKS
			We'll have two fighters.	TIE	TIE	TIE
851		Sergeant McCain:	Where's force - where's he going -	IIG	IIG	IIG
852		Male Speaker:	I was told he was going to That's what I was told.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			777?	IIG	IIG	IIG
853		Sergeant McCain:	Yep, four sevens.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Can you make any sense out of - Okay.	IIG	US	IIG
			He's gonna be in the Chicago area.  50,000 tons will give them.  Most of it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
854		Male Speaker:	Quiet down a little bit. Use the intercom.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
855		Male Speaker:	Yeah, it's going to Washington. All right 19 <sup>th</sup> -	TIE	TIE	TIE
856		Sergeant McCain:	There's more than one aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
857		Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
858	[01:20]	Male Speaker:	Yeah, this is Sergeant Centron.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			, please?	NC	US	NC

		Line 1 is secure so you'll be secure on line			
859	Male Speaker:	1.	TIE	TIE	TIE
860	Sergeant Perry:	Okay. Can I -	NC	NC	NC
861	Sergeant Centron:	Stand by. Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
862	Sergeant Perry:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
863	Male Speaker:	You can pick up.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		You got it, Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
864	Sergeant Perry:	It's Colonel Creski with 1 <sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing.	MISC	TIE	TIE
865	Male Speaker:	Yes, Sir?	IIG	MISC	MISC
866	Sergeant Perry:	Hey, do you have a Senior Control or the Senior Duty Officer or somebody around?	IIG	IIG	IIG
867	Colonel Creski:	Okay. We got out MCC here. He's on a line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We've got our Senior Director? I can send you to him?	IIG	IIG	IIG
868	Sergeant Perry:	Okay. Whoever - Basically whoever is in charge.	TIE	TIE	TIE
869	Colonel Creski:	Cleveland, can I help you?	MISC	IIG	IIG
870	Sergeant Perry:	Who's this?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		This is Colonel Creski with the 1st Fighter Wing.	TIE	TIE	TIE
871	Colonel Creski:	It's Lt. Colonel Cleveland.	TIE	TIE	TIE
872	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	Hey. We got a call from NORAD basically saying get four jets airborne with a hot gun as soon as you can?	TIE	TIE	TIE
873	Colonel Creski:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC

	Lt. Col.	We got word from ACC basically telling us to standby because technically we work for the ACC type of thing and let's make			
874	Cleveland:	sure we get our story straight kind of stuff.	IIS	TIE	TIE
875	Colonel Creski:	We're looking to get a four ship with a gun or whatever you got available to get up to finish escorting Air Force One back in to the Washington area.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
876	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	Okay. Somebody needs to get a hold of ACC and tell them about this.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
877	Colonel Creski:	Okay. I'll talk to my commander.	TIE	TIE	TIE
878	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	I tried to get a hold of NORAD - the number that, you know?	TIE	US	TIE
		Their lines are all busy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
879	Colonel Creski:	Yeah, I can believe it.	MISC	TIE	MISC
880	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	I thought maybe you might have it.	IIG	IIG	IIG
881	Colonel Creski:	No, I don't have the number right now. The circuits are so busy we can even get DSN access.	TIE	TIE	TIE
882	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	Great.	MISC	MISC	MISC
883	Colonel Creski:	Hold on a second. Give me your number.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
884	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	Okay. The number here is - 5411 is command post.	TIE	TIE	TIE
885	Colonel Creski:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
886	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	574 is	NC	TIE	TIE
887	Colonel Creski:	Got it. Okay.	MISC	US	MISC

		We got to shut down line so that we can use it.	ISA	DTA(COA)	ISA
		I'll go talk to my commander and then I'll be right back with you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
888	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	Okay. You understand the issue is that we're being by NORAD and ACC and saying that we don't work for NORAD yet. They're not being dicks about it. They just want to make sure that we don't -	IIS	TIE	IIS
889	Colonel Creski:	Well, if you can get them hot cocked and ready to go, we'd appreciate it.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
890	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	Okay. We're heading that direction.	TIE	TIE	TIE
891	Colonel Creski:	All right. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
892	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
893	Colonel Creski:	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
894	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	Let's have the four ships recently take off or that's taking off - or gonna take off out of Langley?	NC	NC	NC
895	Colonel Creski:	How recently?	IIG	IIG	IIG
896	Lt. Col. Cleveland:	Half a quit. There's another flight -	TIE	TIE	TIE
897	Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
898	Male Speaker:	Hey, this is Colonel Brooks at the Air National Guard Cat.	MISC	MISC	MISC
899	Male Speaker:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC

900	Sergeant Perry:	I guess they're getting ready to launch two of our Air National Guard F-16's out of the 113's.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		These guys don't have a clue who they're talking to and who's their commanding control. I'm assuming it will be you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I need a radio frequency for them to make contact as soon as they get handed off by ATC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
901	Colonel Brooks:	Standby, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
		I'll hand you off to our Senior Director.	TIE	TIE	TIE
902	Sergeant Perry:	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
903	Colonel Brooks:	its 6313 if you get disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
904	Sergeant Perry:	9900	NC	NC	NC
905	Colonel Brooks:	There are five aircraft in our sights. 10, Charlie, 104, Alpha, 10 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
906	Sergeant Perry:	Yes, 1, Kilo, Charlie, 104 Alpha is all he said. I don't know if that means anything.	IIS	TIE	TIE
907	Female Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
908	Male Speaker:	Yeah, Bob Davie, Washington Flight Control.	MISC	US	MISC
		I was told to give you a call about possibly fueling any area?	TIE	IIG	IIG
909	Female Speaker:	Okay. Please, hold. Let me put you on with somebody that can help you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
910	Sergeant Perry:	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
911	Bob Davie:	6313 if you get disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Hold on and I'll patch you up to him.	MISC	US	MISC

912		Sergeant Perry:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
913		Bob Davie:	Call 9900.	TIE	TIE	TIE
914		Sergeant Perry:	Yes, 4, Alpha, 10 going to Kilo, Charlie, Echo, Foxtrot. Copy	TIE	TIE	TIE
915		Bob Davie:	Copy 4, Alpha, 10, Kilo Charlie, Echo, Foxtrot. 9900, copy.	MISC	US	MISC
			One is going to Bangor - Correct. Gold 99.	TIE	TIE	TIE
916		Female Speaker:	Thank you, what was it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
917		Male Speaker:	Come up on 28216.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
918	[01:25]	Female Speaker:	I wonder if he said - I got weapons -	IIG	MISC	MISC
919		Female Speaker:	Is there somebody monitoring the guard?	IIG	IIG	IIG
920		Female Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
921		Female Speaker:	Hi, this is Captain Sortil from	MISC	MISC	MISC
922		Female Speaker:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
923		Sergeant Perry:	I need to talk to your SD.	MISC	MISC	MISC
924		Captain Sortil:	I'll take you up to him. If you get disconnected it's 6313.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Standby. 6313.	MISC	US	MISC
925		Sergeant Perry:	Slow it down.	MISC	US	MISC
			Hey listen, we're getting all kinds of planes out of the sky and you folks are having them launched and we don't know anything about it.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			We need you to have somebody call over here and give us some codes when it -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
926		Captain Sortil:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
927		Sergeant Perry:	Post. here at Andrew's Command	MISC	US	MISC

		Who am I speaking with?	IIG	MISC	MISC
928	Male Speaker:	Standby a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
929	Sergeant Perry:	Okay. Still there?	MISC	MISC	MISC
930	Male Speaker:	Yeah, standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I got another call.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Just give me a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
931	Sergeant Perry:	No problem. No problem.	MISC	MISC	MISC
932	Male Speaker:	Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
933	Sergeant Perry:	Northeast, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
934	Male Speaker:	Hey it's Sergeant Parker from Atlantic City.	MISC	MISC	MISC
935	Sergeant Perry:	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
936	Sergeant McCain:	The authenticators that were faxed over? The Alpha, Bravo? The side was cut off.	IIG TIE	US TIE	IIG TIE
937	Sergeant Parker:	You need us to refax the authenticators to Atlantic City?	IIG	IIG	IIG
938	Sergeant McCain:	Right. Alpha, Bravo -	MISC	TIE	TIE
939	Sergeant Parker:	Okay. Do you have a name on the fax of who sent it to you so I could contact them?	IIG	IIG	IIG
940	Sergeant McCain:	It's Sergeant Perkins or Chief Overman.	TIE	TIE	TIE
941	Sergeant Parker:	Sergeant Perkins or who?	IIG	IIG	IIG
942	Sergeant McCain:	Chief Overman.	TIE	TIE	TIE
943	Sergeant Parker:	I don't know either of those people. All right. I'll work on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		Oh, I'm sorry. I thought you said who do you make it attention to. I don't know			
		who we spoke to there as far as getting			
944	Sergeant McCain:	this stuff faxed.	TIE	TIE	TIE
945	Sergeant Parker:	I'll get it to you as soon as I can.	MISC	TIE	MISC
946	Sergeant McCain:	This is the MCC talking.	MISC	US	MISC
		May I have your attention, please?	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
		Everybody _ slide one. Slide one -	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
947	Sergeant Parker:	Utilities, Tom Berry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
948	Sergeant McCain:	Hey, this is Sergeant McCain up in the Ops room.	MISC	US	MISC
		I need you guys to send a runner up here, pronto.	DTA(RTA)	MISC	DTA(RTA)
949	Male Speaker:	What do you need?	IIG	IIG	IIG
950	Tom Berry:	I need you to send a runner up here pronto or somebody.	DTA(RTA)	MISC	DTA(RTA)
951	Sergeant McCain:	Well, is out of the building right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
952	Tom Berry:	Is there anyone else in the military or air techs down there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
953	Sergeant McCain:	Ray's around here somewhere. I might have to page him.	TIE	TIE	TIE
954	Tom Berry:	I need him to come to the Ops room, pronto. Have him see Sergeant McCain.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
955	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
956	Tom Berry:	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			Weapons on an unsecure			
957		Sergeant McCain:	line. How may I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
958		Tom Berry:	Yeah, hi. Did you 351?	NC	IIG	IIG
959		Sergeant McCain:	Everybody has been told. I will check with each one of the control teams.	TIE	TIE	TIE
960		Male Speaker:	I appreciate it. Thanks.	MISC	US	MISC
			Yes, Ma'am. He's checking with everybody right now. He'll be back with me shortly.	TIE	TIE	TIE
961		Male Speaker:	I need more coffee. Oh, yeah. It's potent.	MISC	MISC	MISC
962		Male Speaker:	-107	NC	NC	NC
963		Male Speaker:	We need to get some Medivac airplanes up in the air.	ISA	ISA	ISA
			Would that be a problem with your guys if we got them -	IIG	IIG	IIG
964		Male Speaker:	From where, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
965	[1:30]	Female Speaker:	You said the national - Washington DC, Baltimore area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
966		Male Speaker:	Yeah. Standby. Sir, if you standby I will check with the MCC. Standby.	MISC	TIE	MISC
			Can we get Medivac aircraft airborne and give them a code?	IIG	IIG	IIG
967		Female Speaker:	Absolutely.	TIE	TIE	TIE
968		Male Speaker:	And get all mode 3.	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Sir, can you call across the hotline to Huntress control?	DTA(RTA)	IIG	DTA(RTA)
969		Female Speaker:	What's the - Do you got their number or can you transfer me?	IIG	IIG	IIG

		I believe it's the same - Standby. Let me			
970	Male Speaker:	see if they can pick up. Standby.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		You are Washington Center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
971	Female Speaker:	That is correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
972	Male Speaker:	I'll have them call you, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
973	Female Speaker:	Thank you. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
974	Male Speaker:	Hey, Jeremy? Have them call Washington Center for that.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
		He left. Washington Center.	TIE	US	TIE
		Oh, I love you.	MISC	US	MISC
975	Female Speaker:	482, west, over.	TIE	NC	TIE
976	Male Speaker:	I know what's going on. Yeah, we just had -	NC	TIE	NC
977	Female Speaker:	We need somebody that has knowledge of what the hell is going on -	ISA	TIE	ISA
978	Male Speaker:	Miller is here, Dana is here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		November, 4?	IIG	IIG	IIG
979	Female Speaker:	Okay. So far all the aircraft that we've been looking at as possible hijacks are either crashed or down.	TIE	TIE	TIE
980	Female Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
981	Female Speaker:	We're not sure if there's any more aircraft right now. What we're gonna work right is ship because every center is closing down as you can see.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		If they don't see them, call right away.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
		If you see it and they haven't hit it up, call that center.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)

			We don't have Boston to work with now,			
			we don't have Boston to work with how, we don't have Cleveland now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
982		Female Speaker:	They're closing down every center.	TIE	TIE	TIE
983		Female Speaker:	Open line. Huntress ID how may I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
984		Female Speaker:	This is Washington Center. We've got a target we need to find out about. He is -	TIE	TIE	TIE
985		Female Speaker:	Okay. Okay. Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			He's got another target.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			BFR?	IIG	IIG	IIG
986		Huntress:	BFR.	TIE	TIE	TIE
987		Washington Center:	BFR.	TIE	TIE	TIE
988		Huntress:	3,100 feet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
989		Washington Center:	3,100 feet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
990		Huntress:	He is 25 miles northeast of Dulles Airport on a southwest heading.	TIE	TIE	TIE
991	[01:35]	Washington Center:	Southwest heading. Okay. Do they have any other mode 3's or anything like that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Find that out.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	IIG
992		Huntress:	It looks like you might have a fighter aircraft in the immediate vicinity at 8,000 feet and descending so you might be taking a look at that guy already.	IIS	TIE	IIS
993		Washington Center:	1200 BFR.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		The mode 3 on your military looks like 4512. He is directly overhead now of the			
994	Huntress:	target.	TIE	TIE	TIE
	Washington				
995	Center:	Okay. We'll pass the information.	MISC	TIE	MISC
996	Huntress:	All right. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
997	Washington Center:	Did you get all of it because I got unplugged?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Twenty five miles northeast of Dulles on a southwest heading, 1200 BFR. Dulles International toward Chicago.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I'm sorry about that.	MISC	US	MISC
998	Male Speaker:	I don't -	NC	NC	NC
999	Washington Center:	It's right here. Okay. The latest one - I need all you guys -	MISC	TIE	TIE
1000	Huntress:	Open line. Northeast, this is Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1001	Male Speaker:	Hey, this is Major Rodriguez.	TIE	US	TIE
		I need to talk to your SD.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Can you hear me?	MISC	US	MISC
1002	Huntress:	Yeah. 6313. I'll patch you right up to him.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1003	Sergeant Perry:	- Secure voice?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1004	Major Rodriguez:	Negative.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1005	Sergeant Perry:	I need a secure voice phone with the SD.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1006	Major Rodriguez:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1007	Sergeant Perry:	You have reached an unsecure line.	MISC	MISC	MISC

		How may I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Sergeant, this is Tom Clinko with			
1008	Major Rodriguez:	Cleveland Center.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1009	Sergeant Perry:	Tom Clinko.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1010	Huntress:	I have a safer 01 that departed elpine at 14:27.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1011	Tom Clinko:	Northeast. You want secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1012	Huntress:	Hold on a minute.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1013	Tom Clinko:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1014	Male Speaker:	We -	NC	NC	NC
1015	Male Speaker:	Oops, sorry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1016	Male Speaker:	The number you have dialed -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1017	Male Speaker:	I got a couple of things to do first.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1018	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1019	Computer Voice:	Cleveland Center, Mr. Clinko, wants to know who's safer it was that came out of Elpine?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		So if we can get weapons to tell him? Okay.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1020	Male Speaker:	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1021	Male Speaker:	Sergeant Perry, this is Major Bridges from the Air Traffic Services Cell, the command center for the FAA in Virginia.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We've got the attorney general in aircraft November 4 about 40 minutes south of Washington and he's demanding a military escort in to Washington National.	TKS	TIE	TKS
		If you can maybe scramble somebody to go in and intercept the aircraft and escort.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)

			OL WALL MOOG			
1022		Male Speaker:	Okay. We'll put the MCC for you and we can check that out.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1023		Sergeant Perry:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1023		Major Bridges:	Go. This is the MCC, Major Nasypany.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1024		Major Briages.		MISC	MISC	MISC
			Hello, this is Major Bridges with the Air Traffic Services cell in the command			
1025	[01:40]	Sergeant Perry:	center for the FAA in Virginia.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1020	[011.0]	20.800.01 0.1.31		112		112
			The attorney general is in November 4, about 40 minutes out of Washington and			
			he's requesting a military escort in to			
			Washington National Airport.	TKS	TIE	TKS
			Is there any way we can do a scramble			
			going?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1026		Major Bridges:	We've got aircraft in the area already.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			What's his code?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1027		Major Nasypany:	Standby. Let me find out.	MISC	TIE	TIE
			Are you still there? Hello?	MISC	IIG	MISC
1028		Major Bridges:	- Frequency?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Major				
1029		Nasaypany:	No, right now we got an attorney general -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1030		Major Bridges:	Still there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1031		Male Speaker:	Yeah, still here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Major	Okay. Their code is 65127 and the			
1032		Nasaypany:	Washington Center frequency is 13365.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1033		Major Bridges:	13365?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Major				
1034		Nasaypany:	Right.	MISC	TIE	MISC
			Okay. We don't have any victor - I can			
1035		Major Bridges:	possibly get a uniform for us?	TIE	TIE	TIE

	Major				
1036	Nasaypany:	Northeast, this is Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1037	Major Bridges:	Hi, this is Sergeant Lucas calling from Otis.	MISC	US	MISC
		Is someone manning the EA booth?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		I didn't get an answer in there.	TIE	TIE	IIG
1038	Major Nasaypany:	There should be. Let me send somebody up there.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1039	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. I'm gonna call them on this 23.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1040	Sergeant Lucas:	I'm gonna go up to the EA booth and Otis is gonna call you on this 23.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1041	Sergeant McCain:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1042	Sergeant Lucas:	No one's up there. They're not getting an answer up there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1043	Sergeant McCain:	That's 605, correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1044	Sergeant Lucas:	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1045	Sergeant McCain:	600 off of Atlantic City. They don't know who that one -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1046	Female Speaker:	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1047	Sergeant McCain:	That is 6579.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1048	Female Speaker:	6579. Do you know what the registrar of this vessel is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1049	Sergeant McCain:	We don't know yet. That's why we're all doing all that and -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1050	Male Speaker:	Is it a cruise ship or -	IIG	IIG	IIG

1051	Sergeant McCain:	Is that a cruise ship?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		It's a cruise ship.	UR	US	UR
		Yeah, we're collecting ID and all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
1052	Male Speaker:	- where the aircraft is. 6527.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1053	Sergeant McCain:	6522	TIE	TIE	TIE
1054	Male Speaker:	22?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1055	Male Speaker:	Washington Center, can you confirm that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1056	Male Speaker:	Okay. His squawk is 6522 not 27. 6522.	UR	TIE	UR
1057	Male Speaker:	What position do you have him on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1058	Male Speaker:	Also, Sir, do you have a lat and long if possible or give me a -	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Oh, I found it. I got it. We have it monitored on screen now, Sir.	IIS	TIE	IIS
1059	Male Speaker:	Oh, you got him?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		He's about 15 miles - Okay.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Do you happen to have a -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1060	Male Speaker:	We're working on it right now. We have fighters airborne in the area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1061	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1062	Male Speaker:	And we're gonna see if we can get to him out there to escort him.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1063	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Please give me a call at 725-3330.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1064	Male Speaker:	Standby. Can you give me the number again?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1065		505	TO TO	TO TO	TO TO
1065	Sergeant McCain:	725 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1066	Male Speaker:	25 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1067	Sergeant McCain:	-3330	TIE	TIE	TIE
1068	Male Speaker:	-30	TIE	TIE	TIE
1069	Sergeant McCain:	Commercial is 703-904 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1070	Male Speaker:	904 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1071	Sergeant McCain:	4436	TIE	TIE	TIE
1072	Male Speaker:	4436. And who am I speaking to?	IIG	IIG	IIG
	•	, ,			
1073	Sergeant McCain:	Major Bridges.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1074	Male Speaker:	Major Bridges. Got it. Okay, Sir.	MISC	US	MISC
	_	We'll try to get back to you when we can.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		You understand that we're really hectic here.	ISA	US	ISA
1075	Sergeant McCain:	I understand.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1076	Major Bridges:	We'll try to get back to you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1077	Sergeant McCain:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1078	Major Bridges:	Okay. On this track, make it special.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
1079	Sergeant McCain:	I'm gonna go ahead and forward intel just so they know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Major Evans?	MISC	US	MISC
		Bravo 545.	TIE	US	TIE
	· ·		i	1	i .

			Tell CONAR that's the attorney general. Airborne special.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			We haven't - I don't know what special yet.	TIE	US	TIE
			Call it special 7. Bravo 545 special 7, the attorney general.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
			I've already made it a special. I've already made it a special.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I'm just letting you know that's who it is. Okay?	MISC	US	MISC
			He's going to Dulles. Washington International, I'm sorry. Washington International.	TKS	US	TKS
			I made it a special 7 just so we can keep an eye on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			He's requesting - Listen to me.	MISC	US	MISC
			He's requesting two armed fighter escorts in to International.	TIE	US	TIE
			We're working that right now, okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
1080		Major Bridges:	Bravo 557, the Delta, 1200, we do not know who it is.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1081		Male Speaker:	Bravo 557?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1082	[01:45]	Sergeant McCain:	Correct. We got it -	MISC	TIE	TIE
1083		Male Speaker:	Be advised that we had a swordfish up that was coming back that way so it maybe him. Maybe.	TSOG	TKS	TKS
			You think you could find out for me?	IIG	IIG	IIG

		Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant			
		McCain, how may I help you?	MISC	US	MISC
1084	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah, hi Sergeant McCain.	MISC	US	MISC
		Lt. Colonel Myers at Fido.	TIE	US	TIE
		Can you give me the number of your - I can get a hold of your fighter there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1085	Male Speaker:	Fighter Officer Number?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1086	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1087	Lt. Col. Myers:	Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
		I'll work it for you.	TIE	MISC	MISC
1088	Sergeant McCain:	The second ship - the second two ships?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Okay. What would be the delay?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Press them up there and load them up.	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
		Whoa, 6601 -	MISC	US	MISC
1089	Lt. Col. Myers:	6601, 02 or 04. Either one of those.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1090	Sergeant McCain:	6601, 02 or 04?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1091	Lt. Col. Myers:	That's correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1092	Sergeant McCain:	All right. Great, thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1093	Lt. Col. Myers:	You bet. Anyone on line?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1094	Sergeant McCain:	Hey, we've been asked to do some airborne command and control. We're just waiting for launch authority with one of our 130's.	ISA	TIE	ISA
		Were wondering what's the COMM plan?	IIG	US	IIG

		Are there frequencies?	IIG	US	IIG
		Are they secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		What's going down?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1095	Lt. Col. Myers:	I got controllers all over up and down the east coast right now.	TIE	US	TIE
		You can contact us if need be on AICC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1096	Sergeant McCain:	AICC?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1097	Male Speaker:	Yep. We should be listening up on that.	IPK	TIE	IPK
1098	Male Speaker:	What frequency is that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1099	Male Speaker:	364.2	TIE	TIE	TIE
1100	Male Speaker:	364.2?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1101	Male Speaker:	Yep. Hey, do you got the - call 64 -	NC	NC	NC
1102	Male Speaker:	I'm sorry?	IIG	US	IIG
		The special 7 is the attorney general of the United States.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I made it a special 7 because that's a dignitary special that 19 use.	TKS	TKS	TKS
		Give you a departure and destination?	IIG	US	IIG
		I know his destination.	TIE	US	TIE
		Do you need departure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1103	Male Speaker:	How are you doing, Joe?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1104	Male Speaker:	I'm all right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1105	Sergeant McCain:	Are you sure?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1106	Male Speaker	Yep. I'm hanging in there. Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1107	Sergeant McCain:	No, because they won't push over to different frequencies.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		They should be over here somewhere. I			
1108	Mala Chaglean	don't know where you're going but what	IIS	TIE	IIS
1108	Male Speaker:	are you gonna do?			
		Off the coast of Atlantic City?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1100					
1109	Sergeant McCain:	Yep.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		That's a cruse ship. That came through			
1110	Male Speaker:	the line about 5 minutes ago.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Ain't this some shit?	MISC	US	MISC
		Yeah, I'm all right. I'm all right. I'm all			
		right.	MISC	US	MISC
		Send them to Bermuda.	MISC	US	MISC
		Fuck them.	MISC	US	MISC
		I hope that got recorded.	MISC	US	MISC
		I haven't been writing shit in there since			
			MISC	MISC	MISC
		Okay. We have a ship that was right			
		outside of Atlantic City. Turns out it was			
		a cruise ship. Okay?	TKS	TKS	TKS
1111	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Suspicious though?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Yeah. Well, they've got helicopters above			
1112	Male Speaker:	it watching it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We have Bravo 545 is a special 7. It's the			
		attorney general of the United States			
		requesting fighter escort - armed fighter			
		escorts in to Washington National.	TKS	TIE	TKS
		Oh, fuck.	MISC	US	MISC
		Yeah, we're working it.	TIE	TIE	TIE

1113		Sergeant McCain:	We're working it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1114		Male Speaker:	Here's the information for the attorney general. He left Milwaukee going to Washington National citation 560, requesting armed fighter escorts. 55 - correction - 6522 and CONAR knows. That was put in to the chat.	TKS	TIE	TKS
1115		Sava a gut Ma Cain.	Are we conding the E fighters on them?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1115		Sergeant McCain:	Are we sending the F fighters on them?  They're working on it through weapons.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1110		Male Speaker:		HE	HE	HE
1117		Sergeant McCain:	So 626 has got the attorney general and they're in route to the -	TKS	TIE	TIE
1118		Male Speaker:	Okay. That's the fighters that are going to the attorney general?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1119		Sergeant McCain:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1120	[01:50]	Male Speaker:	Roger that. Thank you. Roger that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1121		Sergeant McCain:	What was their call sign?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1122		Male Speaker:	You know what? I don't know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Can you give me a call sign on it? Bravo 545.	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain, can I help you?	MISC	US	MISC
1123		Sergeant McCain:	Yes, this is Lt. Col. Hayes, the fighter officer at the 177 <sup>th</sup> .	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Is the mission director available or could you pass a message to him?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1124	Male Speaker:	I can, yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1125	Sergeant McCain:	I have two more aircraft loaded with offensive capability. I'm stepping two pilots to run the airplanes.	TKS	TIE	TIE
		Do you know what he would like to do with it?	IIG	US	IIG
		Would he like to launch those or have them go -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1126	Lt. Col. Hayes:	Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
		Where are you from, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1127	Sergeant McCain:	Atlantic City.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1128	Lt. Col. Hayes:	Atlantic City. Let me pass this up. I've got to put you on hold.	MISC	TIE	MISC
		Ma'am?	MISC	US	MISC
		Atlantic has got two more aircraft uploaded with offensive capabilities.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Got two pilots standing by and wants to know what you want to do with them.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1129	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Tell them the airplanes are not - they're gonna start and before they shut down do they want to shut down or launch.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1130	Lt. Col. Hayes:	As soon as I get word from the commander I will let you know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1131	Sergeant McCain:	Okay, thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1132	Male Speaker:	Just stay on the line, Sir.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)

1133	Sergeant McCain:	Oh, okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1134	Male Speaker:	This is the MCC.	TIE	US	TIE
		What do you have uploaded on those guys?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1135	Sergeant McCain:	I believe it's only AGI right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1136	Male Speaker:	Okay. What's the call signs?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1137	Major Nasypany:	I don't have call signs.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I can put a call sign - a local one if you like or if you'd like to give me one -	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1138	Lt. Col. Hayes:	We had snakes originally. We had snake 11 and 12 and we -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1139	Major Nasypany:	Okay, Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1140	Lt. Col. Hayes:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1141	Major Nasypany:	The commander wants you to keep them on standby on the ground right now.	DTA(RTA)	TIE	TIE
		Shut them down and stay on alert with them.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1142	Sergeant McCain:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1143	Lt. Col. Hayes:	I'm about to call my wife and tell her to get to the school pronto and get the kids out and go home and lock the doors.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I don't want her to panic, but I tell you what.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1144	Sergeant McCain:	It's probably safer in the school.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1145	Lt. Col. Hayes:	No, they're hitting public places.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1146	Sergeant McCain:	Let me know if you need anything.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I know. I'm using you for phone calls and I know you're not qualified but at this			
1147	Male Speaker:	point I really don't give a fuck.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1148	Sergeant McCain:	I don't either.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1149	Female Speaker:	Not like I don't have the experience.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1150	Sergeant McCain:	Exactly. I know you know how to make phone calls.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Oh, by the way. You're on orders.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1151	Male Speaker:	What's up?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1152	Female Speaker:	I'm serious. There's car bombs reported and if they're gonna be hitting public places then I don't want my kids in school.	MISC	MISC	MISC
	•				
1153	Sergeant McCain:	What should we do?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1154	Male Speaker:	Why did we turn off the - There should be no civilian aircraft airborne.	IIS	TIE	IIS
1155	Sergeant McCain:	That's correct. That way if we make a friendly, we know who it is because we've ID it. If it's not friendly -	TKS	TIE	TKS
1156	Female Speaker:	Gotcha. Can you give me a call sign on the special 7?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1157	Sergeant McCain:	November 4.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1158	Male Speaker:	November 4?	IIG	US	IIG
		13365 Victor?	IIG	IIG	IIG

			W to low with the within house			
			We can be lax with the criteria because you're supposed to be - There's not supposed to be any aircraft flying.	TKS	US	TKS
			What you're gonna see is possibly a lot of helicopters, all right? A lot of civilian - Yeah.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1159		Sergeant McCain:	Only one guy at the FAA -	NC	NC	NC
1160		Male Speaker:	And they've all shut down. All the FAA centers are shut down. Until you can get it identified - He's being lateral -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1161	[01:55]	Sergeant McCain:	We can go with it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1162		Male Speaker:	I don't know now. He was being lateral.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			646?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1163		Sergeant McCain:	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1164		Male Speaker:	I don't know. I can't tell you that for sure.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1165		Sergeant McCain:	- Air force one is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1166		Male Speaker:	Tell them we need to know where Air Force One is.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
1167		Sergeant McCain:	And we want to know if they're controlling the flight or - out of Langley as an escort.	DTA(RTA)	IIG	IIG
1168		Male Speaker:	Air Force One.	NC	NC	NC
1169		Sergeant McCain:	Also, are they working a fighter escort?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			We already asked you twice.	ISA	TIE	ISA

1170	Male Speaker:	You need to go back and change that.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
		You got exclamation point instead of 1.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Where? Where?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1171	Sergeant McCain:	Right there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1172	Male Speaker:	In area 2, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1173	Sergeant McCain:	There are two of them out there. They've turned the auto IDs off, too.	IIS	TIE	TIE
1174	Male Speaker:	Yeah. You want me to tell this one also?	IIG	IIG	IIG
	•	As far as I know on the Ops floor everybody's been reported that were okay.	ISA	TIE	ISA
1175	Sergeant McCain:	I need to find out about -	NC	NC	NC
1176	Male Speaker:	What do you need to know?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1177	Sergeant McCain:	They should be getting back to us on that.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1178	Male Speaker:	No shit. Fucking moron.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Drop it. Go ahead and drop it. Go ahead and drop it.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
		Bravo 607 and the unknown are bad.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		E3 is not paying - We still have another one out there, 633, it's just southwest - just southeast of J50.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1179	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1180	Male Speaker:	All the sectors have reported in but the units haven't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1181	Sergeant McCain:	You have call in a status to the EA group.	DTA(RTA)	TKS	DTA(RTA)

1182	Male Speaker:	Admiral Perry should be up there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1183	Sergeant McCain:	calling looking for Huntress.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1184	Male Speaker:	You got Huntress.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1185	Sergeant McCain:	You're working with some of the flyers in the Washington DC airspace and everybody is kind of wondering if we can hand them off to you and let you take over control or do you want control?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1186	Male Speaker:	Who are you talking about?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		What's - You got a call sign on the aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1187	Sergeant McCain:	We have - You know the call signs that we work over there.	IPK	TIE	IPK
1188	Male Speaker:	Are you talking about the attorney general?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1189	Sergeant McCain:	I'm talking about your fighters in the Washington DC area.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1190	Male Speaker:	I'm gonna put you on the line with my MCC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1191	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1192	Male Speaker:	He's looking for control of the fighters in the DC area, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1193	Sergeant McCain:	Okay, who's -	NC	NC	NC
1194	Male Speaker:	This is Washington Center.	MISC	US	MISC

			Gary? What do you got? I'm sorry?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1195		Sergeant McCain:	6,500 feet? Where is he?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1196		Male Speaker:	In the airspace that -	NC	NC	NC
1197		Sergeant McCain:	Give me an arrow, bud.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			Scope 2, scope 1. There.	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Is that the Z track?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1198		Sergeant McCain:	They Z'ed him because he disappeared	TIE	TIE	TIE
1199	[02:00]	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1200		Sergeant McCain:	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1201		Male Speaker:	Can you work that?	DTA(RTA)	IIG	DTA(RTA)
			They want to intercept on that guy. I got a			
			cruiser that wants an intercept.	TKS	TIE	TKS
			What?	IIG	US	IIG
			You do know, Gary, you do know that we got an E3 station 100 miles south of Washington - 100 miles south of Chicago and we also have another one over Washington DC.	TKS	US	TKS
			You know that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			1 Ou Know that?	IIU	IIU	IIU
1202		Sergeant McCain:	No.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1203		Female Speaker:	Well, I'm telling you. I'm trying to keep you up - We've been at this since 8:00 this morning.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		So - If you can find a runner, I could use a bottle of water.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		We're working it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		we le working it.	1112	TIL	1112
		Thank you guys for coming in. I appreciate it very much. I just want to let you guys know that - Thank you very much. It's appreciated. All you guys that showed up. Thanks, Sam.	MISC	US	MISC
		I've got to get - I've got to call my wife or have somebody call her for me.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1204	Sergeant McCain:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1205	Gary:	Hi, this is Colonel Piscano.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Is this NEADS?	IIG	US	IIG
1206	Sergeant McCain:	Yes, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1207	Sergeant Perry:	Is Colonel Marr there?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1208	Colonel Piscano:	Standby, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		He's up in	TIE	US	TIE
1209	Sergeant Perry:	Listen, let me ask you a - Go ahead. I need to talk to him.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1210	Colonel Piscano:	Okay. Thank you. 706.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1211	Sergeant Perry:	You're about the only one I can get through to. Everyone else is busy.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1212	Colonel Piscano:	706 if you get disconnected.	TIE	US	TIE
		Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
		Her line is busy.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		Listen, here's what I need. I need to know			
		- I need to know if the FAA - We want to			
1213	Sergeant Perry:	launch an airplane from -	NC	NC	NC
		Let me put you on with the MCC. Hold			
1214	Colonel Piscano:	on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1215	Sergeant Perry:	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1216	Colonel Piscano:	MCC on - go.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1217	Sergeant Perry:	This is Colonel Piscano, Headquarters.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1218	Colonel Piscano:	Yes, how are you doing, Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Good. Let me put you on speaker here,			
1219	MCC:	okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1220	Colonel Piscano:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1221	MCC:	Can you hear us?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1222	Colonel Piscano:	Yes, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		We're kind of worried about flying an			
1223	MCC:	airplane.	TIE	US	TIE
		Can we fly an airplane from Syracuse			
		connected to Stewart?	IIG	TSOG	TSOG
1224	Colonel Piscano:	Okay. Syracuse connected to Stewart?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Okay. That should be no prob -	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Do you need an escort or do you need -			
		What are you looking for, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1225	MCC:	We just don't know if we'll be able to fly.	ISA	ISA	ISA
1226	Colonel Piscano:	Who is it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1227	MCC:	This is a military aircraft, correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1228	Colonel Piscano:	We want 30 to support this disaster.	DTA(RTA)	TSOG	TSOG
		Okay. I don't see any problem with you			
1229	Male Speaker:	flying, Sir.	ECA	TKS	ECA
1230	MCC:	Okay. So we just do a flight plan?	IIG	IIG	IIG

			Do a normal flight plan saying it's for this			
1231		Colonel Piscano:	and you can head out - Let's see -	DTA(RTA)	TIE	TIE
1232		MCC:	Do you have any specific call signs that you are giving airplanes priority or whatever?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1233		Colonel Piscano:	No, we're not.	TIE	TIE	TIE
3.000			Let's see. It's a C130 connecting, correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
			We'll get you a call sign. Sir, we're trying to get you a good call sign so we'll know who it is.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I would say file a normal flight plan in coordination with FAA.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
			Sir, be advised that Boston is gone. They have evacuated. We have Cleveland evacuating at this time as well.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1234		MCC:	FAA centers?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1235		Colonel Piscano:	Yes, the FAA centers.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1236	[02:05]	MCC:	We just wanted to be sure that when we get an airplane that launches here -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1237		Colonel Piscano:	That's no problem.	MISC	US	MISC
			Just make sure its squawking.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
			Do you have mode 4 capabilities on the jet and mode 2?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			On your mode 2, make sure that's standard and also make sure you're mode 4 is all loaded up as well.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
1238		MCC:	And you're gonna give us a call sign?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1239	Colonel Piscano:	Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
		We're looking that up right now, Sir. We can't get it right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I'm gonna give you a call sign.	TIE	US	TIE
		Geez - What's a good call sign for you guys? How about -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1240	MCC:	Skier is our normal call sign.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
1241	Colonel Piscano:	Skier?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		That sounds good to me. Skier.	MISC	US	MISC
		I got a lot of people talking at me right now, Sir. Skier 01.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1242	MCC:	Steel 72. This is - Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
		We need a code on steel 72.	IIS	IIS	IIS
		364.2. Hello? 364.2	TIE	TIE	TIE
1243	Colonel Piscano:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1244	MCC:	Yeah, Sergeant Kelly at Otis.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		How are you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1245	Male Speaker:	Good.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1246	Sergeant Perry:	Hey, we got two jets on status.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1247	Sergeant Kelly:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1248	Sergeant Perry:	Are you guys gonna need us or anything?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		If you want the loads we can pass the loads.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1249	Sergeant Kelly:	Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
		Yes, we are very concerned about that.	ISA	TKS	TKS
1250	Sergeant Perry:	Okay. Can you come up on the in of us or	NC	NC	NC
1251	Sergeant Kelly:	Our battle station is manned so maybe I can transfer you up there -	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG

			IC A NEADGMCC: 4			
1252		Sergeant Perry:	If we come up on the NEADS MCC in the private, we'll patch the loads that way.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
		,	How does that sound?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1253		Sergeant Kelly:	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1254		Sergeant Perry:	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1255		Sergeant Kelly:	Sure.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1256		Sergeant Perry:	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1257		Sergeant Kelly:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1258 1259	[02:10]	Sergeant Perry: Sergeant Kelly:	Hi, this is Colonel Piscano from Headquarters again.  Yes, Sir.	MISC MISC	MISC MISC	MISC MISC
1260	[02.10]	Sergeant Perry:	Yes, I don't know who I talked to but I was talking to someone about launching some planes from -	IIS	TIE	IIS
1261		Colonel Piscano:	Yeah, you started with me and then I patched you to Major Nasypany.	ISA	ISA	ISA
			He's standing right here but he's on the other phone.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			What can I help you with, Sir?	IIG	US	IIG
1262		Sergeant Perry:	He told us that he is using skier 01 as a call sign?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1263		Colonel Piscano:	He's on the line now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1264		Sergeant Perry:	Go ahead, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1265		Colonel Piscano:	Our call sign will be skier but probably a different number.	TIE	US	TIE
			They're used to using the first and the last number of the plane. They're maybe up to 3 airplanes.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1266		Sergeant Perry:	Yeah, maybe. We'll know better later.	MISC	TIE	TIE

		Do you have any codes or are you gonna be squawking 1200?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1267	Major Nasypany:	Do you want the number from the command post on the 109? I'll give it to you.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1268	Colonel Piscano:	Sir, can you have them call me here with the codes.	DTA(RTA)	IIG	DTA(RTA)
		Call over to my ID section.	DTA(RTA)	US	DTA(RTA)
		Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
		I'll get you a number.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
1269	Major Nasypany:	You guys are hard to get to by the way.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1270	Colonel Piscano:	BSN 5876368 or 69?	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Just give them the command post codes.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
		The tower there will have codes to give my ID section so we can track you guys. Mode 3 codes.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1271	Major Nasypany:	Okay. Will do.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1272	Colonel Piscano:	Your pilots should be loading	IPK	IPK	IPK
		and just make sure your pilots load up their mode 2 and mode 4.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(COA)
1273	Major Nasypany:	Okay. They'll call you with the mode 3 numbers. Okay. Bye.	MISC	TSOG	TIE
1274	Colonel Piscano:	Okay. Yes, Sir. Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1275	Major Nasypany:	Yes, this is Lake AFC.	MISC	US	MISC
		We have pending southwest of J55 - or southwest of J55 data.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1276	Colonel Piscano:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1277	Major Nasypany:	You got your radial switch on for some reason.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			You want to see the radial spec?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1278		Male Speaker:	Yeah.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1279		Major Nasypany:	Boston Center? Boston Center?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1280		Male Speaker:	It doesn't fit the profile. It doesn't fit the profile. Whiskey 105 -	PRTA	TIE	PRTA
1281		Male Speaker:	No.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1282		Male Speaker:	Is it that one right now?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1283	[02:15]	Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1284		Male Speaker:	Yes, this is Samantha Thompson with the 138 <sup>th</sup> Fighter Wing and I'm calling to let you know that the take off time of our alert set out of Michigan. He just wanted you to know that.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1285		Female Speaker:	I'm sorry, ma'am. I can't hear you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1286		Male Speaker:	I said that the take off time is 10:23.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1287		Sergeant Perry:	10:23?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1288 1289		Samantha Thompson:	Yeah.  Is that Zulu time?	TIE IIG	TIE IIG	TIE IIG
1290		Sergeant Perry: Samantha Thompson:	I'm not sure. 14:23.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1291		Sergeant Perry:	14:23? What type of aircraft?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1292		Samantha Thompson:	A 16.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1293		Sergeant Perry:	Where are they heading?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1294 1295		Samantha Thompson: Sergeant Perry:	It's circling over Detroit and Chicago.  Yep. Bye.	TIE MISC	TIE MISC	TIE MISC

1296	Samantha Thompson:	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1297	Sergeant Perry:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
12),	Samantha	Shay!	1,1150	1,115 C	171150
1298	Thompson:	You got a mode 3?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1299	Sergeant Perry:	Weapons, Sergeant Powell.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1300	Samantha Thompson:	Alpena just called. They have 311 airborne at 14:23. It's an F-16 and it's gonna be operating in the Detroit and Chicago area.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1301	Sergeant Perry:	Saber what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1302	Female Speaker:	Saber 111. I don't know how many aircraft. Airborne at 14:23 Z.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1303	Sergeant Powell:	14:23?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1304	Sergeant Perry:	That's what she said, yeah.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1305	Sergeant Powell:	Okay. Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1306	Sergeant Perry:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1307	Sergeant Powell:	Hi, this is Lt. Col. Christian at CONAR.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Is there a phone that I can talk securely to security forces people on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1308	Sergeant Perry:	I can patch you out to -	NC	US	NC
		Hold on, let me see if -	NC	TSOG	NC
1309	Sergeant Powell:	Can you just give me their phone number and I'll call that then?	DTA(RTA)	TSOG	TSOG
1310	Sergeant Perry:	Okay. 6830.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1311	Lt. Col. Christian:	6830. Thank you.	MISC	TIE	MISC
1312	Sergeant Perry:	Okay, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1313		Lt. Col. Christian:	Not right now. 011 is out there right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I know who this one is but I don't know who the second military is.	ISA	TKS	ISA
			What's his track number like?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1314		Sergeant Perry:	How long?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1315		Lt. Col. Christian:	Do we have any information as to where that 57 and the hot metal -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1316		Sergeant Perry:	The New York guys are surveying helicopters and -	TIE	TKS	TKS
1317		Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1318		Male Speaker:	Hey, this is Sergeant Bernowski here at Langley.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1319		Female Speaker:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1320		Male Speaker:	Can you tell us what frequency you need us to be on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1321		Sergeant Perry:	Yes, ma'am. I'll patch you through to the weapons guys.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
			Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
1322		Sergeant Bernowski:	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1323		Sergeant Perry:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry. Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1324		Sergeant Bernowski:	Mike?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1325		Sergeant Perry:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1326		Sergeant Bernowski:	Yeah, we're trying to get a hold of the weapons shop.	ISA	ISA	ISA
1327	[02:20]	Sergeant Perry:	Who's this?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1328		Operator:	This is the operator.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		We got a call that somebody called weapons and they put them on hold and			
		then they got forwarded over here.	IIS	TKS	IIS
1329	Sergeant Perry:	I tried to patch them to 631.	TIE	US	TIE
		Let me try it again.	TIE	TSOG	TIE
1330	Operator:	Okay. Ma'am, are you still here? Hello, ma'am?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1331	Sergeant Perry:	Is it Langley?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1332	Operator:	Ma'am? Ma'am?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1333	Sergeant Perry:	I'll patch them back up. I'm trying to patch you up there again, okay?  Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	TIE MISC	TSOG US	TIE MISC
1334	Operator:	Hey this is Sergeant Bernowski here again.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1335	Sergeant Perry:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1336	Operator:	Can you patch me to your weapons unit?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1337	Sergeant Perry:	I'm attempting to.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1338 1339	Sergeant Bernowski: Sergeant Perry:	Okay. Hold on.	MISC MISC	MISC MISC	MISC MISC
1340	Sergeant Bernowski:	We got Atlantic City on the line wanting to know - dispatch -	TIE	TKS	TIE
1341	Sergeant Perry:	Open line. Northeast, can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1342	Sergeant Bernowski:	Yes, this is Sergeant Bernowski here at Langley. We were trying to find out -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1343	Sergeant Perry:	They need a frequency for the aircraft and I can't get them up for it. I tried to patch them up.	TIE	TKS	TIE
1344	Male Speaker:	Standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC

		Northeast Air Defense Sector, this is			
1345	Sergeant Perry:	Sergeant McCain, can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
	Sergeant				
1346	Bernowski:	Hi, this is Captain Ainsly.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		How are you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1347	Sergeant Perry:	I'm busy.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		How are you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1348	Male Speaker:	I'm looking for a good number to talk to Huntress on.	TIE	IIG	IIG
		We tried 4.2 and couldn't get through.	ISA	ISA	ISA
1349	Sergeant McCain:	You can call 6313.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Let me forward you to 6313 and they should be able to give you a frequency.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1350	Captain Ainsly:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1351	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1352	Captain Ainsly:	Yes, I'm still here.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1353	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Standby. Okay, ma'am. That line is busy.	MISC TIE	US TIE	MISC TIE
1354	Captain Ainsly:	We're about to launch some aircraft.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1334	Capiain Ainsiy.	I need a good frequency.	DTA(RTA)	IIG	IIG
		Theed a good frequency.	DIA(KIA)	IIO	IIO
1355	Sergeant McCain:	Right. Standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1356	Captain Ainsly:	It's gonna be a first call sign. Two are airborne and we're gonna launch two more.	TKS	TKS	TKS

			Okay. Our weapons section is asking for			
1357		Sergeant McCain:	a call sign on those -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1358		Captain Ainsly:	First 01.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1359		Sergeant McCain:	First 01?	MISC	US	MISC
			Okay. First 01 and I apologize.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1360		Captain Ainsly:	How do we know that they went and did that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1361		Sergeant McCain:	What are we talking about?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1362		Captain Ainsly:	Continental or whatever?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1302		Capiain Hinsiy.	Continental of whatever:	no	no	no
1363		Sergeant McCain:	Oh. Where did they take off from?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1364	[02:25]	Female Speaker:	We don't know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1365		Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1366		Female Speaker:	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1367		Sergeant McCain:	Ma'am, we're still working that.	TIE	ISA	ISA
			Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			372.9, 372.9.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1368		Female Speaker:	372.9?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1369		Sergeant McCain:	That's correct.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1370		Captain Ainsly:	Okay. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1371		Sergeant McCain:	You bet.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1372		Captain Ainsly:	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1373	Sergeant McCain:	This is Sergeant McCain, Northeast Air Defense Sector. I was listening in on the other line.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Thanks for showing up. Sorry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I show you secret also. Brian Daniels, okay?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1374	Captain Ainsly:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		How can I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1375	Sergeant McCain:	I need to talk to a weapons director or somebody like that regarding tasking.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1376	Captain Ainsly:	Okay. Let me see what I can do for you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1377	Sergeant McCain:	Thank you very much.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1378	Sergeant Perry:	Hold on,	MISC	US	MISC
		6313 if you get disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Sir? Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		The line is busy right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1379	Male Speaker:	Okay. Do you want me to hold on?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1380	Sergeant Perry:	Call back at 6313 in a couple of minutes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1381	Male Speaker:	I've been trying that. I can't get through.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Is that the only one your on?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1382	Sergeant Perry:	That's the only one they've got.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1383	Male Speaker:	You want me to keep calling back then?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1384	Sergeant Perry:	Yeah. Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1385	Male Speaker:	Okay, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1386	Sergeant Perry:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1387	Male Speaker:	Go ahead, sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1388	Sergeant Perry:	Yeah, this is Lt. Col. Craig.	MISC	MISC	MISC

		I was unable to get through on 6403 for the last hour.	TIE	TKS	TIE
		Do you have another number or a number for the DO?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		This is about - I need to talk about what you need us to do so that we can figure out if we need other people.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
		We're normally not manned here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1389	Male Speaker:	Sir, can you standby a just a moment?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		We had battle staff in here anyway and I want to talk to them and see if they have a point for you.	TIE	TSOG	TSOG
1390	Sergeant Perry:	Hey, you got a flight out of Richmond at 22 out of Richmond, Virginia so when they pop up they're friendly. Just letting you know.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1391	MCC:	Out of Richmond?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1392	Lt. Col. Craig:	Out of Richmond, Virginia. You should see them airborne now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1393	Female Speaker:	Do they have a code yet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1394	Sergeant McCain:	I haven't got a code on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Continental. How long have you been in here?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1395	Male Speaker:	Half hour or 45 minutes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1396	Sergeant McCain:	You probably need to - No one needs to spend more than 45 minutes to an hour at a time in here anymore.	MISC	MISC	MISC

Everybody needs to blow off steam and			
relax a little bit so if you want to take a break then go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
I'll get Sam up here and work you guys in teams of two.	MISC	MISC	MISC
I am just trying to keep everybody alert and nerves frazzled so that we can do the job.	MISC	MISC	MISC
Lyle?	MISC	MISC	MISC
Let's work out a plan of hour on hour off. Me and you go and then Harry and Bianchi will be the other pair. Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
We can do it right now at 12:30. Do it right now at 12:30 because I just sat down so if you want to take it then we'll have those other two come in and take it at 1:30.	MISC	MISC	MISC
Let Bianchi know.	MISC	MISC	MISC
Come back in about 1:30.	MISC	MISC	MISC
That way we keep everybody fresh. That's what I'm worried about more than anything.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			We're not doing anything for night shift. As far as I know we're here all the time until - We actually need 3 more other than him. Okay. We need two more besides that. We still got Nora, Juanita Sheppard. He's here. He's working with surveillance. He's working with surveillance.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			If you get Nora and Juanita to come in along with Mike Mateland and John Detro, they'll make up for it and everyone can work.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			I can't hear you. I can't hear you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1397		Male Speaker:	Did you hear that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1371		mene specimen.	Did you near that:	no	10	<u> </u>
1398		Sergeant McCain:	No, I didn't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
			Northeast Air Defense sector, this is Sergeant McCain.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1399		Male Speaker:	Yes, this is Lt. Col. Craig calling again looking for the MCC or the DO.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1400	[02:30]	Sergeant McCain:	Where the hell is Josie Bon?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Give me a track number on that bomb - that guy going by Cleveland.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(COA)	DTA(RTA)
			He was just made friendly. He was just made friendly.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1401		Male Speaker:	No, he was made friendly before. We're gonna make him -	TIE	TKS	TIE

1402		Sergeant McCain:	Is that the one that's supposed to be going in to Cleveland?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		0	Okay. Okay, so they don't know if that's - Do we know who that aircraft is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			I'm just trying to keep us sane with everything that's going on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			What I really want to know is where the intel community was during all of this?	IIG	MISC	MISC
			I realize it's a tough job and you got to -	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Gary, update me on the two aircraft from Canada.	IIG	IIG	IIG
			One of them is down? Is that right?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1403		Lt. Col. Craig:	I'm sorry?	MISC	IIG	MISC
1404		Sergeant McCain:	Update me with the two aircraft out of Canada.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
			One of them is down?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1405		Male Speaker:	One was turned back to Paris. This one here is -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1406		Sergeant McCain:	All right. That's what I need to know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Just you and - I'm sorry. I think Cruz pretty much called in.	TIE	MISC	MISC
			Who told you that? Who told you that? Major Evans?	IIG	MISC	IIG
			Have you had a chance to get out of here for a while?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1407		Male Speaker:	No, not yet.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1408	[02:35]	Sergeant McCain:	Why don't you go ahead?	MISC	MISC	MISC

		He's not had a chance to get out of here			
		yet so -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1409	Male Speaker:	Yeah, sure. Yeah, go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1410	Sergeant McCain:	I have a speaking code also if you want it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1411	Major Evans:	Yes.	MISC	TIE	TIE
1412	Sergeant McCain:	When is he airborne?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1413	Female Speaker:	Well, he's not airborne yet. He will be.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1414	Male Speaker:	For what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1415	Female Speaker:	To return to base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I understand but everything's been			
1416	Male Speaker:	grounded for the most part.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1417	Male Speaker:	Unless you're on a mission.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1418	Female Speaker:	He's got approval - He's got approval.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1419	Male Speaker:	Through who?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1420	Male Speaker:	Through the CO of this base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1421	Female Speaker:	Okay. Can the CO of your base call the CO of our base?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1422	Male Speaker:	She's breaking up.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1423	Male Speaker:	Unless he is in a misunderstanding of what's going on, we need to stay grounded.	TKS	TKS	TKS
		What you guys should do is have your CO call our CO.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1424	Male Speaker:	6300 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1425	Female Speaker:	Are you copying that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1426	Male Speaker:	That would be 6300.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1427	Female Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1428		Male Speaker:	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1.420		M I G I	Unless they are in a search and rescue mode they need to remain grounded	TIVO	TIVO	TIVO
1429		Male Speaker:	unless otherwise approved.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1430		Female Speaker:	Okay. This is Andrews?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1431		Male Speaker:	Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1432		Female Speaker:	Okay. Don't hang up. Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1433		Male Speaker:	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1434		Male Speaker:	Okay. I told them that they can't take off.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I have a question for you. We have a possibility of having a couple of F-18s to	TKS	TKS	TUC
1.405		16 1 6 1	be used as an asset for CAP.			TKS
1435		Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1436		Male Speaker:	Basically, for your protection.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1437		Male Speaker:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1438	[02:40]	Male Speaker:	How do you want to go about coordinating them if you guys need them?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1439		Male Speaker:	Okay. This is what you have to do. You have to call that number, 6300.	TSOG	TIE	TSOG
1440		Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1441		Female Speaker:	He's approving all assets. Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
1442		Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1443		Female Speaker:	He will let you know who can be airborne and who can't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1444		Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1445		Female Speaker:	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1446		Male Speaker:	Yep.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1447		Female Speaker:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1448		Male Speaker:	Bye.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1449	Female Speaker:	Way to go, Mo.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1450	Male Speaker:	6301 could do it. 6301 going to 72.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1451	Female Speaker:	Go ahead.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		He can't hear you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1452	Male Speaker:	Can you have him call me at -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1453	Sergeant McCain:	Hold on.	MISC	US	MISC
		He's right here. I'll get him on the line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1454	Male Speaker:	Hello, this is Commander Gates.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		May I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1455	Sergeant McCain:	Hello, this is the CCO of CONAR.	MISC	US	MISC
		Are you the fighter officer?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1456	Male Speaker:	I'm one of them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1457	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Can we go secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
	Commander				
1458	Gates:	We don't have secure on this yet do we?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Yeah, we got 3303. I don't know how we			
		got on this line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Stand by.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1459	Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1460	Commander Gates:	Northeast Air Defense Sector, Sergeant McCain,	MISC	MISC	MISC
		how can I help you?	IIG	MISC	MISC
1461	Male Speaker:	Colonel Goldstein.	MISC	US	MISC
		I was just wondering if I could go secure with someone from fighter duty?	IIG	IIG	IIG

		•			
	Commander				
1462	Gates:	6305, Sir. Have you tried that number?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1463	Male Speaker:	No, I have not.	TIE	ISA	TIE
1464	Sergeant McCain:	That's the number for a fighter officer.	TIE	TIE	TIE
	Colonel				
1465	Goldstein:	Okay. Got it. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1466	Sergeant McCain:	You bet.	MISC	MISC	MISC
	Colonel				
1467	Goldstein:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1468	Sergeant McCain:	Hi, this is Bob Deluce at Chicago Center.	MISC	US	MISC
		Are you the sector that's going to be			
		taking over the airspace over Chicago			
		Center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
	Colonel				
1469	Goldstein:	Chicago Center?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Hold on. Let me check.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1470	Sergeant McCain:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1471	Sergeant Bianchi:	We haven't been notified here yet.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Okay. Somebody's gonna be taking it			
1472	Bob Deluce:	over and I'm just trying to find out who.	IIG	TKS	IIG
1473	Sergeant Bianchi:	We've got an E3 heading up your way.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			Well, we got some aircraft that want to reposition and there's a medivac unit that			
1474		Bob Deluce:	needs to test some of their airplanes this afternoon if they need to use them.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			I need to know who we need to get approval from for them.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1475		Sergeant Bianchi:	I tell you what. I can put you up to our fighter officer?	TSOG	TIE	TIE
1476		Bob Deluce:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1477		Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay? Hold on and I will try to transfer you to the number there -	MISC	US	MISC
			The same as this number but the last four digits are 6800. I'll try to transfer you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1478		Bob Deluce:	Thank you very much.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1479		Sergeant Bianchi:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1480		Bob Deluce:	Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1481		Sergeant Bianchi:	Yes?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1482		Bob Deluce:	Hello, this is Lt. Colonel Bear calling from the 1 <sup>st</sup> Fighter Wing.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			How are you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1483		Sergeant Bianchi:	Not too bad, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1484		Lt. Colonel Bear:	Can I talk to your duty officer or someone like that, please?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1485		Sergeant Bianchi:	Our fighter officer is at extension 6300 or 6305, either one.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1486	[02:45]	Lt. Colonel Bear:	6300 or 6305?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1487	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yes, Sir.	MISC	TIE	MISC
1488	Lt. Colonel Bear:	And there is no one on this line right now that I can talk to like that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1489	Sergeant Bianchi:	Not for a fighter officer. We have our Mission Crew Commander, that's all.	ISA	TIE	TIE
		Do you want to talk to them?	IIG	TSOG	TSOG
1490	Lt. Colonel Bear:	Yeah, that would be fine.	MISC	TIE	MISC
1491	Sergeant Bianchi:	Ma'am, you need to pick up on line one.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1492	Lt. Colonel Bear:	Major Deskins.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1493	Sergeant Bianchi:	Hi, this is Lt. Colonel Bear calling from the - We're just trying to get an idea -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1494	Lt. Colonel Bear:	We heard conversation on both lines.	TIE	US	TIE
		You'll have to call back.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Fuck, Sam, I don't remember.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I've taken so many phone calls today.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		He'll call back if it's important.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		There he is.	TIE	US	TIE
1495	Sergeant Bianchi:	There he is.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1496	Major Deskins:	He wants to go secure but we can't. I can't go secure. I don't have it available right now to go secure.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1497	Lt. Colonel Bear:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1498	Sergeant McCain:	Yeah, this is Sergeant Gaber from the 178 <sup>th</sup> Op. I'd like to go secure.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1499	Male Speaker:	Hold on a second.	MISC	US	MISC
		Are you still on the line?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1500	Sergeant McCain:	I'm still on the line.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1501	Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1502	Sergeant Gaber:	Northeast Air Defense Sector, this is Sergeant McCain, may I help you?	MISC MISC	MISC MISC	MISC MISC
1503	Sergeant Bianchi:	Hey listen, I got an aircraft that's flying from San Angelo in to Boston FCI Counter Terrorist Team.	TKS	TKS	TKS
		We need to get a BPR so the plane can land in Boston.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1504	Sergeant Gaber:	Counter terrorist team? And you need a what?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1505	Sergeant Bianchi:	A BBR so that the airplane can land in Boston.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1506	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. I need you to stay on the line for just a minute. Okay, Sir?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I need you to stay on the line just a few more minutes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		We're up channeling all that information you just asked me and hopeful we'll get you the permission or at least point you in the right direction of who you need to contact.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1507	Male Speaker:	Outstanding.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1508 1509	Sergeant McCain: Male Speaker:	I need you to hold this line just a few more minutes.  Go for it. Go for it.	MISC MISC	MISC MISC	MISC MISC
1510	Sergeant McCain:	Okay, Sir? I'm gonna forward you to 6305, just in case you get cut off.	TIE	TIE	TIE

1511		Male Speaker:	6305? What's that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			6305. You're gonna be speaking to Lt.			
1512		Sergeant McCain:	Colonel Daniels. He's our fighter officer.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1513		Male Speaker:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1514		Sergeant McCain:	Okay?	MISC	US	MISC
1515		Male Speaker:	Okay. Thank you.	MISC	US	MISC
1516		Sergeant McCain:	Standby.	MISC	US	MISC
1517		Male Speaker:	Probably that guy.	MISC	US	MISC
1510				Mag	TTG.	Maga
1518		Sergeant McCain:	Americans are stupid.	MISC	US	MISC
1519		Male Speaker:	Hi, this is Reggie Davis at CONAR.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			Are you guys up on the CONAR CO jet?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1520		Sergeant McCain:	Say again?	IIG	US	IIG
			We're in a regular CONAR chat window.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1521		Male Speaker:	Who's your FIDO right now? Iceman?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1522	[02:50]	Male Speaker:	Yes.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1523		Reggie Davis:	Can you forward me up to him or give me his number?	DTA(RTA)	IIG	IIG
1524		Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay. Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
			6300 or 6305. I'll patch up to one of them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1525		Reggie Davis:	Okay. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1526		Sergeant Bianchi:	Busy. His line is busy.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			6300?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			It's in my - That one rings up in the washroom. Nope, no such luck.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1527		Reggie Davis:	We're gonna launch two 860s in the next 15 minutes.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			We were advised to provide you with mode 2, mode 4, squawk and call signs.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1528		Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay. Do you need to go secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1529		Reggie Davis:	No, because the mode 4 is just gonna be today.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1530		Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay. Your call sign, Sir?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1531		Male Speaker:	Air Force Rescue 67 Flight.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			It's a flight of two 860 helicopters. 02 squawks will be 60. Mode 4 is Day 11 A and B. That will do it.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			You will probably hear from them in about 30 minutes I guess.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1532		Sergeant Perry:	Okay, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1533		Male Speaker:	What was your name again?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1534	[02:55]	Sergeant Perry:	Sergeant Perry.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1535		Male Speaker:	Okay. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1536		Sergeant Perry:	Thank you, sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1537		Male Speaker:	We're gonna shut down everything and make sure we know who is what out here.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1538 1539		Sergeant Perry:  Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.  Hey, this is Major Solinas from 1 <sup>st</sup> Air Force.	MISC MISC	MISC MISC	MISC MISC

1540	Sergeant Perry:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1541	Male Speaker:	I am trying to get in touch with Lt. Colonel. Daniels.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1542	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yeah, you're still looking for that BBR?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1543	Major Solinas:	Yeah, I called 6305 and nobody answers the phone.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1544	Sergeant Bianchi:	Try - We were told to have you call Hampton direct and they'll deal with you.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1545	Major Solinas:	Give me the number.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1546	Sergeant Bianchi:	Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1547	Major Solinas:	Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1548	Sergeant Bianchi:	All right. I got someone checking to see if we even have one.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		We don't deal with them on a day to day basis.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1549	Major Solinas:	I appreciate that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1550	Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay. We don't have a phone number for them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1551	Major Solinas:	Do you have an area code that's roughly in the same area?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		I can call the 555 information.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1552	Sergeant Bianchi:	Area code?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		I don't think anyone's working in there.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Boy, let me see.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1553	Major Solinas:	Don't worry. I'll find another way.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1554	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yeah. We were told to have you call them.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Maybe you have a DSN phone listing there anywhere?	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
		Do you have a world wide directory type thing?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1555	Major Solinas:	No, I don't.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1556	Sergeant Bianchi:	Oh, shit.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I was looking for them here. I can't - I can't find anything.	IIS	IIS	IIS
		Let me see. Langley, Andrews - That's the only place I don't have.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1557	Major Solinas:	Is it an Air Force Base?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1558	Sergeant Bianchi:	It's the one just north of Boston. That's all I know.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1559	Major Solinas:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1560	Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1561	Major Solinas:	I'll give them a call.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1562	Sergeant Bianchi:	Sorry about that.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1563	Major Solinas:	No problem.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1564	Sergeant Bianchi:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1565	Major Solinas:	Yes, Sir. This is Sergeant Baker calling from Langley Air Force Base.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1566	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yeah.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1567	M : C !:	Just letting you know that quit 25	THE	TIE	THE
1567	Major Solinas:	downtime is 17:19.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1500	g	17.10 0: 1.1:0	H.C.	W.C.	TIG.
1568	Sergeant Bianchi:	17:19. Single ship?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1569	Sergeant Baker:	Ship of two waiting on one more.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1570	Sergeant Bianchi:	You're waiting on 26?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1571	Sergeant Baker:	Right.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1572	Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1573	Sergeant Baker:	Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1574	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yep. No problem.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1575	Sergeant Baker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
	8	Sergeant Perry, this is Lt. Colonel Bear			
1576	Sergeant Bianchi:	calling from the fighter wing.	MISC	MISC	MISC
	201800000000000000000000000000000000000	I talked to your duty officer about 30		3.23%	3.32.6
		minutes ago.	ISA	ISA	ISA
			1511	1871	1511
		Do you have an idea of the schedule of			
		events as far as cap measurement and those things are gonna happen?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		0 0 11	по	no	no no
1577	Sergeant Baker:	No idea, Sir, but I could put you through to someone who may know.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
13//	Sergeum Baker:	to someone who may know.	1300	1300	1300
1570	C D: 1:	Olson. Thoules	MICC	MICC	MICC
1578	Sergeant Bianchi:	Okay. Thanks.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Let me get you through to the person that			
1.550		has the knowledge. Hold on. Let me put			
1579	Sergeant Perry:	you up to 6300, Sir. Standby.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1580	Lt. Colonel Bear:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			Yes, this is Lt. Colonel Hayes from			
1581		Sergeant Perry:	Atlantic City.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1582		Lt. Colonel Bear:	Yes, sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1583	[03:00]	Sergeant Perry:	We've got two airborne for almost 4 hours.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			We're wondering if we could try to work a swap out with the -	IIG	IIG	IIG
1584		Sergeant Perry:	Let me put you through to the weapons guys. Standby.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			6313 if you get disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1585		Lt. Colonel Hayes:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1586		Sergeant Perry:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	TIE	MISC	MISC
1587		Lt. Colonel Hayes:	This is Sergeant Christopher with the Indiana National Guard.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Can you please standby for Colonel Peters to go secure?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1588		Sergeant Perry:	Colonel Peters.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1589		Lt. Colonel Hayes:	Yes, Sir. Standby. WE need to switch to secure frequency. Okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Here we go. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1590		Sergeant Perry:	Hi, Lt. Tracy here from the Maryland State Police Aviation.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			I'm trying to work through a problem so I can get the Medivac back in service down here.	IIS	IIS	IIS
			We generally operate in the Baltimore airspace and the Washington airspace.	TIE	TIE	TIE

			I got approval for operations in the Baltimore airspace. Washington is working on it.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			When I get up to Western Maryland and Frederick, Maryland, my guys are like -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1591		Sergeant Christopher:	Let me give you to our MCC.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1592		Colonel Peters:	Sure.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1593		Sergeant Perry:	MCC here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1594		Lt. Tracy:	Hi, Lt. Tracy here from Maryland State Police.	TIE	US	TIE
			We're calling about medivac service up in our state.	TIE	US	TIE
			We generally deal with Baltimore airspace and Washington airspace.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			At this point, I can't operate in Washington.	ISA	ISA	ISA
1595		Sergeant Perry:	When your aircraft take off -	MISC	MISC	MISC
1596		Lt. Tracy:	6313	IIG	IIG	IIG
1597		MCC:	6313, yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1598		Lt. Tracy:	What are you looking for?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1599		MCC:	Open line. Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1600		Male Speaker:	Ramp one, ramp two. Airborne at 18:43. Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1601		Male Speaker:	18:43. Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1602		Male Speaker:	Two birds airborne, Grant one and two.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1603	[03:05]	Sergeant Perry:	Two?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1604		Male Speaker:	That's what he said.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		For the duration of the - This exercise has			
1605	Sergeant Perry:	been cancelled.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1000	zergeenu i erryt	What can I say?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		This exercise has been cancelled for the duration of the crisis. Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1606	Male Speaker:	Does ID know that anybody from outside should be calling this place at this point?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1607	Male Speaker:	I'll give you the number.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1608	Male Speaker:	Are they up?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1609	Male Speaker:	Got it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1610	Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1611	Male Speaker:	How are you doing?	MISC	MISC	MISC
		This is Chief Cooper from	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Who am I speaking with?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1612	Male Speaker:	Sergeant Perry.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1613	Male Speaker:	Sergeant Perry, how are you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1614	Sergeant Perry:	Very good, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1615	Chief Cooper:	We have some birds that need to get out to a carrier so that that asset can start moving strategically the way it's supposed to start moving in the grand scheme of things.	TKS	TKS	TKS
		What's the hold up on - Someone said that those guys weren't allowed to launch out of Louisiana.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1616	Sergeant Perry:	Let me find out about that for you, Keith.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1617	Chief Cooper:	Okay. I'm talking to NORAD.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1618	Sergeant Perry:	Okay. Okay. Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC

		1			1	
			Okay. Do they have their flight plans filed and everything like they're supposed to?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			We've got some instructions for you here, Chief.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			Give me a second.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1619	[03:10]	Chief Cooper:	Okay. I'm talking to NORAD on the phone right now.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1620		Sergeant Perry:	Okay. Your instruction is to call the initial command center at are code 703-904-4423.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1621		Chief Cooper:	Do you know who Colonel Marr is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1622		Sergeant Perry:	Yes, he's our commander.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1623		Chief Cooper:	All right. We have permission from Colonel Marr -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1624		Sergeant Perry:	Right. I found that out that its -	NC	NC	NC
1625		Chief Cooper:	- these five planes. There's gonna be two per hour.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1626		Sergeant Perry:	How many aircraft and can you give me codes?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1627		Chief Cooper:	They're gonna be on codes 2010 through 2030.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1628		Sergeant Perry:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1629		Chief Cooper:	That's the blocks of codes. They're getting to launch from Louisiana now. Colonel Marr knows about it	TKS	TKS	TKS
			and just tell whoever you need to tell that this is happening.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1630		Sergeant Perry:	Thank you for the call.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1631		Chief Cooper:	All right.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1632		Sergeant Perry:	Hey, ID?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1633		Chief Cooper:	Yeah?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1634		Sergeant Perry:	I have a series of Navy aircraft on block 2010 through 2030 coming out of Louisiana.	TKS	TKS	TKS
			Permission from Colonel Marr? Was it given?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			They're going.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1635		Chief Cooper:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1636		Sergeant Perry:	What kind of Navy aircraft? Carriers.	IIG	IIG	IIG
1637		Female Speaker:	FAA - 250?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1638		Sergeant Perry:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1639		Female Speaker:	Who are you guys checking out?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1640		Sergeant Perry:	I'm sorry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1641		Male Speaker:	Right here. I don't know.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1642		Female Speaker:	Are they friendly?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1643	[03:15]	Male Speaker:	Yeah -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1644		Female Speaker:	Any alert on those two airliners?	IIG	IIG	IIG
			Two airliners out of Chicago are missing?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1645		Male Speaker:	- two hours ago.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1646		Male Speaker:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1647		Male Speaker:	Yeah, this is Lt. Col. Anderson with Langley.	TIE	MISC	MISC
			Do you copy?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1648		Male Speaker:	Hello, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1649		Male Speaker:	Hold on, Sir. I'll patch you up to someone that can take care of that.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1650		Sergeant Perry:	Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC

	Lt. Colonel	Okay. I believe it's 6300 if you get			
1651	Anderson:	disconnected.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Hold on.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1652	Sergeant Perry:	Northeast, Sergeant Perry.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1653	Lt. Colonel Anderson:	Sergeant Perry, Lt. Colonel Anderson at Langley.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		I'm wondering if there's any kind of game plan yet on whether or not you're gonna need more jets on status or in the air from Langley.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1654	Sergeant Perry:	Yes, Sir.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1655	Lt. Colonel Anderson:	No one is answering there at 6300.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Is there anyone in that mission plan that I can be able to talk to?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1656	Sergeant Perry:	Standby, Sir.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1657	Sergeant Perry:	Northeast, Sergeant Bianchi. Hello?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1658	Lt. Colonel Anderson:	I'm sorry. I was trying to call Fort Worth. Thanks.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1659	Sergeant Perry:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1660	Lt. Colonel Anderson:	Hey it's Boston Center.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1661	Sergeant Perry:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1662	Sergeant Bianchi:	Yeah I got a guy from Rhode Island.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Can you tell me who I need to call?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		What line?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1663	Female Speaker:	What code?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1664	Sergeant Bianchi:	Do you know what BPA is?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		Actually that's a location on Long Island. This guy is on a 51, 40, 47 miles north of BPA at 1,500 feet.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1665	Boston Center:	Standby.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		Are all military aircraft with Black Hawk Air Force?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1666	Sergeant Bianchi:	We're just going off the line real quick. I'll be right back.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1667	Boston Center:	Yeah, we ID it and it's a low wing 107.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1668	Sergeant Bianchi:	Actually, no. This is north at Boston.  Landed near Boston and they said it was -	TKS	TKS	TKS
1669	Boston Center:	Northeast Air Defense Sector, this is Sergeant McCain, may I help you?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1670	Sergeant Bianchi:	Hi, this is Major Cherry at the SOA Command Center.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		I need to coordinate some life support flights and whatnot to - I'm told that we need to do it through each individual air defense sector.	IIS	US	IIS
		Is that correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1671	Boston Center:	Are you doing it - Is this military or civilian?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1672	Male Speaker:	Civilian.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1673	Boston Center:	Okay. I'm gonna give you a number to call and they will help you out. It's commercial number area code 703-904-4423.	TKS	TKS	TKS

1674		Sergeant McCain:	Okay. That's us.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		V	We need to get these released and we want to make sure the military knows about it so that they can be released.	IIS	IIS	IIS
			We were told by NORAD that the individual defense sectors need to get the information on the aircraft released.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1675		Major Cherry:	Can I give you some call signs?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1676		Sergeant McCain:	Sure. Tell me when you're ready to copy or what I can do is I can fax them to you -	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1677		Major Cherry:	I would rather you tell me over the phone and then fax them later.	TSOG	TSOG	TSOG
1678		Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1679	[03:20]	Major Cherry:	Go ahead, ma'am.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1680		Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Call sign is November 127 Kilo Charlie departing out of Alpha Foxtrot Whisky. Destination is Capa Delta Kilo.	TKS	TKS	TKS
1681		Major Cherry:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1682		Sergeant McCain:	And the agency is CDC and it's doctors.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1683		Major Cherry:	Okay.	MISC	MISC	MISC

1684	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. The next call sign is November 1218 Charlie departing out of Kennison going to same destination and its CDC and its doctors. The next call sign is November 802 Alpha Bravo departing out of Kennison, destination is Capa Delta Kilo and same thing CDC and doctors. The next one is November 325, departure Delta Foxtrot and its pharmaceuticals but we don't have the destination.	TKS	TKS	TKS
		Do you need that?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1685	Major Cherry:	It would help. Yeah.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1686	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. We'll standby on that one.  Do you want the rest of these?	MISC IIG	MISC IIG	MISC IIG
1687	Major Cherry:	How many do you have total, ma'am?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1007	Major Cherry.	Trow many do you have total, ma am:	no	IIO .	IIO .
1688	Sergeant McCain:	I have about 20 in front of me.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1689	Major Cherry:	Go ahead and fax it to me.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
		The area code is 315 -	TIE	TIE	TIE
1690	Sergeant McCain:	This is a commercial fax?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1691	Major Cherry:	Yes.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1692 1693	Sergeant McCain: Major Cherry:	315 - 334-6772.	TIE TIE	TIE TIE	TIE TIE
1694	Sergeant McCain:	6772?	IIG	IIG	IIG

1.50.5		That's correct. That's our fax and you	****	***	****
1695	Major Cherry:	need permission to fly these guys;	IIS	IIS	IIS
		is that correct?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1696	Sergeant McCain:	Yes	TIE	TIE	TIE
		and how do we know when they're approved to go?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1697	Major Cherry:	Hold this line and I will get you permission here in just a few minutes	TIE	TIE	TIE
1698	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. I'll hold the line and I'll go ahead and put these on the fax machine.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Who should I address it to it?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1699	Major Cherry:	Sergeant McCain. Major Nasypany?	IIG	IIG	IIG
		I got this lady from the - they're calling us back now with a bunch of these aircraft that want to take off that have doctors and pharmaceuticals on it. They need permission to take off.	IIS	IIS	IIS
		Who do we get that through?	IIG	IIG	IIG
1700	Sergeant McCain:	Sergeant Dooley.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1701	Major Cherry:	That phone number is calling me.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		These guys have filed flight plans, okay?	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Now they want permission to take off.	TIE	TIE	TIE
		Yes, they did.	TIE	TIE	TIE

		Now this organization is calling back to us wanting permission for these guys to take off. They're all doctors and pharmaceuticals and medical teams and stuff. This lady here is out of NORAD calling from that commercial number that we were given for commercial flight for them to file flight plans for because we			
		couldn't handle that, right?	IIS	IIS	IIS
		Now these guys have called her, they've files, she's calling us now with permission to call back them and say that they're clear to go.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1702	Sergeant McCain:	Ma'am, are you there? Hello? Hello? Ma'am, are you there? Ma'am, are you there? Hello? Ma'am, are you there?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1703	Major Cherry:	Attention in the area. Attention in the area. This is the MCC tech with a public service announcement.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		If you are having a child care problem due the emergencies in the city limits of Rome, I have a phone number available for you to call. We have some people that are willing to go by and get your kids and take care of them for you until this is over.	MISC	MISC	MISC
		If you have child care problems within the city limits of Rome, please come to the MCC tech and I'll give you a phone number you can call to have your kids taken care of.	MISC	MISC	MISC

			Thank you.	MISC	MISC	MISC
1704		Sergeant McCain:	Ma'am, are you still there? Ma'am? Are you on the line? 366-2497. Okay?	MISC	MISC	MISC
			You got Debbie Spiker is the one that's coordinating this all. They'll take care of it all.	TIE	TIE	TIE
			You need to pick one of them.	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)	DTA(RTA)
1705		Major Nasypany:	I've got a whole bunch of civilian flights right here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1706	[03:25]	Sergeant McCain:	Okay. Great. Here she is right now. I just saw the phone off the hook and picked it up.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1707		Sergeant McCain:	I need to talk to her.	ISA	ISA	ISA
1708		Male Speaker:	He wants to talk to you. He wants to talk to you.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1709		Sergeant McCain:	Sergeant McCain?	MISC	MISC	MISC
1710		Male Speaker:	Yes, ma'am. I got your fax. I got four pages here.	TIE	TIE	TIE
1711		Major Cherry:	Let me see. I faxed you one, two, three, four, five, six.	IIS	IIS	IIS
1712		Sergeant McCain:	Hold on. I got more coming.	MISC	MISC	MISC

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